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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR ENSURING THE QUALITY OF SOFTWARE
DESIGN
by
Yujian Fu
Florida International University, 2007
Miami, Florida
Professor Xudong He, Major Professor
Software development is an extremely complex process, during which human errors
are introduced and result in faulty software systems. It is highly desirable and important
that these errors can be prevented and detected as early as possible. Software architecture
design is a high-level system description, which embodies many system features and prop
erties that are eventually implemented in the final operational system. Therefore, methods
for modeling and analyzing software architecture descriptions can help prevent and reveal
human errors and thus improve software quality. Furthermore, if an analyzed software ar
chitecture description can be used to derive a partial software implementation, especially
when the derivation can be automated, significant benefits can be gained with regard to
both the system quality and productivity.
This dissertation proposes a framework for an integrated analysis on both of the design
and implementation. To ensure the desirable properties of the architecture model, we apply
formal verification by using the model checking technique. To ensure the desirable proper
ties of the implementation, we develop a methodology and the associated tool to translate
an architecture specification into an implementation written in the combination of ArchJava/Java/AspectJ programming languages. The translation is semi-automatic so that many
manual programming errors can be prevented. Furthermore, the translation inserting mon
itoring code into the implementation such that runtime verification can be performed, this
provides additional assurance for the quality of the implementation. Moreover, validations
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for the translations from architecture model to program are provided. Finally, several case
studies are experimented and presented.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation presents an integrated framework for the software quality assurance at
the design level and its automated realization. Methods for proving the correctness the
translation programs are also provided. This framework is part of the overall SAM [198]
software development paradigm, which has been developed at FIU for the past 10 years and
funded by several major NSF grants. In the SAM software development paradigm, a soft
ware system is formally modeled and specified at software architecture design level with
subsequent refinements. The correctness of a formal SAM architecture design is formally
verified. The translation from SAM architecture model to a program language of a for
mal verification tool is developed and the correctness is formally validated. Furthermore,
this research extends existing research results on SAM through automated implementation
of SAM architecture specifications. This prototype implementation provides additional
means for ensuring system properties at implementation level using runtime verification,
and can serve as a basis for production quality implementation. The translation method
from a SAM architecture design consists of several parts: structure translation, behavior
translation, and property mapping.
So this framework is not specific to one model but with general purpose. The formal
verification technique of the software architecture specification is applied and correctness
of translation is well established based on the well defined theory - rewriting theory [144].
A prototype implementation of the runtime checker of the framework on SAM, a soft
ware architecture description language, was developed. Structure and behavior of SAM
model are translated into ArchJava and Java code respectively. System instrumentation
and runtime monitor is implemented using Aspect!. The translation design demonstrates a
systematical mapping from the model to its corresponding implementation. In addition, a
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correctness proof of the translated program in the implementation level is provided. This
chapter describes the difficulties faced by the software engineering field with regard to qual
ity, specifically correctness and the motivation for this work. This chapter concludes with
contributions of this research to the field of software engineering in terms of increasing
quality.
1.1 Assurance of the Correctness of Software Systems
When compared to software engineering’s significance and broad application areas, the
field’s ability to provide correct and reliable products seems greatly lacking. This defi
ciency has become a great danger in today’s world. Specifically, safety critical software
systems such as airplane controllers or nuclear reactor controllers can devastate human
lives and properties when they fail to behave correctly. There have been many disasters
due to the incorrect execution of software systems [127], including the tragic accident of
the Ariance 5 flight 501 [13]. The report “Information Technology Research: Investing in
Our Future” from PITAC (President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee) [16]
pointed out that the software maintaining and testing are under the pressure of change.
In 2003, Tony Hoare proposed the “Grand Challenge” of the program verifier [102], a
project that involved thousands of researchers for the next 15 to 20 years to build a verifying
compiler that
“uses mathematical and logical reasoning to check that programs that it compiles.” [102]
The fundamental problems are how to obtain and document the correctness specifica
tion of a program and how to fully automate the verification/checking of the documented
aspects correctness. While accomplishing this goal now requires effort from “(almost)
the entire research community” including theoretical researchers, compiler writers, tool
builders, software developers and users, these two interrelated problems have been the ma
jor concern of the formal methods research community in the past several decades. This
dissertation discusses the correctness assurance of software, which is one of the fundamen
tal aspects of the “Grand challenge.”
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Currently many methods and techniques have been developed to verify software systems
in both design ( [106,115,139]) and implementation level ( [91,95,125,126]). Among
them model checking, a formal verification technique, is widely used in the design verifi
cation due to its highly automation, runtime analysis [95], a light-weighted formal verifi
cation technique, has been explored in the implementation level. Verification of software
architecture specification is to check the software architecture model (generally formally
specified) against the system properties. At present, various of meaningful architectural
specifications make it feasible to determine the properties of a software system and enable
more thorough and less costly testing. Unfortunately such specifications are rarely used in
industrial. One of the reasons is that there is not a correspondence between a specification
and the software itself. In other words, even if some properties can be verified in the system
model through the endeavored efforts, the implemented code of the model after we shifted
can still be messed up because of the inconsistency between model and implementation. At
the same time, this consistency relationship is hard to be maintained without a systematic
mapping strategy. Also, the properties of the implementation of the corresponding system
model still need to be checked to validate the model at the implementation level. Further
more, often software behavior and flaws are observable only during a program’s execution,
and even then may be invisible except under certain unusual conditions. Programs written
in such circumstances frustrate attempts to create robust systems and are inherently fragile.
Thus, a scientifically sound approach to software development is required to be able
to deal with meaningful and practical verification for consistency of specifications and
implementations.
1.2 Necessity of the Integration of Model Cheeking and Runtime Analysis
For the past twenty years, formal verification methods have enlarged its domain of appli
cation as computing power has increased, so that formal verification can handle more than
just toy examples. Testing has been a standard practice to ensure the correctness quality
of software. However, formal verification and testing have limitations. Formal verification
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methods are performed before programs are put into the real environment. Thus these
heavy-weighted formal methods are mostly concerned as static verification techniques.
They have their own limitations in terms of effectiveness. I explain in the following.
Formal verification requires a formal software specification language. Temporal logic
[171] is a formal specification language that extends propositional and first order logic with
the timing span. With its accurate semantics temporal logic has been widely applied in the
formal verification applications. There are some user-defined logics for its simple syntax
and implementation environment [119]. However, there is a huge gap between a specifi
cation and the software itself. Model checking and theorem proving are two main formal
methods used for the verification of software systems. Because of expert knowledgement,
notations and less automation theorem proving are mainly used for the infinite system veri
fication in that case model checking has less ability. Model checking is a technique building
a finite system and a finite state model of a system and checking whether a given property
holds in that model. Model-checking algorithms offer an exhaustive searching and auto
matic application to completely analyze the system. Counterexamples are provided when
errors are found. However, model-checking may only verify systems expressed through
state-based machines, it is more limited than theorem proving, and it suffers of the state ex
plosion problem. Moreover, model-checking may be difficult to be applied, since it usually
requires skills on formal specification languages.
Furthermore, because of the difficulty of using formalism and the limitation on the size
of the model, formal verification is still not a feasible solution to obtain the correctness
of the execution of whole software. Testing has been the prevalent choice for ensuring
the execution of software. However, testing cannot give complete assurance of correct
execution in the sense that exhaustive testing is infeasible [154]. Therefore, we cannot rely
on only these two methods for obtaining reliability on the correct execution of software.
Compared to the above approaches, runtime verification is designed to ensure the run
time conformance of an execution trace of a system with its formal requirement specifi
cation. Runtime verification takes a program and a formal requirement specification as
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inputs. When a program is running, the execution of the program is checked against the
formal requirement specification at runtime. The purpose of runtime formal analysis is to
bridge the gap left by formal verification and testing. Formal verification attempts to guar
antee that all possible executions of software yield correct results. In comparison, runtime
formal analysis provides the correctness on the current execution of a program. While a
program is running under the supervision of a monitor, we can make sure that so far the
program has behaved correctly. Thus researchers can say that runtime verification is not
complete. Furthermore, runtime verification is done after the program is released while
formal verification has to be done before the product is released. Finally, formal verifi
cation is performed in the development stage so it is considered as verification technique
while runtime analysis is performed after the product is released and conducted while the
program is running so it is a post-development, monitoring technique.
Runtime formal analysis helps detect, identify and correct errors while the program is
running, which is a great aid to the assurance of program correctness. There are many
cases when users cannot detect errors because of the subtlety. For example, the Pentium
floating point unit bug is so subtle that it could not be discovered for a long time. Even
when errors are detected, it is hard to identify the source. For example, when a program
crashes by Segmentation Fault on Unix, let us just guess there is incorrect pointer arithmetic
in the program. However, we do not know the place and computation data where the
Segmentation Fault happens. Furthermore, early detection of an error can lead an effectual
meta-level activity, such as human intervention or automatic recovery action.
Considering the strong complementarity between those two worlds, I believe an inte
gration between model checking and runtime analysis may provide an useful approach to
verify large scale complex software systems.
Moreover, runtime verification at the design level is more significant than that in the
implementation. The error detection is performed at an earlier stage is one of the most
obvious advantage. First, the verification at the design level can check the implementation
is consistent with its model. Although there is a fine model of a software system, when we
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we move to the implementation, various errors may be introduced due to the requirement
of implementation of the program. Thus the runtime verification at the implementation
level can provide more confidence for the developer and designer for the system analyst.
Furthermore, some issues can only be observed in the execution. For instance, duplicate
definition, overflow, file not found, and others, are all program errors exhibits only dur
ing program running. Finally, because of the state explosion of model checking, runtime
verification is preferred to solve the scalability of the system. Although several heavyweighted formal verification methods are widely used in the verification of system model,
runtime verification in the design level is still a very challengeable research area. The next
chapter deals with most of the current research work and focuses on the program in the
implementation level. Thus this is an open area for the runtime verification on the model
of the systems. Even if one can show that the implementation is correct in terms of some
properties, one cannot say the implementation follows the system design and system design
correctness. This area can also bridge the gap between the design and implementation of
the system development process.
1.3

Contribution

This dissertation addresses the following four areas of the integrated verification on SAM
architecture model depicted in the Figure. 1,
1. Model checking at the design level
This dissertation discusses what properties model checking can verified based on
the SAM architecture model. The model checker used in this dissertation is (core)
Maude [47], which is a rewriting logic based high level reflective programming lan
guage with tool support. Because of its efficient rewriting engine and its metalan
guage features, Maude turns out to be an excellent tool to create executable environ
ments for various logics, theorem provers, and even programming languages. In this
context, we identify following contributions. First, software architecture verification
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Figure 1: Three Areas of the Integrated Framework Addressed

and analysis methods in design level is developed, which is a general systematic step
wise approach that summarizes the formal analysis methods for the design model.
Secondly, the instantiation of the method on the model checking tool (Maude) with
several case studies reveal the necessity and flexibility of the method. Statistical data
is collected and analyzed. Finally, the translation from SAM architecture model to
the Maude programming language has been formally validated.
2. Runtime checking at the implementation level
The runtime verification architecture monitors and checks the execution of the tar
get SAM program through a property based monitor extracted from the core Maude.
Maude is used here to generate the finite automaton for a property. The runtime
checker is generated from the finite automaton based on the algorithm proposed by
Rosu [177]. The target SAM program is generated from the behavior model of SAM.
The translation algorithm Is needed to transform the SAM model to the input of run
time checker, a package of XML format file. In this context, we identify following
contributions. First, in the development of prototype tool, SAM Parser, architecture
structure translation is developed and realized using ArchJava. Second, properties
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transformation to finite automata is developed and extracted from Maude output. Fi
nally, the translation is formally validated by establishing a rewriting theory for a
Predicate Transition Net.
3. Translation validations
Two different translations are developed in this dissertation. One is mapping from
SAM model to the Maude programming language, another is mapping from SAM
model to the ArchJava/Java/AspectJ construct. Although we can validate the model
at the implementation level by checking the program against properties, we still need
to ensure the correctness of the translation at the implementation level - the program
is the corresponding image to the model. Although we can validate the model at
the design level by checking properties of the model using some model checker,
we don’t know the program written by the model checker programming language
corresponding to the model after the translation, e.g., the correctness of translation at
the design level is not validated yet.
The contribution in this context is presented as follows. First, a translation cor
rectness is formally defined as a criteria for the target validation. To validate the
translation from SAM to the ArchJava/Java/AspectJ construct, the correctness of the
generated Java program is proved on the behavior model - Petri nets. Based on the
implementation, the ArchJava/Java/AspectJ construct is compiled to Java program.
After the careful analysis based on the simplification, a sequential object oriented
program and its operational semantics are introduced to represent the Java program.
After that, the definition of communication event is given based on the asynchro
nous invocation among objects and furthermore, the communication trace is defined
as a sequence of communication events. Finally, I prove the consistency between
the communication trace of the simplified object oriented program and the execution
trace of the behavior model of SAM component/connector - a Predicate Transition
Net.
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4. System modeling and analysis of Service Oriented Architecture (SOA)
SOAs will not scale without significant mechanization of service discovery, service
adaptation, service composition, and service monitoring; as well as data, protocol,
and process mediation. In this context, my contributions are: first extend SAM model
to the service oriented architecture, as named SO-SAM, to formally analysis service
composition, integration; secondly, apply the integrated framework on the SO-SAM
model to validate the methodology on the SO-SAM model; finally, a case study is
presented.
1.4 Chapter Organization of Dissertation
Chapter 2 describes the analysis methods for the correctness of the formal architecture
specification in both design and implementation level. First, I classify the different analysis
method used in the formal specifications: theorem proving vs. model checking. After that,
a classification for the representation of the target program in the implementation level is
given: abstract model vs. implementation. In this chapter, I evaluate related work, which
helps the reader to understand the design rationale of the integrated framework.
Chapter 3 identifies fundamental knowledge used in this dissertation, including soft
ware architecture model (SAM) with Petri nets and temporal logic, ArchJava and Aspect
oriented programming language. The last two are used in the runtime analysis and the
implementation of the prototype tool SAM Parser.
Chapter 4 gives an overview of the integrated framework. This chapter includes the
structure of the framework, how to analyze the system properties using this framework.
This chapter is mainly from my previous work [56].
Chapter 5 introduces a software architecture verification and analysis method and applied
it in the model checking of SAM model [77]. Moreover, a translation algorithm from
SAM model to Maude programming language is presented. The translation algorithm is
automatically implemented in the java program and integrated with the runtime verification
code (Chapter 6).
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Chapter 6 focuses on the method and implementation of realizing the runtime analysis
of SAM model in the implementation level. The translation algorithm is presented from
SAM model to ArchJava/Java/AspectJ construct. The functional code and monitor code
generation are discussed. The synthesis of a runtime checker is demonstrated. Finally, a
prototype tool, SAM Parser is developed and presented. Details of the components of the
prototype tool are described.
Chapter 7 discusses the validation approaches for the translations from SAM architecture
model. Two translations are validated - from SAM to Maude programming language and
to Java construct. Translation from SAM to Maude programming language is validated
by establishing consistency between behavior model of SAM component/connector and
rewriting theory. Translation from SAM to ArchJava/Java/AspectJ construct is constructed
by establishing the consistency between behavior model of SAM component/connector
and Java construct. The limitations of Petri nets are imposed on the second translation
validation. Both are established on the translation correctness criteria.
Chapter 8 demonstrates the effectiveness of the integrated framework by illustrating case
studies. The case studies include a coffee machine, a network protocol under attack sce
nario, an online shopping example, a cruise control system. An extension of SAM model
to analyze the service oriented architecture is demonstrated. Finally, an application of the
integrated framework on the UML architecture description is presented.
Chapter 9 summarizes and concludes the dissertation has achieved and points out future
works.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK

2.1

Introduction

In this chapter, we first review analysis methods for checking the correctness of pro
grams (see Section 2.2). Two groups are discussed: methods for a model of a program and
methods for an implementation of a program. After that we introduce the correctness proof
of translation based on the design and implementation level (see Section 2.3).
2.2

Analysis of Systems

In this section we discuss the analysis methods in two groups. Section 2.2.1 describes
analysis methods applied to the models of programs. The purpose of this section is to give
readers a brief background on analysis methods for models, which helps one to understand
the necessity for analysis methods on implementation. Section 2.2.2 describes analysis
methods for implementations. In section 2.2.2 we describe the goals of these methods and
the approaches these methods have taken.
2.2.1 Analysis on the Model of Systems
The program development process begins with the model of a program and desired prop
erties for the program. Formal methods are mathematical techniques that describe the mod
els of programs and desired properties. In addition, formal methods can be used to verify
the correctness of a program in terms of given properties. A method is formal if it has a
sound mathematical basis, typically given by a formal specification language.
An advantage of formal methods is that formal methods reveal the ambiguity, incom
pleteness, and inconsistency in the model of a program. When formal methods are used
in the early program development process, they can reveal design flaws that might other
wise be discovered only during costly testing and debugging phases. During the past two
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decades, tools dedicated to formal methods have been introduced. There have been an
increasing number of successful industry case studies using formal methods [46,58].
A weak point of this approach, however, is that the correctness of a model does not
necessarily mean that the implementation is correct. This is because the implementation
has more detail than the model and is susceptible to errors not present in the model. In
addition, there are negative aspects of formal methods including hard to leam/use notations
[33,58], high computing power requirements, and primitive tools inadequate for practical
usage [58]. Two common formal paradigms are theorem proving and model checking.
Theorem Proving
The goal of theorem proving is to prove whether a model satisfies given properties. The
approach of theorem proving is to prove M h p by mathematical deduction where M is a
model of a program given as characteristic statements on the program and p is a property.
An advantage of theorem proving over model checking is that theorem proving provides
better scalability to handle infinite state model by induction. Another strong point is that
theorem proving uses a more expressive language which includes quantifiers, leading to
succinct specification of parameterized systems [15]. The last strong point is that theorem
proving works on the syntactical reasoning which provides a relatively complete proof
system and can prove any temporal property that indeed holds over the given system.
A weak point of theorem proving is that theorem proving is undecidable as many logic
systems are, so that it is hard to be automatic. Due to this limitation, completely automated
theorem provers are infeasible. Therefore, theorem proving requires user ingenuity and
interaction. Another weak point is that theorem provers suffer from the inability to find
counter examples. If the property fails to hold, deductive methods normally do not give
much useful feedback, and the user must try to determine whether the fault lies with the
system and property being verified or with the failed proof. Finally, theorem proving needs
the expert knowledge about the theory used during the proving, which means it is hard to
be mastered by the people not working in this area. For a list of theorem provers see [3].
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Model Checking
The goal of model checking is similar to that of theorem proving - to prove whether a
model satisfies given properties. However, the approach of model checking is different from
that of theorem proving. A model checker provides a design specification language for
describing a model of a system, which is similar to a programming language but simplified.
Also, a model checker provides a property specification language for describing desired
properties, A property specification language may be the same as the design specification
language. A model checker generates and explores all possible/reachable states of the
model and checks whether all the states satisfy the given properties.
An advantage of model checking compared to theorem proving is that describing a model
in a design specification language is more familiar to a programmer than describing a model
as characteristic statements. Another advantage is that model checking provides automatic
verification. In other words, given a model and properties written in formal specification
language, the verification process does not require user interaction. Furthermore, model
checking can give counter examples which are useful for debugging.
A disadvantage of model checking is that tractable reachability testing algorithms exist
for only very simple systems [60,122]. In many cases, even those simple systems require
large amount of computational resources. (There has been active research on state reduction
techniques [121], such as symbolic model checking [113,138], binary decision diagram
reduction [35], and partial order reduction [165]).
To avoid state explosion problem [202], modeling languages have restrictions on the
language construct, such as data type and expression [23-25]. Consequently, restriction in
the language requires approximation and make modeling of systems difficult. There has
been active research on the state reduction technique [45,121], such as symbolic model
checking [113,138], binary decision diagram reduction [35], partial order reduction [165].
Symbolic representations are mainly used for the hardware verification, while partial order
reduction is good at the loosely coupled systems. However, symbolic representation is very
sensitive to the order of variables. For a list of model checkers, see [3].
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Symbolic Representation

Explicit representation of system models bring tons of states

that is hard to be handled by the computer. McMillan [138] proposed a symbolic repre
sentation of the states in his dissertation. The basic idea is shown in the following. Any
finite-state system can be encoded using a set {b\,..., bn} of binary variables, just as or
dinary data types of programming languages are represented in binary form on a digital
computer. For this reason, such representations are often called symbolic model checking
techniques [113,138]. The data structure for it is using Binary decision diagrams [35,36]
(BDD)that has following features:
• Every boolean function has a unique, canonical BDD representation.
• Boolean operations can be implemented with complexity proportional to the product
of the inputs.

Partial Order Reduction

Whereas symbolic model checking derives its power from ef

ficient data structures for the representation and manipulation of large sets of sufficiently
regular structure, algorithms based on explicit state enumeration can be improved if only a
fraction of the reachable pairs need to be explored. This idea can be successfully applied in
the case of asynchronous systems that are composed of concurrent processes with relatively
little interaction.
The frill transition system has as its runs all possible interleavings of the actions of the
individual processes. For many properties, however, the relative order of concurrent actions
is irrelevant, and it suffices to consider only a few sequentializations. Reduction techniques
that take advantage of the commutativity of actions are therefore often called partial-order
reductions. The main problem in the design of a practical algorithm is to detect when two
actions commute, given only the “local” knowledge available at a given system state.
The general idea of the partial-order reduction algorithms [105,166,194] is to approx
imate the semantic notion of commutativity of actions using syntactic criteria. There is
always a tradeoff between the potential effectiveness of a reduction method and the over
head involved in computing a sufficient set of actions that must be explored at a given state.
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Moreover, the effectiveness of partial-order reductions in general depends on the structure
of the system: it is well suitable for loosely coupled, asynchronous systems instead of
tightly synchronized systems.
Unfoldings [67, 68,139] are a partial-order approach to the automatic verification of
concurrent and distributed systems, in which partial-order semantics is used to generate a
compact representation of the state space. For systems exhibiting a high degree of concur
rency, this representation can be exponentially more succinct than the explicit enumeration
of all states or the symbolic representation in terms of a BDD, thus providing a very good
solution to the state-explosion problem.
Software Testing
Full-scale formalization of complex systems is an extremely expensive activity both
technically demanding and labor intensive. In particular, formal proof that an implemen
tation conforms to its specification is rarely cost-effective (in terms of risk reduction). A
balance between proof and testing offers a more pragmatic approach. Software testing con
sists of the dynamic verification of the behavior of a program on a finite set of test cases,
suitably selected from the usually infinite executions domain, against the specified expected
behavior. Because testing requires the execution of the software, it is often called dynamic
analysis. By using formal methods and testing together, we can: Reduce the cost of de
velopment by applying testing techniques much earlier in the lifecycle while defects are
relatively inexpensive to correct. In the work of [80], the author demonstrated in the form
of the Vmodel, the limited benefits that can be accrued when the only formal model avail
able is the code itself. Static analysis of the code can help in deriving adequacy criteria,
and dynamic analysis of the code to access whether the criteria have been met. Besides, the
author pointed out that the far greater possibilities that exist when formality is introduced
into higher layers - the specification and design.
As a form of verification, testing has several advantages over static-analysis techniques
(e.g. model checking). One advantage of testing is the relative ease with which many of
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the testing activities can be performed. A second advantage of testing is that the software
being developed can be executed in its expected environment. A third advantage of testing
is that much of the process can be automated.
Although, as a form of verification, testing has a number of advantages, it also has a
number of limitations. Testing cannot show the absence of faults - it can show only their
presence. Additionally, testing cannot show that the software has certain qualities. More
over, test execution results for specific test cases cannot usually be generalized. Software
testing is mostly about empirical correctness, and historically testing techniques have been
applied, quite naturally, at the code level. Testing by its nature can never conclude anything
mathematically valid, as it amounts to taking a sample and trying to infer a generally valid
judgment on the whole from the observed part.
Runtime Verification
Runtime verification is considered as a so-called light-weighted formal analysis method.
Runtime verification is a method or algorithm to analyze the execution trace of a running
program based on a formal specification and concludes a certain property about that pro
gram. Two main features are exposed in the runtime verification - a formal specification of
system property and the execution trace to be analyzed. A runtime checker takes a system
and properties as input, check the system against properties when the system is running.
Currently, most of runtime verification tool use temporal logic(TL) as the specification
language of the program. For instance, Temporal Rover and DBRover tools [8] trans
lates LTL properties into comments, which are inserted at chosen positions in the program,
JPaX [95] presented three algorithms with some optimization to monitor future and past
linear time temporal logic (LTL). Java MultiPathExplorer [184] is a tool that checks a past
time LTL safety property against a partial order extracted online from an execution trace.
Java-MoP [39] is a generic logic monitoring tool for a paradigm merging specification and
implementation. POTA [183] is a partial order trace analyzer system that analyzes dis
tributed execution traces. Almost all of these tools are working on the code level. Next,
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we enumerate design issues on the runtime formal analysis and the rationale for design
decisions. These issues are general issues, not specific to certain system architecture.

Infrastructure

Runtime verification, a light-weighted formal analysis, is more practi

cally feasible than so-called heavy-weighted formal analysis on the large complex systems,
in terms of scalability and on-line checking. Scalability is a feature of a technique that
should be practically applicable to large systems consisting of thousands or millions of
lines of code. Because the behavior of a system in the execution might be different from
that in the static, e.g. data racing and deadlock among threads, checking system online is
quite necessary.
Currently the runtime verification monitor or observer is generally implemented in the
following processes. The system is designed to have two basic functions. First function
is the ability to discharge the program execution events as soon as possible, in order to
minimize the space requirements. Second is the ability to check the observable events
against the system specification, in most cases are formally specified. The typical example
is JPaX [95], which is composed of two modules - instrumentation and observer. Instru
mentation module is responsible for extracting event traces and feed them to the observer,
while observer is to check high-level and/or low-level properties. JavaMaC [119,126] con
sists of three parts (filter, event recognizer, and runtime checker), however, the filter and
event recognizer are the part that deals with the event extraction and feeding. Although
some method, e.g. AspectJ, can weave the instrumentation by join point and advice, the
basic functionality of this part cannot be weaved. The systems that using insertion, e.g.
Temporal Rover and DBRover [8], do not have a clear two-module infrastructure. How
ever, the insertion procedure and checking code are corresponding to these two modules.
This two-module infrastructure does not depend on any logic and programming lan
guage. One of the most obvious benefits of this infrastructure is that the observer/monitor
can be executed in parallel with the monitored program and can be implemented distrib
uted.
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Program Execution Trace and Its LTL Semantics

The events can be categorized as

low-level and high-level events. In the case of runtime verification of the system model
in the implementation, we have both kinds of events. The low-level events are variables,
method calls, thread switch, etc., and the high-level events are those are relevant to the
specification elements. In the case of monitoring system model in the implementation level,
low-level events are actually those model elements that are mapped into the implementation
level.
The interpretation of the execution traces depend on the logic we used or the specification
language of the system. In the standard temporal logic, the event trace is infinite while in
the practice we use finite trace with the last state stuttering. The linear temporal logic
semantics in the event traces can be recursively defined using rewriting logics. We present
the semantics of execution trace semantics in terms of propositional LTL as follows [88,
92,93,95,177]:
Assume two total functions on traces, head : Trace —> Event returning the head event of
a trace and length returning the length of a finite trace, and a partial function tail: Trace —>
Trace for taking the tail of a trace. That is, head(e,i) = head(e) - e, tail(e,t) = t, and
length(e) = 1 and length(e, f) = 1 + length(t). Assume further for any trace t, that tj denotes
the suffix trace that starts at position i, with positions starting at 1. The satisfaction relation
Trace Q Formula defines when a trace t satisfies a formula f, written t f= f, and is
defined inductively over the structure of the formulae as follows, where AP is any atomic
proposition and

and 02 are any formulae 1:

In our work we use this event trace semantics.

Formula Transforming

The formal specification logic cannot be directly used as the

observers. The logic formulae are first transformed into finite state automatons and then
can be used for the input file of the runtime checker. Currently, there are two main methods
in the transformation of linear temporal logic. One method is called automata-based and
another is rewriting-based.
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Table 1 : Event trace semantics of TL formula
t (= true
t (= false
t^p
t^<f)Xop 02
O0
t (= 00
t |= 0iU02
t (= O0
t |= 00
t H0
t 1= 01 §02

iff t is always true
iff t is always false
iff t e and headf} is p
iff t (= 0i and/or/xor/implies/iff t (= 02
when op is V/ A / © / —
iff t e and tailf) (= 0
iff 31 < i < lengthf) + 1: p 0
iff VI < i < lengthify h (= 0
iff 31 < i < lengthf) + 1:
02 and
VI < j < i: tj 0i
iff t e and headf) |= 0
iff 31 < i < length fy tj |= 0
iff VI < i < lengthify ti 0
iff 31 <i< lengthify ti 02 and
VI < j < /: tj [= 0i

1. Automata-based Transformation.
In the automata-based method, there are two groups. Bemd Finkbeiner etc. [69] using
alternating automata [196] to represent the temporal logic formula. They proposed
three basic algorithms based on the transformation and some optimization on these
algorithms. Depth-first search is easy to be implemented by inefficient in that it may
traverse part of a trace multi-times. The breadth-first algorithm traverses the trace
once but it may have an exponential number of sets of nodes. Backward traversal
can avoid these issues and it was also proposed and discussed in the work [92,177].
The advantage of using alternating automata to represent the language accepted by
temporal formula is that the alternating automaton that accepts the same language as
the formula is linear in the size of the formula, while it is worst-case exponential for
nondeterministic or V-automata.
In the work of [82], the authors proposed a method that transform LTL formula into
Buchi automata, which is efficiently implemented in the TaX (Trace analyZer) that
is integrated in the JPaX. The algorithm presented in the work [82] is based on an
efficient tableau-like LTL to Buchi automata translation. The difference of this work
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from the work in [69] is that this work uses a deterministic automaton. But nondeterministic automata are more concise than deterministic one.
The event trace semantics of LTL is infinite in the sense of automata, which is differ
ent from the above semantics.
2. Rewriting-based Transformation.
Rewriting logic [144] is logic of concurrent change that can naturally deal with state
and with highly nondeterministic concurrent computations. It has good properties as
a flexible and general semantic framework for giving semantics to a wide range of
languages and models of concurrency. Membership logic [32] is a sublogic of rewrit
ing logic. Maude [47] is a high-level meta-language that support both equational and
rewriting logic computation. JPaX [95] is an example of the rewriting-based trans
formation which uses Maude [47] as logic engine. In the paper [95], they presented
8 rules to translate LTL based on several functional modules which are theories in
membership equational logic [32]. Rewriting logic semantics was introduced before.

Translation Mechanisms From Model to Program Language

The translation mecha

nism or a mapping methodology from the system design model to the programming lan
guage is necessary and critical for the runtime verification application on the system model.
It aims at systematically constructing a relationship between high level model of the sys
tem and its mirrored low level implementation. The benefits of the translation are listed as
follows:
• allow the model checking in the programming language context.
Model is a high level abstraction of the system and often written in the mathematical
expressions to be concise and precise. These expressions cannot be recognized by the
programming language compiler without the effort on the translation. In this case,
the target language is the programming langauge that is mapped from the model.
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• bridge the gap between the high level specification and its implementation.
Model is an abstract description of software systems thus many issues are ignored
in order to obtain the high-level structure and behavior in the design. Many system
implementations are hard to follow the model description because of the environment
of the system implemented. There is a gap between system models and their mirrored
implementation. Without a systematic translation, the model does not make sense for
the released systems.

Program Instrumentation

Program instrumentation is a procedure for inserting moni

toring code into monitored program to get dynamic behaviors of monitored program. It
can be done in both source code and byte code level to extract relevant events. Many pro
gram instrumentation tools are designed on different programming languages, such as C,
C++ [159] and Java [18] code in the byte code level.
Valgrind [159] implements bytecode instrument in two ways, one is using insertions to
put calls to C functions, another is extending the UCode with new instructions. The BCEL
(Byte Code Engineering Library) [50] is a toolkit for the static analysis and dynamic cre
ation or transformation of Java class files. It enables developers to implement the desired
features on a high level of abstraction without handling all the internal details of the Java
class file format and thus re-inventing the wheel every time. BIT (Bytecode Instrumenting
Tool) [125] is a collection of Java classes that allow one to build customized tools to instru
ment Java Virtual Machine (JVM) bytecodes. jContractor [18] performs on-the-fly byte
code instrumentation to detect violation of the contract specification during a program’s
execution. jContractor is a pure Java library providing a rich set of syntactic constructs for
expressing contracts and it allows the checking without source code. jMonitor [114] is a
pure Java library and runtime utility for specifying event patterns and associating them with
user provided event monitors. jMonitor instrumentation works at the Java bytecode level
and does not require the presence of source code for the Java application monitored. The
class bytecodes of the monitored Java program are Instrumented on the fly by the jMonitor
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class loader according to the needs of the externally specified jMonitor event patterns and
event monitors.
Jass [27], Java with assertions, allows annotating Java programs with specifications in
the form of assertions. The Jass tool translates annotated assertions into Java programs in
which compliance with the specification is dynamically tested. Jass supports two groups
of annotations, classical program verification (e.g. pre- and postconditions, invariants) and
behavioral subtyping for the trace assertions using JDI (Java Debugger Interface). Jass is a
pre-compiler which is written in Java.
Compared with manual assertion, some tools can automatic instrument programs.
ANNA (ANNotated Ada) [181,192] is a generalized assertion checking system for an
notated Ada programs. Given Ada program, a user makes annotations written in ANNA
language. ANNA provides classes of annotations for monitoring different entities-object,
subtype, statement, subprogram, result and exception. Given annotated Ada program,
ANNA compiler compiles annotations into corresponding inline Ada codes or checking
functions or tasks depending on the annotations. Then, ANNA compiler puts these code
into proper place of the source code. ALAMO (A Lightweight Architecture for MOnitoring) [110,111,193] is a monitoring system for ANSI C programs. ALAMO monitors every
activity in syntax level, such as addition, assignment, loop. The configuration language
provides which activities are to be monitored. Based on the configuration, given ANSI C
source code, ALAMO instruments the source code following the configuration.
There is an interesting relation between program instrumentation and aspect-oriented
programming [118]. Aspect-oriented is one of software development methodology that
complements object-oriented method in the system design and development process. It
performs cross-cutting on different concerns of system subunits or components. In com
parison, the runtime verification is put forth something done more after the fact. Runtime
verification is to deal with some aspects in different units of a running application that con
cerns properties specified. These properties are related with different classes, functions and
can be observed on the interleaving execution with the running application. Furthermore,
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some work using AspectC++ [134] on the instrumentation of C++ code proved that little
performance overhead is introduced into the monitored program, which is better than that
of C++ instrumentation. Runtime verification workshop 2007 [179] is to create a synergy
between the fields of runtime verification and aspect oriented programming.

Summary
Software Quality Assurance (SQA) aims to ensure that the final product will have an
acceptable quality. It is mainly a management activity to identify quality problems early
in the development. In the quality engineering, to accurately assure the correctness of
software systems, formal methods is necessarily applied. The above discussion about the
formal analysis of software design can be summarized in the Figure 2.
before release
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after release
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1 Runtime Verification
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Figure 2: Summarization of the formal analysis methods of the software design

2.2.2

Analysis of Implementation

Methods for the implementation of a program check whether executions of the program
satisfy given properties. These methods are applied in later stages of the program develop
ment process because they require the implementation of the program.
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An advantage of these methods is that they can check actual executions of a program.
Although a model is proven correct, however, it does not necessarily indicate that the imple
mentation is correct; the implementation has more detail than the model and is susceptible
to errors not present in the model. For example, a model may implicitly assume a natural
number can be arbitrarily large. However, an implementation may restrict a natural number
to be less than 232 because the implementation chooses to represent a natural number in 32
bits. Then, overflow error which may happen in the implementation cannot be detected
in the model. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that implementation is strictly following
a model because there can be errors caused by human programmers who implement the
program after understanding the model.
These methods, however, do not provide mathematical guarantees on the correctness
of the target program as the analysis methods for the model do. Another negative when
compared to the analysis methods for the model of a program is that these methods are
applied in the late stages of program development process, which leads to costly debugging
and re-coding the program.
These methods support different levels of monitoring according to application purpose.
A method can monitor unit behavior (for example, communication between processes),
functional behavior (for example, step-by-step instruction trace). The finest-level target
activity of function monitoring is the execution of a statement in a source code. That of
instruction monitoring is the execution of an instruction. A statement consists of several
instructions. Compared to instruction monitoring, function monitoring needs to recognize
all consecutive instructions forming the statement. We classify analysis methods on imple
mentation into the following three groups according to the level of monitoring.
1. unit monitoring: to monitor behaviors intra-processes;
2. function monitoring: to monitor behaviors inter-processes;
3. instruction monitoring: to monitor behaviors in an instruction level, more specific
into the machine level.
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The level of monitoring affects the amount of overhead and the instrumentation stages
in general. For example, analysis methods for process-level behavior instrument the com
munication interface between processes. Analysis methods for instruction-level activity
instrument the run-time execution environment on which each instruction of the target pro
gram is executed. Details of three levels of monitoring are discussed in the follows.
Unit Monitoring
The goal of this group of methods is to monitor externally observable behavior of
processes such as input/output or communication between processes. An advantage of
these methods is that they decrease the difficulty of instrumenting target program by in
strumenting only an interface of a process that is well defined and observable outside the
process. Another benefit is its low overhead cost. Each process is considered as a unit
so the interaction of it with the outside is the only concern for the monitoring. The exter
nal behavior of a process generates less frequent events compared to the internal behavior.
This leads to less overhead in the instrumented target program. A drawback to these meth
ods is that they check only external behavior of processes. They cannot check desirable
properties concerning internal behavior of a process. For example, suppose a process has
a stack implementing push() and pop(). A non-emptiness property stating that the number
of popO’s should be less than the number of pushQ’s cannot be checked in process-level
monitoring. In other words, unit monitoring cannot detect a violation in internal behavior
which does not effect external behavior or at least not until the violation corrupts external
behavior eventually. Even when an error in external behavior is detected, the source of
the error inside of a process is hard to find. Some systems performing unit monitoring are
described below.
Model-based testing aims to detect violations by using a formal model of the program.
Testing oracle takes input/output execution of a program and check whether the execution
is correct with regard to the formal model of the program. The difference between these
works is mainly the formalism they use to describe a model. Supervisor [182] compares
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the output of a target program and expected output generated by interpreting the model
of the program written in SDL [11,12]. Dillon [53] develops an algorithm to generate
a testing oracle from a Graphical Interval Logic specification [52]. Clarke [43] conducts
a case study on automatic testing of Philips Audio Control Protocol using a specification
written in ACSR [34].
JEM (Java Event Monitor) [129] is an event-mediator type of system like the CORBA
event channel. In other words, JEM provides its own communication channel similar to
the CORBA event channel. A benefit of using its own event channel rather than a standard
event channel is freedom in defining primitive events. However, using its own event channel
does not scale well compared to using a standard event channel.
Function Monitoring
The goal of this group of methods is to monitor internal behavior of processes at a
statement-level. For example, a non-emptiness property that the number of pop()’s should
be less than the number of pushQ’s in a stack can be monitored at this level of monitoring.
A strong point of these methods is that these methods can check various desirable proper
ties not limited to properties on external behavior. A weak point of these methods is that the
instrumentation of a target program for monitoring various activities is a complicated task.
Deciding where to insert probes into a program in general is a nontrivial task [188] because
it requires knowledge of program structure. Furthermore, instrumentation may modify the
semantics of the target program if thorough care is not taken. For example, suppose a re
turn statement is inserted into a method accidently. The statements of the method after the
return would not be executed. This is a serious problem especially for manual instrumenta
tion. Second, source code is usually only available to the developers of a program. In many
cases, though not all cases, these methods require the source code of a program in order to
recognize and instrument target statements. The prototype tool - SAM Parser, belongs to
this category.
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ALAMO (A Lightweight Architecture for MOnitoring) [110,111] is to reduce the diffi
culties in writing monitoring tools by constructing a platform on which monitor construc
tion is relatively easy. However, accessibility to the entire set of states in the target program
causes 2-3 orders of magnitude overhead. Since SAM Parser uses online instrumentation,
there is very light overhead. MaC MaC [126] architecture monitors events generated from
three types of statements: variable assignments, method invocation, and method returns.
Thus, the MaC architecture does not cause such high overhead. A monitor and a checker of
the MaC architecture are generated automatically from the requirement specifications. The
MaC architecture provides a low-level specification language to define primitive events In
addition, the MaC architecture instruments the target program automatically according to
the definitions of primitive events. SAM Parser architecture is similar as MaC’s. We will
compare them in Chapter 6. JRTM (Java Run-time Timing constraint Monitor) [150,151]
aims to detect violation of timing properties using Real-Time Logic (RTL) [109] as a prop
erty specification language. Based on informal definitions of primitive events, the tar
get program is instrumented manually. Unless instrumentation is performed correctly, the
analysis cannot produce the correct result. SAM Parser instruments program automatically
which ease lots of work and reduce errors in the most extent. Sentry System [41,42] aims
at a low-cost, low-precision monitor. Sentry is a monitor watching over the behavior of a
target program continuously. Time Rover [8] is to detect the violations of assertions over
target program variables. Assertions are written in temporal logic at run-time. Time Rover
uses a normal temporal logic and metric temporal logic which extends the temporal logic
by supporting the specification of real-time constraints to temporal operators. Also, the
temporal logic used by Time Rover supports counting operators so that a user can specify
the number of event occurrences in the assertion. A user has to write and insert assertions
into a target source code. Time Rover supports various languages such as Java, C++, and
Verilog.
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Instruction Monitoring
The purposes of this group of analysis methods are 1) to monitor and check the behavior
of the target program in terms of instruction-level activities; 2) is to steer the target program.
These methods provide a virtual machine as run-time execution environment to monitor the
execution of the target program instructions one by one. An advantage of these methods
is that they do not require the instrumentation of a program because a virtual machine can
monitor execution of a target program as it is without instrumentation. This removes the
difficulty of instrumenting a target program. In addition, a code size does not increase due
to inserted probes. Furthermore, these methods can monitor and check the behavior of
the target program at a finer-grained level, compared to the function monitoring methods.
Finally, these methods provide the accessibility and controllability of entire set of target
program states. A weak point is that this fine-grain monitoring capability costs a run-time
overhead magnitude of 2-3 because of the slow interpretation speed of a virtual machine.
In addition, these methods are machine dependent. Furthermore, these methods need a
specialized run-time execution environment rather than the existing environment which is
reliable and familiar to users. This requirement may prohibit these methods from being
widely applied. Finally, reasoning about high-level properties based on instruction-level
behavior is not an easy task.
Dynascope [189-191] serves as an instruction-level behavior monitor such as an array
bound checker. A weak point is that Dynascope does not provide a requirement specifica
tion language. As an event-based debugger for C programs, Dalek [160,161] is to detect
composite events from the instruction level execution of target program. JPDA (Java Plat
form Debugger Architecture) [4] provides a debugging interface so that a programmer can
access information available on JVM and manipulate the execution of the target program.
We summarize the above discussion based on the features to be examined for the moni
tored program in the Table 2.
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Table 2: Summary of Implementation Analysis
High Level
Specification
Model-based Tes
JEM
Yes
ALAMO
No
Yes
MAO
JR1M
Yes
Sentry
Tes
Yes
Time R.
SAM Parser
Yes
Dynascope
No
Dalek
No
JPDA
.No

Methods
TJnTt
Monitoring
Function
Monitoring
Instruction
Monitoring

Code
Overhead Event
Size
Overhead Frequency
Small
Small
Low
No
Tmair^~~ Low
Large
Large
Medium
Medium Medium
Medium
Medium Medium
Medium
Medium Small
Medium
Medium Medium
Medium
Medium Low
Low
No
Low
High
No
Tow
High
No
Low
High

Instru.
Property
Complex. Class
Low
No
No
No
Auto
To
Auto
No
High
No
Auto
No
High
To
Low
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No

2,3 Translation Correctness
Translation is a necessary unavoidable step in most cases for the verification of the sys
tem model at both design and implementation program. In the verification of design level,
the tools require certain programming language that may not be the specification of the
model. It is necessary to translate from the model to the program languages recognized by
model checkers. In the verification of implementation level, the specification language of
the model may not be same as language for the program, then similar situation happens. In
both situations, a validation process is necessary to show the correctness of the translated
code being consistent with the original model. This procedure is similar as the procedure
defined in the “verified compiler” [102] - the output from a compiler is consistent with
the input program, which is proposed by C. R. Hoare in the “Grand Challenge” in 2003.
Currently, several research works have been done in the translation validation.
Pnueli [173] etc. presented the notion of translation validation as a new approach to the
verification of translators (compilers, code generators). In their approach each individual
translation is followed by a validation phase which verifies that the target code produced
on this run correctly implements the submitted source code. [172] presented an automatic
code validation tool based on the uninterpreted functions and symbolic represented models.
There are many works have been done on the translation from the formal specification
to a model checker programming languages. The basic goal of translation from the formal
specification to the model checker programming language is to verify the system properties
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specified in the specification. [78] presented a set of rules that translate from Petri nets to
Promela for use within SPIN. [99] presented two translations, one is from high level Petri
nets to SMV, another one is from high level Petri nets to FTS (Finite Transition System).
Both translations are necessary for the system properties verification and analysis. The
soundness of the second translation was also justified. [98] discussed the analysis method
on the SAM [198] architecture model using SMV. In this work, several translation rules
from SAM to SMV are provided. These rules are consistent with the stepwise translation
algorithm in the work [99]. WRIGHT [21] and DARWIN [133] are two other software ar
chitectures that have been successfully verified by model checking techniques. In summary,
the translation step is necessary for most model checking process. Currently, however, the
justification and validation of the translation steps are less provided.
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CHAPTER 3
PRELIMINARIES

3.1

Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 1, the integrated framework is proposed for verification and
validation of software architecture model in both design and implementation level.
In this chapter, Section 3.2 gives a brief introduction of Software Architecture Model
- SAM, including two formalisms - Petri nets and temporal logic. Two object oriented
programming language used in the target code ArchJava and AspectJ will be discussed in
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively.
3.2

SAM - Software Architecture Model

SAM, an architectural description model based on Petri nets and Temporal logic, is wellsuited for modeling distributed systems. SAM architecture model is hierarchically defined
as follows. A set of compositions C = {Cj, C2,..., Q} represents different design levels or
subsystems. A set of component Cmi and connectors Cnj are specified within each composi
tion Ci as well as a set of composition constraints CSi, e.g. Cj - {Cmi, Cni, CSi}. In addition,
each component or connector is composed of two elements, a behavioral model and a prop
erty specification, e.g. Cy = (S¡j,

Each behavioral model is described by a PrT net,

while a property specification by a temporal logical formula. The atomic proposition used
in the first order temporal logic formula is the ports of each component or connector. Thus
each behavioral model can be connected with its property specification. A component Cmi
or a connector Cni can be refined to a low level composition Q by a mapping relation h, e.g.
h(Cmi) or h(Cmi) = Ci. Fig. 3 shows a graphical view of a simple SAM architecture model.
Fig. 18 shows the SAM model of coffee machine with three components and three con
nectors. From this figure, we can see the coffee machine itself is modelled as a composition
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Figure 3: A SAM Architecture Model

CoffeeMachine, which has three sub components: CMlnterface, CoinHandler, and BrewingFacility. The example coffee machine is discussed in the Chapter 8. In this section,
I introduce two component methods integrated in SAM model: Petri nets and Temporal
Logic.
money cm

coffeetype cm

CoffeeMachine

Figure 4: SAM Model of Coffee Machine

3.2.1 Petri Nets
Petri nets [153], introduced by Dr. Carl Adam Petri in his PhD thesis (Kommunikation
mit Automaten), is a formal and graphical appealing language that is appropriate for mod
eling concurrent and distributed systems. A main motivation for the use of Petri nets in
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concurrent and distributed systems modeling is the possibility to formally state and decide
certain desirable system properties, such as liveness and boundedness. There are in general
two kinds of Petri nets: low-level Petri nets and high-level Petri nets. Although they have
the same expressive power, high level Petri nets provide a more succinct and manageable
system description.
In the development of reliable, secure, and error-free software systems the application of
Petri nets is a well-known approach. Petri nets with its syntax and structure are suitable for
the description of concurrent and distributed systems. In the following we use PrT nets as
an example to introduce the syntax and semantics of high level Petri nets.
Predicate/Transition Nets

We introduce Predicate Transition Nets (PrT Nets) as an example of a high level Petri
net.
Definition 1 (PrT Nets) A Predicate/Transition net is a 8-tuple(P,T,F,TL,ip,L,R,MQ),
where:
1. Pisafinite set ofplaces, T is afinite set oftransitions (PC\ T = §>, PU T #= <E>/ and F is
a set ofarcs orflow relations between each pair ofP and T, e.g. F C (PxT)U(TxP).
The tuple (P, T, F) forms a basic Petri net structure,
2. £ consists ofsome sorts of constants together with some operations and relations.
3. (p is a relation associated each place p in P with a subset ofsorts.
4. L is a labelling function on arcs. Given an arc f e F, the labelling function of f,
L(f), is a set of labels, which are tuples of constants (CONs) and variables (X). If
f £ F, Iff) =
5. R is a mapping from transitions to a set of inscription formulae. The inscription on
transition t e T, R(t), is a logical formula built from variables and the constants,
operations, and relations in structure S; variables occurring free in a formula have
to occur at an adjacent input arc of the transition.
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6. Mq is the initial or current marking with respect to sort, which assigns a multiset of
tokens to each place p in P with the same sort, Mq : P —> MCONs.
Dynamic semantics of PrT nets:
1. A marking M of a PrT net A is a mapping function defined from set of places P to
constants MCONs.
2. The enabling condition of a transition t e T under a marking M with a substitution
a = {x, <— Ci\xi e X,Ci e MCONs} is defined as follows:
Vp € P.(L(p, t) : a) c M(p) A R(f) : a
3. If a transition t € T under a marking M with a substitution a is enabled, a marking
M' is obtained after the transition t is fired, then the firing condition of a transition t
is defined as:
V/7 € P.M(p) = M(p) - L(p, i) : aU L(t,p} : a.
In PrT nets, each place is assigned a sort indicating what kind of tokens it can contain.
The tokens in a place can be viewed as a multi-set over the sort. A marking of a PrT net is a
function that assigns tokens to each place. A label is assigned to each arc to describe types
and numbers of tokens that flow along this arc. Each transition has a boolean expression
called guard, which specifies the relationship among arcs related with the transition. Petri
nets in Fig. 21 demonstrates the behavior model of the components in the coffee machine
example (in Chapter 8).
For example, in Fig. 21 transition input is enabled in the marking Mq under the assign
ment f such that /(x) = 50, f(y) = 2. After firing of transition input under assignment /,
M{money.cmi) = M(coffeetype..cmi) - ®,M(request_cmi) = (50,2>, M(sig) = true, and
the tokens in other places remain the same.
3.2.2 Temporal Logic
Temporal logic defines each propositional predicate calculus on a time slot. It is specif
ically referred to the modal-logic introduced around 1960 by Arthur Prior [174] under the
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moneycmi

coffeetype_cmi

<p - {moneyjcmi int, requestjcmi f-»< int, int >,
sig f-» boolean, readyjcmi t-> boolean
coffeetypejcmi t-> int,coffee^ervejcmi int}
coinJbackjcmi f-> int, changejcmi
int}
ready.enjoyjcmi f-> int}
Mo = {moneyjcmi f-> 75, coffeetypejcmi f-» 2, sig f-> {},
readyjcmi f-» {}, request jcmi f-» {},
coffeeserve-cmi i-r {}, readyjenjoyjcmi apsto{}}
coin-backjcmi (-* {}, changejcmi i-» {}}

Figure 5: Behavior of a Subcomponent (CMInterface) in CoffeeMachine
name of Tense Logic and subsequently developed further by logicians and computer sci
entists. In 1977, Amir Pnueli [171] extended the tense logic with four operators (□, O, O>
U) for future time linear temporal logic and four for past time (□, Diamonddot, odot, S)
and concerned with the specification and verification of programs, especially concurrent
programs in which the computation is performed by two or more processors working in
parallel.
Temporal logic [136] is a widely used logic for specifying properties of reactive and
concurrent systems. Formulae in classical Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) can be built using
the following operators:
F ::= true | false ] AP | -> 0 | tpiop^i

Propositional operators

O0IO0ID0I0JC/02

Future time operators

O0 | O

Past time operators

| Q 0 | 0i S 02

The semantics of temporal logic is defined on the system behaviors (infinite sequences
of states). The behaviors are obtained from the execution sequences of petri nets where
the last marking of a finite execution sequence is repeated infinitely many times at the end
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of execution sequence. For example, for an execution sequence Mo,Mn, the following
behavior a =«: Mo,M„, M„,... » is obtained, where M is a marking of the petri net.
Let cr =«; Mq, Mi, ... » be the behavior, where each state

provides an interpretation

for the variables mentioned in predicates. Let D be the data domain. The semantics of a
temporal formula p in behavior a and position j is denoted by (cr,y) f= p. We define:
• For a state formula p, (cr, j) |= p
• (<T j) k "7? <=> (a,j)

Mj (= p;

p;

• (a,j) |= p V q <=> (cr,y) k p or (p-,j) k q;
•

J) k np <=> (cr, i) k P for all i > j;

• (cl/) k Op
• (cr, y) (=

(cr, i) k P for some i > y;

pUq & 3i > j : (cr, /) k q, and Vj <k< i, (a, k)k p;

• (^ j) k Vx € D.p(x) <=» for any element m in D, (cr,j) k p(w);
• (o’,]) k 3% e D.p(x) <=$ for some element m in D, (cr,j) (= p(m);
The models of LTL are infinite execution traces, reflecting the behavior of such systems
as ideally always being ready to respond to requests, operating system being typical exam
ple. LTL has been mainly used to specify properties of finite-state reactive and concurrent
systems, so that the full correctness of the system can be verified automatically. In the real
environment, the event sequence is finite instead of infinite. There are two possible options
currently to describe this finite trace using that infinite semantics. We think the most ap
propriate assumption to make at the end of the trace is that it is stationary in the last state.
Then its semantics can be defined as the finite trace is infinitely extended by repeating the
last state. Another option would be to consider that all atomic predicates are false or true in
the state following the last one, but this would be problematic when inter-dependent pred
icates are involved, such as “gate-up” and “gate-down”. The semantics of finite trace LTL
is described in the next chapter.
36

Property specifications for each component/connector in SAM are defined by LTL for
mulae. Some heuristic rules of how to specify temporal properties are given in [97]. The
following is a property of component CoffeeMachine called Request'.
((money-cmi(85) A coffeetype-cmi(T}) —>
O(change-cmi(^,S} V (changejcmi(\fy A ready-enjoy.cmi(iff}}
This formula indicates that (Fig. 21), if the place money~cmi has token 85 and place
coffeetypejcmi has token 2, in the some future time, either we will has token 85 in the
place change jcmi and token 1 in the place readyjenjoyjcmi.
3.3
3.3.1

Maude
Introduction

Maude [48] is a freely distributed high-performance system, supporting both rewriting
logic and membership equational logic. Because of its efficient rewriting engine and its
metalanguage features, Maude turns out to be an excellent tool to create executable envi
ronments for various logics, theorem provers, and even programming languages.
In Core Maude [48] the basic units are functional modules and system modules. Maude’s
functional modules define data types and operations on them by means of equational theory,
which is an extension of ordered equational logic called membership equational logic [146].
A Maude system module specifies a rewrite theory. We explain the rewrite theory and
equational theory as follows.
3.3.2

Rewriting Logic and Membership Logic

Maude is a declarative language based on rewriting logic, which has its underlying equa
tional logic as a parameter. In particular, the underlying equational logic chosen for Maude
is membership equational logic, a conservative extension of both order-sorted equational
logic and partial equational logic with existence equations. It supports partiality, subsort
relations, operator overloading, and error specification.
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Membership Logic
A signature in membership equational logic [144] is a triple ¡Q = (X, E, S) with K a set
of kinds, (K, E) a many-sorted (or “many-kinded”) signature, and S = {SkheK a Á'-kinded
family of disjoint sets of sorts. The kind of sorts s is denoted as [s]. An Q - algebra is then
a (K, E)-algebra A together with the assignment to each sort s €

of a subset As Q Aj¿. A

E-algebra contains a set A^ for each kind k e K, a function Af : A^¡ x ... x A^
each operator / €

Ak for

and a subset As c Ak for each sort s e Sk, with the meaning that

the elements in sorts are well-defined, while elements without a sort are errors. Intuitively,
the elements in sorts are the good, or correct, or non-error, or defined, elements, whereas
the elements without a sort are error or undefined elements. In general, a total function at
the kind level restricts only to a partial function at the level of sorts.
We use T%(X)k to denote the set of E-terms with kind k over variables in X, where X is
the set of kinded variables. Atomic formulas are either E - equations of the form t = f,
or E - memberships of the form t : s, where the term t,f e
sentences are conditional formulae of the form VA.0 if A//?/ = qt A

and s e Sk- E a7w7

: sj, where 0

is either a E-equation or a E-membership, and all the variables in 0, p¡, qh and w7 e X.
These sentences are Hom clauses on the atomic formulas, quantified by finite sets of Kkinded variables. Such memberships are a generalization of sort constraints and can be
used to specify partial functions, that become defined when their arguments satisfy certain
equational and membership conditions.
Rewriting Logic
A Maude system module specifies a rewrite theory [144]. A rewrite theory has sorts,
kinds, and operators (perhaps with frozen arguments), and can have three types of state
ments: equations, memberships, and rules, all of which can be conditional.
A signature in rewriting logic is an equational theory (E, E), where E is an equational
signature and E Is a set of E-equations. Rewriting will operate on equivalence classes of
terms modulo E. For example, string rewriting is obtained by imposing an associativity
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axiom; multiset rewriting by imposing associativity and commutativity, etc.. Many tech
niques for rewriting modulo equations have been studied, which is precisely what Maude
does, using the equational attributes given in operator declarations - such as associativity,
commutativity, and identity - to rewrite modulo such axioms.
Sentences over a signature (E, E) have the form [Z]£ -» [t'Jg, where t and f are E-terms
possibly involving some variables, and [Z]£ denotes the equivalence class of the term t
modulo the equations E (usually, we omit the subscript and simply write [/]). A rewrite
theory 1R is a 4-tuple IR = (E, E, L, R) where E is an equational signature, £ is a set
of E-equations, L is a set of labels, and R is a set of labeled rewrite rules with the form of
R c LxT^e(X)2 that are either of the unconditional form r : [/] -> [Z7], or of the conditional
form [Z]

[Z'] if

A (fjWj : Sj) A (fkpk

qk).

Rewriting logic is a logic for reasoning about concurrent systems having states, and
evolving by means of transitions. The signature of a rewrite theory describes a particular
structure for the states of a system, and the rewrite rules describe which elementary local
transitions are possible in the distributed state. The inference rules of rewriting logic [177]
allow to deduce general concurrent transitions which are possible in a system satisfying
such a description.
3.3.3 Functional Module & System Module
In Core Maude [48] the basic units are functional modules and system modules. A
functional module is an equational style functional program with user-definable syntax in
which a number of sorts, their elements, and functions on those sorts are defined. A system
module is a declarative style concurrent program with user-definable syntax.
A functional module is declared in Maude using the keywords
fmod <ModuleName> is
<DeclarationsAndStatements>
endfm
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In Maude, functional modules are equational theories in membership equational logic satis
fying some additional requirements. Computation in a functional module is accomplished
by using the equations as rewrite rules until a canonical form is found. This is the rea
son why the equations must satisfy the additional requirements of being Church-Rosser,
terminating, and sort decreasing.
A system module is declared in Maude using the keywords
mod <ModuleName> is
<DeclarationsAndStatements>
endm

<DeclarationsAndStatements> includes sorts and subsorts, operation, equation, rules, etc..
declaration.
The system modules specify the initial model T of a rewrite theory Æ = (£î, E, L, K) in
the membership equational logic variant of rewriting logic. These initial models capture
nicely the intuitive idea of “rewrite systems” in the sense that they are transition systems
whose states are equivalence classes [Z] of ground terms modulo the equations E in

and

whose transitions are proofs a : [Z] —> [Z'] in rewriting logic, that is concurrent rewriting
computations in the system described by the rules in R. Such proofs are equated modulo a
natural notion of proof equivalence that computationally corresponds to the “true concur
rency” of the computations. By adopting a logical instead of a computational perspective,
we can alternatively view such models as “logical systems” in which formulas are validly
rewritten to other formulas by concurrent rewritings which correspond to proofs for the
logic in question.
3.3.4 Maude Model Checking
The Maude LTL model checker supports on-the-fly explicit state model checking of
concurrent systems expressed as rewrite theories. In the Maude LTL model checker [66]
implementation, they introduce a distinguished sort State, the initial model
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of a rewrite

theory IR = (Z, E, R) has an underlying Kripke structure given by the total binary relation
extending its one step sequential rewrites. This can be express in the following.
For each kinded term [/] € T^E„state, if we have [a]: [i] -> [/'] is a proof term in

then

[/'] e T^iEstate- We can then associate to iR and State the Kripke structure K(H, State) =
{T^iE^tate,
and

£x), where

is the one-step sequential JR-rewriting relation on T^/e,state,

is the labeling function with the form

: T^/e,state

^{SPred^, State)), where

SPred(E, State) is the set of first order formula.
Maude model checking is an automatic process on a finitary rewrite theory IR = (Z, E,
R) at initial states [/] of sort State, with the set {[«] e Ze/^IIR (- [/] —> [w]}, of all states
reachable from [/] is finite. The rewrite theory iR should satisfy the previously mentioned
requirement with all reachable states [«] having sort 5 tate. Furthermore, the equational
theory (Z, E) should be confluent and terminating and the rules R should be coherent rela
tive to the equations E [32], Note that many rewrite theories of interest may have an infinite
number of states, yet the states reachable from any given initial state may still be finite.
Based on the above illustration of the model checking strategy on rewriting theory, we
demonstrated the syntactical definition of each model checking module in Maude. A
rewrite theory # satisfying the above assumptions can be specified in Maude by a sys
tem module, denoted by M. Then, given an initial state, init of sort StateM, we can model
check different LTL properties beginning at this initial state by the following steps:
• defining a new module, say CHECK - M, that includes the modules M and the
predefined module MODEL - CHECKER as submodules;
• giving a subsort declaration, subsort S tateM < S tate., where 5 tate is one of the key
sorts in the module MODEL - CHECKER’,
• defining the semantics of the state predicates by means of equations involving the
operator
op _I=_ : State Prop -> Result [special ...] .
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in MODEL - CHECKER. We define the semantics of each state predicate, say
a parameterized state predicate p, by giving a set of (conditional) equations of the
form:
ceq expl |= p(ull,...,unl) = true if Cl .

ceq expk |= p(ulk,...,unk) = true if Ck .

where:
- the expi, 1 < i < k, are patterns of sort States, that is, terms, possibly with
variables, and involving only constructors, so that any of their instances by
simplified ground terms cannot be further simplified;
- the terms p(uli,..., uni), 1 < i < k are likewise patterns of sort Prop,
- each condition Ci, 1 < i < k, is a conjunction of equalities and memberships;
such conditions may involve auxiliary functions, either imported from auxiliary
modules, or defined by additional equations in our module CHECK - M.
Once the semantics of each of the state predicates has been defined, we are then ready,
given an initial state init, to model check any LTL formula, say form, involving such
predicates.This can be done by using the reduce command in Maude as follows:
reduce init |= formula .

3.4 ArchJava Programming Language
Object oriented programming languages are popular for its object point of view on the
program. An object is an entity, either abstract or concrete, which encapsulate the informa
tion inside. For the communication to outside, this entity provides an interface that can be
invoked by other entities totally or partially. Its attributes generally are invisible so that the
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characters of the entity can be well protected without the malicious attacks or unintended
damage.
Although there are many advantages and widely applicable areas of object oriented pro
gramming languages, most of object orient programming language is not very good at de
scribing the component-based software architecture. The component building block in the
component-based architecture has to be written manually with good care and well design
so that it can implement and realize the general function and communicate with environ
ment in a good manner. In order to more efficiently handle the software architecture, which
is SAM in our Implementation, we used ArchJava as the target programming language in
the translation.
ArchJava [19] is an extension to Java that seamlessly unifies software architecture with
implementation, using a type system to ensure that the implementation conforms to archi
tectural constraints. In other words, ArchJava is proposed to avoid inconsistency, confu
sion, and violation of architecture properties when decoupling implementation code from
software architecture. Fig. 6 shows a piece of ArchJava code.
3.4.1 Components, Ports and Architecture Composition
A component in ArchJava is an object that communicates with other components in a
structured way [17]. In ArchJava, a component type class is introduced to specify the type
of components that share some behavior and structure.
A component can only communicate with other components at its level in the architec
ture through explicitly declared ports. A port in ArchJava represents a logical communi
cation channel between two or more components. Ports in ArchJava declare two sets of
port modifiers - provides, requires. A provided method is implemented by the compo
nent. The definition of a provided method must be given either inside or outside the port.
For example (Fig. 7), the search port provides downloadPoem method that can be Invoked
from the user interface (component SwapUI). The implementation of downloadPoem is
shown in Fig. 7. Conversely, each required method is provided by some other component

43

public component class MainComponent {
private final SubComponentl coml = new SubComponentlQ;
private final SubComponent2 com2 = new SubComponent2();
private final Subcomponents com3;
private final SubComponent4 com4;
connect coml.in, com2.out;
public port port 1 {
requires void sendMsg(Msg p_msg);
provides Msg getMsgQ;

}
connect pattern Subcomponents.send, SubComponent4.recv;
public MainComponent() {
com3 = new SubComponent3();
com4 = new SubComponent4Q;
connect(com3.send, com4.recv);

}
public Msg getMsgQ {

}
}
Figure 6: A Shorthand Example of ArchJava

connected to this port. In Fig. 7, the poems port requires method that get descriptions of
all the poems in the database (component PoemStroe) getPoem{PoemDesc desc). A port
may have both required and provided methods, or have only one or the other as shown in
the example.
In ArchJava, a hierarchical software architecture is expressed as a composition of a num
ber of subcomponents connected together. A subcomponent is a component instance nested
within another component. For example, in Fig. 8. three subcomponents are a user inter
face (SwapUI), a poem database (PoemStore), and a poem peer (PoemPeer) instance in the
main component PoemSwap.
A static hierarchy of interacting component instances is defined by connect primitive.
The connect primitive connects two or more ports together, binding each required method
to a provided method with the same name and signature.
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public component class PoemPeer {
public port search {
provides PoemDescf] search(PoemDesc pdesc);
provides void downloadPoem(PoemDesc desc);

}
public port poems {
requires PoemDesc[] getPoemDescsQ;
requires Poem getPoem(PoemDesc desc);
requires void addPoem(Poem poem);

public port interface client {
requires client(InetAddress addr) throws IOException;
requires PoemDesc[] search(PoemDesc pDesc, int)

void downloadPoemfPoemDesc desc) throws IOException {
client peer = new client(desc.getAddress[]);
Poem newPoem = peer.download(desc);
if (newPoem != null) {
poems.addPoemfnewPoem);

}

Figure 7: Poempeer class

Connect expression is to describe interaction between dynamically created components
at run time. For example, three connect expressions are declared in the class PoemSwap
(Fig. 8). A connection pattern is used to document a set of connections that can be in
stantiated at run time using connect expressions. Each connect expression must match a
connection pattern declared in the enclosing component. For example, the first three con
nect patterns in Fig. 8.
3.4.2

Connector Abstractions in ArchJava

Connector [20] in ArchJava is mainly designed for the situation that connectors need
to be specified explicitly in large scale systems. The connector class has the ability of
type checking and invocation of matched ports in communicated components. User can
explicitly define built-in semantics in ArchJava for the invocation of matched ports in a
connector.
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public component class PoemSwap {
private final SwapUI ui = new SwapUI();
private final PoemStore store = new PoemStore();
private final PoemPeer peer = new PoemPeerQ;
connect pattern SwapUI.poems, PoemStore.poems;
connect pattern PoemPeer.poems, PoemStore.poems;
connect pattern SwapUI.search, PoemPeer.search;
public poemSwap() {
connect(ui.poems, store.poems);
connect(peer.poems, store.poems);
connect(ui .earch,peer, search);

1

Figure 8: PoemSwap class

3,5 Aspect Oriented Programming Languages
Although OO technology offers greater ability for separation of concerns, it still has
difficulty for localizing concerns that do not fit naturally into a single program module, or
even several closely related program modules. Concerns can range from high-level notions
such as security and quality of services to low-level notions like buffering, caching, and
logging. They can also be functional, such as business logics, or non-functional, such as
synchronization. Some concerns, such as XML parsing and URL pattern matching, usually
couple with a few objects, yet achieve good cohesion. Other concerns, such as logging, will
intertwine with many highly unrelated modules.
Aspect-oriented programming (AOP) [26,118] is a new technology for separation of
crosscutting concerns into single units called aspects. An aspect is a modular unit of cross
cutting implementation. It encapsulates behaviors that affect multiple classes into reusable
modules through the pointcut(s) and advice(s). Through this constructs, Aspect-Oriented
Programming complements OO programming by allowing the developer to dynamically
modify the static OO model to create a system that can grow to meet new requirements.
In other words, it allows us to dynamically modify models or implementations to include
code required for secondary requirements (in our case, it is runtime verification) without
modifying the original code. Fig. 9(a) is a simple Java class, and Fig. 9(b) shows the aspect
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code that monitors the setting of a point. A pointcut setterQ is defined at the method calls
either setXQ or setYQ. Advice afterQ returning is used to deal with after the method call
is returned. For more detailed syntax information, please refer to [26].
class Point {

aspect SetterTracking {

private int x, y;

private static boolean stay = false;

Point ( int x, int y ) {this.x=x; this.y=y }

pointcut setterQ : target( Point) &&
( call ( void setX( int ) || call ( void setY( int ) );

void setX( int x ) {this.x=x;}
void setY( int y ) {this.y=y;}

afterO returning : setterQ {

int getXQ { return x;}

stay = true;

int getYQ { return y;}

(a) Class Point

(b) Aspect SetterTracking

Figure 9: An Example of AspectJ
Our runtime checker in the implementation is implemented by AspectJ. Besides, our
work shows that an aspect-oriented approach can assist in the generation of component
customizations that extend the component with properties declared in the model.
3.6 Summary
As we have discussed in the previous chapter, the proposed framework integrates multi
ple techniques seamlessly: algebraic specifications, Petri nets, category theory, and trans
formation systems. This chapter gives a brief introduction for each of them as the back
ground knowledge for the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 4
AN OVERVIEW OF INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK

4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the basic idea and the structure of an integrated framework for the
verification of software architecture model. The basic idea of the integrated framework can
be illustrated in a reference frame in Fig. 10.

In Fig. 10, each quadrant represents the scope of a technique or data module (holds the
file of a model or a program). For instance, the Quadrant I represents the scope of model
of the system, the Quadrant IV represents the model checking technique, the Quadrant
II represents the program module, and the Quadrant III represents the runtime checking
technique. In this reference frame, horizontally there are two layers — system layer and
verification layer. System layer (Quadrant I & II) has the model denoted in the Maude
programming language (Quadrant I) and the Java construct code of the model (Quadrant
I). Verification layer (Quadrant III & IV) has the runtime checker (Quadrant IV) and model
checker (Quadrant III). Vertically there are two paths - implementation path and model
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path. Model path (Quadrant I & IV) has the model denoted in the Maude code program
ming language, and the model checker that is used to cheek the correctness of the model.
Implementation path (Quadrant II & III) has the Java construct of the model (Quadrant II)
that is obtained from a translator, and the runtime checker (Quadrant III) that is used for
the property checking of the Java construct. Both the model denoted in the Maude code
programming language and Java construct of the model are obtained from the translation
on the software architecture model of the system. The architecture model can be viewed as
in the third coordinate axis.
The layers and paths with the system model form three types of relations: translation
relation, input relation, and consistency relation. The two paths form two input relations
- system model in model checker code is the input of model checker in the model path
and corresponding Java construct code is the input of runtime checker in the implementa
tion. The translation relations are constructed by translators from the system model to the
model checker code and Java construct code. The consistency relation can be obtained by
comparing the results of the model checker and runtime checker.
The layers and paths make each quadrant more meaningful. We name each quadrant us
ing a combination of layer names and path names. For instance, the system-model quadrant
represents the model is designed and translated into a programming language recognized
by a model checker, but has not yet been verified. The system-implementation quadrant
represents an individual piece of code translated into Java construct and has not been veri
fied by runtime checker, the Java construct is corresponding to the architecture model. The
verification-implementation quadrant denotes the runtime checker that is used to verify and
validate some program represented in Java construct. The verification-model quadrant de
notes the model checker that is used to verify and validate the model of systems. The above
vertical and horizontal relations connect different quadrants together. Next, let us see how
to implement each quadrant in the integrated framework.
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4.2 The Integrated Framework
The framework [73] is designed on the model checking and runtime analysis of the
software architecture model based on the previously illustrated idea. The overall structure
of the integrated framework is shown in Fig. 11.
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Figure 11: Overview of the Integrated Framework

This framework includes three layers, input layer, translation phase, and verification
phase. Input layer has the input file of the software architecture model and formal require
ment of the system properties. The translation phase can be split into two parts - model
checking parts and runtime checking parts. The model has to be translated into the pro
gramming language that recognized by the model checker. This translation outputs the
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component specified by the programming language of model checker. This translation is
called MCTranslation. In the runtime checking part the model is translated into the program
language in the implementation level. Moreover, it needs to instrument the translated pro
gram based on the property specification, so that we can know where and what we should
observe and verified. This translation can be done in parallel with the instrument, which is
called online instrumentation. Thus we get the component as an instrumented program for
the model. This translation is called ImTranslation.
The verification phase has two entities, model checker and runtime checker. It is ob
viously to know that model checker is used to check the component of model checker
program, and runtime checker is used to check the component of instrumented program.
We split this framework into several modules, mainly data modules and function modules.
Data modules are the input of output of the function modules. For instance, model in
model checker code, translated and instrumented program are all data modules, while logic
engine, and translator for McTranslation and ImTranslation are all function modules.
Fig. 11 has a correspondence with the picture shown in the Fig. 10. This correspondence
can be shown in the Table 3.
Table 3: Correspondence between Reference Frame and Integrated Framework
Reference Frame

Integrated Framework

System Layer

Translation Phase

Verification Layer

Verification Phase

Model Path

McTranslation - Program for Model Checker - Model Checker

Implementation Path

ImTranslation + Logic Engine - Instrumented Program - Runtime Checker

From the Fig. 11, we can see that the model path implements the verification in the
design level, and the implementation path realizes the verification in the Implementation
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level. Our framework integrates the verification of software architecture model in the de
sign level with that of in the implementation level because of the highly complementary
between model checking and runtime verification. The runtime verification is used to re
solve the state explosion problem in the model checking. For those properties that cannot
be verified due to the size of the system increasing, I can move the verification from design
level using model checking to the implementation level using runtime analysis. This results
are demonstrated by several case studies in Chapter 8.
4.2.1 Input Layer
The input layer has two parts - Model module (Mm) holds input file of software archi
tecture model, and the Property module (Pm) holds the input file of property specification
of the system. Software architecture model is the core part of all data modules in the frame
work, e.g., all other data modules can be obtained from this module. The model can be any
architecture description language that is model-oriented [200]. The reason that I limit the
model description language to be model oriented [200] because the model-oriented formal
method is constructed in terms of mathematical structures such as tuples, relations, func
tions, sets, and sequences, thus the mapping strategy can be designed easily from the model
to the implementation. On the other hand, I can save the property-oriented description of
the system for expected properties. In short,
Model module (Mm) is a set of states X = {cr|cri,

...} that describes the

system model (M) behavior using a formal specification language.
Besides, it holds the properties of the system specified formally.
The property module (Pm) is the formatted file for the system property specification.
Linear temporal logic (LTL) Is used in this work to specify the system properties. These
LTL formulae are rewritten into a certain format (e.g., XML file) that can feed to the mod
ules in the translation phase. Since the property module is a transformed specification for
system properties, it specifies a set of states that satisfies a proposition (P). In short,
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Property module (Pm) is a set of states E' = {T(cr')|P(cr')

A cr' e

E'}, where

T(cr') is a power set of state cr', P(cr') denotes property P holds on the state a.
We have S' c E.
4.2.2 Translation Phase
The translation phase has two parts - McTranslation and ImTranslation. McTranslation module translates the architecture Model module to the program that is recognized
by a model checker. Let Pm represent the data for the program recognized by a model
checker. The McTranslation defines a mapping relation (TMc) from the Model module
(Mm) to the program module recognized by a model checker (Pm), e.g., TMc: Mm —> Pm.
ImTranslation module translates architecture Model module to the low level programming
language in the implementation level (in this case I use object oriented programming lan
guage (OOPL)) to feed to the runtime checker. Let Pj denote the data module specified by
the object oriented programming language. ImTranslation implements a mapping relation
Tlm from Model module (Mm) to the 00 programming language data module (Pj). In
short, TIm : Mm -> Pj. The translation algorithms are demonstrated in the following two
chapters: Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
Currently there are several different model checker tools developed during recent
decades, such as Maude, SMC, SPIN, etc.. In this dissertation, I did not develop a new
model checking tool. Ichoose one available tool for the model checking purpose since
develop a model checker is not the research goal. Model checking (Me) is an exhaustive
searching process of the property states out of all system states, e.g., Me = {V<rz e E.U/crj =
S'}Runtime checker module (Rv) has two basic functions - discharge the necessary events
for the model monitoring as soon as possible, and check the event traces against the prop
erties specification. In short,
Rv = {Vo-i e ECMrr. Uz- cri = S'}, where

is the currents system states that the

model is executing, Zcurr c E.
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4.2 J

Translation Validation

There are two translations in the integrated framework. The verification results on the
model highly depend on the correctness of the translations. If the translation is not correct,
it does not make sense to verify the system model because the verification is not reliable
for the model. Several works have been done for the correctness proof of the translation
from a formal model to the model checker program using category theory [65,162,163,
168]. In Chapter 71 proposed methods to formally prove the behavioral consistency for the
translation from SAM architecture model to the Maude programming language [47].
The correctness proof from the formal model to the low level implementation program is
still a very challenging research issue. In Chapter 7,1 proposed a semantic-based method
to prove the behavior consistency between the SAM model and the Java construct output
from the runtime checker SAM Parser by stepwise comparison of the state sequence.
4.2.4 Verification Phase
In the verification Phase there are two purposes - verify the system properties of the
model in the design level and in the implementation level. In this work, I choose some
available model checking tool (Maude [47]) to verify the system model in the design level.
The discussion of the design level verification using model checking is presented in
Chapter 5.
In the implementation level, the primary objective was to create a runtime environment
that would simplify the realization, implementation, execution, and monitoring of SAM
architectures while preserving the properties specified in the model. To develop a method
ology to reach this goal, 1(1) identify an automatic implementation of SAM models, (2)
generate runtime verification code from SAM properties, and (3) instrument or weave the
runtime verification code into the implementation.
The discussion of the implementation level verification is presented in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION IN THE DESIGN

5.1 Introduction
A software architecture (SA) design provides a high-level abstraction of system topol
ogy, functionality, and/or behavior [167, 187], which provides a basis for early system
understanding and analysis as well as a foundation for subsequent detailed design and im
plementation. Therefore, software architecture plays a critical role in the software de
velopment process. In the past decades, tremendous research has been done on software
description languages and their analysis.
There are two main research groups in the field of software architectures analysis: one
group has focused on the design issues, formal foundations, and analysis of architectures,
which is discussed in this chapter; while the other has resulted in technologies for imple
menting software architectures, which is discussed in the Chapter 6. The first approach has
focused on architectural design abstractions called styles and the semantics underpinning
such styles [187]. To date theorem proving and model checking are two main streams for
the architectural analysis. As discussed in Chapter 2, model checking Is widely used in aca
demic and industrial for the software analysis and verification due to its highly automatic
feature and counter example feedback.
Model checking is a technique building a finite state model of a system and checking
whether a given property holds in that model [44]. It designates a collection of techniques
for the automatic analysis of reactive system. The inputs to a model checker are a (usually
finite-state) description of the system and a number of properties. The model checker either
confirms that the properties hold or reports that they are violated by giving an counter
example. There are several different model checking tools, such SMV [113,138], SPIN
[45,121], etc.. The Maude model checker supports on-the-fly explicit state model checking
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of concurrent systems expressed as rewrite theories. We introduce the related work on
architecture analysis in the following section.
5.2

Related Work

Analyzing software architecture is to predict the quality of a system before it has been
built and not to establish precise estimates but the principal effects of an architecture. Var
ious architecture analysis methods have been proposed in the literature. An overview of
scenario-based architecture analysis method is given [54]. Scenario-based architecture
analysis method [116,117] appeared in 1993, whose purpose is to develop a systematic
way to evaluate quality attributes on the model-based architecture. Correctness is one of
the key attributes of the software product quality. The correctness verification is infused
into the several system key properties, such as safety, functional requirements analysis
methodology [89,90,94,95]. Our work is to develop an integrated and systematic method
ology for the correctness assurance based on the integration of the formal analysis methods
- namely, model checking and runtime verification. In this chapter, we focus on the model
checking based architecture analysis and verification method for the correctness assurance.
5.3

Software Architecture Verification & Analysis

In this section we discuss the software architecture verification & analysis in the design
level. First, we give an architecture-independent software architecture verification & analy
sis method (SAVAM). Then based on the method, we present the application of SAVAM
on the Software Architecture Model (SAM).
5.3.1 Software Architecture Verification & Analysis Method
Software architecture provides a high level abstraction of large scale complex systems
in the design level. However, the verification and analysis of software systems lag far
behind the increasing growth in size and complexity of software systems. This is due to the
fact that methods, techniques and tools for assuring the software quality, e.g,. correctness,
reliability, etc., fall behind the software modeling and specification. In this section, we
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address a model checking based, architecture model independent verification and analysis
method with respect to software quality, especially, correctness. This method can be mainly
enumerated below.
1. Identify the software system using specific software architecture description lan
guage.
2. Characterize a canonical functional partitioning for the domain.
3. Map the functional partitioning onto the architecture’s structural decomposition.
4. Choose a (set of) quality attribute(s) (in our work is correctness) with which to assess
the architecture.
5. Choose a proper model checker as the verification and analysis tool.
6. Map the software model onto the programming langauge recognized by the model
checker.
7. Identify a proper set of structure properties from the architecture structure.
8. Identify a proper set of behavior properties from the architecture behavior.
9. Map the software architecture properties to the specification specified by the model
checker.
10. Evaluate the architecture model of the system against the properties using model
checker.
11. Analyze the results.
In our work, as an example of the software architecture verification and analysis method
(SAVAM), we chose SAM as a software architecture model, and Maude as the model
checker. In the application of SAVAM on the SAM architecture model and Maude model
checker, we have instantiate the above procedure as follows.
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1. Identify the software system using SAM architecture model.
2. Characterize a canonical functional partitioning as components, connectors for the
domain.
3. Map components and connectors onto the architecture’s structural decomposition.
4. In our work, we focus on the correctness verification. Correctness is one of the
features of the software product qualities.
5. Choose Maude model checker as the verification and analysis tool.
6. Map the SAM model onto the Maude programming langauge. This procedure is
provided in the next section in detail. The validation of the translation is provided in
the Chapter 7.
7. Identify a proper set of structure properties from the SAM architecture structure.
8. Identify a proper set of behavior properties from the SAM architecture behavior.
9. Map the software architecture properties to the specification specified by the Maude
model checker.
10. Evaluate the architecture model of the system against the properties using Maude
model checker. The results are demonstrated in several case studies In Chapter 8.
5.3.2 Software Architecture Perspectives
The architectural design of a software system can be described from (at least) three per
spectives - the behavior of its domain of interest, its structure, and the property classifica
tion on the architecture domain. These perspectives reflect a consensus within the software
architecture community, as witnessed by the literature [142], We will discuss each of these
perspectives in turn.
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Behavior - Functionality
A system’s functionality is what the system can do during the execution. It may be a
single function or a bundle of related functions which together describe the system’s over
all behavior. For large systems, a partitioning divides the behavior into a collection of
functions which together comprise the system’s function but which are individually sim
ple to describe or otherwise conceptualize. Typically, a single system’s functionality is
decomposed through techniques such as structured analysis [143] or object oriented analy
sis [178], but this is not always the case. For the software product quality analysis, such as
correctness, a model based approach will bring more accurate and precise reasoning of the
system. An important feature of software architectures is the ability to allow reasoning on
interesting properties of the system. This would allow an early in the software development
analysis of relevant features of the system, and it would help in evaluating the suitability
of a software architecture. Automatical analysis of the software architecture model with
tool support can further highly reduce the errors introduced by human involvement. Sev
eral works have been done in formal analysis and tool support for the architecture quality
analysis [98,203].
Structure
A system’s structure is the combination of ingredients of the system abstraction, which
reveals how it is constructed from smaller connected pieces. The structure is described in
terms of the following parts: 1. A collection of components which represent computational
entities (e.g., a process) or persistent data repositories (e.g., a file); 2. A representation of
the connections between the components, that is, the communication and control relation
ships among the components. In our analysis of architectures, we use notations in software
architecture model SAM - a component based formal architecture model as lexicon.
To understand the overall behavior of a system, we would need to provide more detailed
descriptions of the computations possible within components and the overall coordination
of a collection of components with various connection relationships between them. Such
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computational and coordination models are explicit in a SAM architectural description
model.
Property Classification
Property classification is one of the key issue for the software architecture verification
and analysis due to the following reasons. First, the verification of system is based on the
architecture model against the system properties. Without property specification, there is no
way to put the verification. Second, system behaviors are specified on the functional and
nonfunctional features, which are formalized in the property specification of the system.
Thus the formal verification techniques, such as model checking, can be applied. In our
work, system properties are specified as temporal logic formula. Although the main two
streams of the temporal properties are safety and liveness, several works have been done
for the temporal logic property classification.
Safety liveness properties are first proposed by and stipulated in the work of [123]. The
first formal definition of safety and liveness was given by Alpem and Schneider [22]. In
contrast to Lamport, they represented a finite prefix of an execution as the set of all possible
continuations from that point on, which leads to a slightly more general notion of safety
properties. A property is a liveness property, if and only if it contains at least one continua
tion for every finite prefix. This corresponds to the intuition that the “good thing” can still
happen after any finite execution.
The difference between this two characterization is in those properties that are not invari
ant under stuttering. However, an explicit use of finite executions for the characterization
settle the matter.
Further distinct work on safety-liveness property characterization was presented by Zohar and Amir in their work of [135]. In this paper [135], the property is characterized as
a hierarchical organization mainly being composed of safety and liveness properties. The
combination of these two basic property categories, four more complicated categories are
derived. The hierarchical organization is shown in the figure Fig. 12.
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Figure 12: Property Hierarchy

In this hierarchy, the upper level contains properties in the lover level, i.e., properties in
the lower level is a proper set of those in the upper level. This hierarchical classification
Is based on the investigation of finite words or sequence of states. Properties of property
classes in the hierarchy are
1. Closure: (using set operations)
safety, guarantee properties - closure under union and intersection;
persistence, recurrence properties - closed under union and intersection;
obligation is closed under three boolean operations;
reactivity is closed under three boolean operations.
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2. Duality: safety under complement is liveness properties; recurrence under comple
ment is persistent properties; and vice versa.
3. Topological properties: safety properties are the closed sets and liveness properties
are the open sets (This coincides with [22].); recurrence properties are the G$ sets
and persistent properties are the Ga sets.
4. Every property can be represented as the intersection of safety and liveness property.
5. Semantical relation: Every specifiable k-property is a k-specifiable property.
All these properties hold for the four characterizations: language view, topological view,
temporal logic view, automata view. Finally, the conclusion from [135] is coherent with that
in [22] (for those invariant on stuttering). Further work is [38]. They do not characterize
a partition but a hierarchy of properties. The least level of this hierarchy coincides with
the characterization of safety properties. The higher levels provide a finer distinction of
different liveness properties.
[155] extended the safety-liveness classification on the finite state sequence for a com
putation to the infinite state sequence for all computations. I think, this can fall in the group
of CTL classification.
A different kind but practical classification based on the system context was proposed
by [59].
All these classifications fall in the safety-liveness point of view. Moreover, few of them
considered the complexity of model checking on different classes. The work of Ivana and
Radek [37] investigated the complexity based on the classification in [135], thus filled in
the piece of blank in this area.
In [37], Ivana and Radek pointed out for explicit model checkers, there is no complexity
difference for different classes in the hierarchy for all algorithms presented. Some benefits
can be obtained by employing some heuristics on different algorithms. While it’s more
efficient to use specialized algorithm for symbolic model checkers. Thus properties are

62

classified in terms of the verification complexity as three classes: reactivity, recurrence and
safety from difficulty to easy.
The work [59] provided a thorough overview on the property classification patterns and
also discussed the mappings to LTL formulas. These patterns are abstracted from over
500 examples. The authors also created an online repository for information about prop
erty specification for finite-state verification, and keep updating the property patterns. The
property patterns identified in the work [59] are general to many systems, but some are not
suitable for specific domains. In the following, we will identify some of the properties in
the SAM architecture model.
To be consistent with the SAM architecture specification, we identify the properties as
two main streams in SAM - structure properties and behavior properties. Besides that,
since SAM is also suitable for the realtime embedded systems, the realtime properties are
listed. Because realtime system is out of this dissertation, we do not consider this group in
detail.
1. Structure Properties. This kind of properties is closely related to the topology of
the model. Most of these properties can be directly verified on the SAM model
without animating the system. These properties are necessary conditions that ensure
the feasibility of the system. If one of them is not fulfilled, we can assert firmly that
the system is erroneous. Among these properties, we cite the following properties:
• Port consistency. The port pi for a component/connector has to be semantically
consistent with the port p2 that communicates with it of a connector/component.
The semantically consistency means that 1) the two ports have to have the same
name; 2) the token (tk) flowing out of one port flows into another port. This
property has the following pattern:

P2(tk)).

• Token flow. For a component/connector, if a token (tk) is consumed by the
transition after the input port (/?,), and then the same token (tk) is produced by
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the transition before some output port (po). The property for the token flowing
has the pattern: n(pi(tk) -» Opo(tk))
• Sort consistency. If there is token flowing through a component/connector, the
sorts for the input and output have to be consistent, this can be validated through
the guard condition defined in the transitions.
• Structure splitting. One component (COTi) can communicate more than one
components (Cmi) through one connector (C„). The communicated ports in the
other components (COTi) have to follow sort consistency, sometimes may also
need to follow token flowing.
Those enumerated structure properties are easily to be verified. Many of them can be
observed through the structure or the guard in the transitions.
2. Behavior Properties. This kind of properties concern the dynamic behavior of the
systems. This means that they are related to state changing of the system. The
evaluation of the dynamic behavior properties are based on the behavior description
- Petri nets. Its verification is achieved on a set of places describing a possible
evolution of the system. Among these properties, we cite the following properties:
• Responsiveness. This property indicates for any request sent from an output
port (po) in a component, there must be a response from an input port (/?,) In
another component. The token information may be different. The pattern for
this property is: □(po(iio)

Op^tki)).

• Selective responsiveness. The receiving ports (ps) get information from the
same sending ports (pr), and the relation between two receiving ports (psi, ps2)
are exclusive or. The pattern for this property is: □(/?,.

(ps\ V p^)). Here we

use or to represent exclusive or.
• Conjoined reverse. This property provide a reverse reasoning from the input
port in a component, generally it has to be past time LTL.
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• Cause-effect. This property expresses a chain relation among more than one
component. The ports involved have to be in an ordered relation. If the ordered
relation is broken, the property cannot hold.
3. Realtime Properties. These properties aim at evaluating the system in terms of time
response. Having constraints on the different activities, we want to be able to deter
mine if the system can answer in a limited time. The constraints that can be stated
on activities include delay, period, deadline, etc.
Most of the behavior properties can be referred to the work [72].
In the verification and analysis process, we concern mainly the behavior properties, since
structure properties are easily to be identified and verified. The results for the property
verification will be discussed for each case study in the Chapter 8. Next, we discuss the
translation algorithm from SAM to Maude model checker in order to fulfill the requirement
of the verification and analysis method using Maude.
5.4

Translation from SAM to Maude

The SAM model allows formal validation of a component system against system con
straints and property specified on its abstraction represented by a component or connector.
Here, validation means that the developer can animate the specification by providing ini
tial markings and checking if the responses meet the expected results. Validation of SAM
is based on the precise syntax and semantics of Petri net formal language and temporal
logic. The validation will cover the topology and dynamic behavior of the Petri net as well
as temporal logic formulae. Here we present how to translate SAM model to the Maude
language.
Step 1. Translation to the functional module: generate the sorts operators used in the
functional modules for the model signatures. This step translates each place, sorts, mark
ings in a Petri net into the corresponding part in Maude’s functional module.
1. For all sorts in the behavior model.
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• Int, bool and String sort in a Petri net are also sorts in Maude. Int and bool are
implicitly imported while String module must be imported by user explicitly.
• Other user defined sorts that are not defined in Maude must be declared as sorts
in the functional module.
• Declare a sort named Marking.
2. For all ports in a component/connector and places in the behavior model.
• Map them to the operator p with the same identifiers, and we have the following
sentence in function module:
op p : <sorts> -> Marking .

• Note: each element in the Cartesian product is a parameter in the operator.
Step 2. Translation to the system modules. There are three types of system modules,
one is for the model signature that corresponds to the architecture structure and dynamic
behavior of the model, one is for the mapping to the predicates, and one is for the model
checking, which includes the property specification.
1. Model structure and dynamic behavior Module (SysID).
• Define each basic component or connector as a system module with the decla
ration of variables and necessary rules and operators.
• Each composition is specified as a system module that including its sub
components and connector that are predefined as a module.
• All guard conditions in a transition are a (un)conditional rule with the following
format:
rl [id] : <input places marking>
=>
coutput places marking> .
crl [id] : cinput places marking>
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=>
<output places marking>
if ccondition marking> .

where id is the identifier of the transition.
2. Predicates mapping module(SysID-PREDS). In this module each place is mapped to
an operator in Maude.
• The identifier of an operator is P connected with port or place’s identifier.
• The parameters of an operator are the sorts of the place.
• Result type of this operation is predefined type for logic formula in Maude
(Prop).
• Finally, we have to connect each operator with a predicate by defining equations
as following format:
eq ml op m2 1= Pid = true .

where ml and m2 are Markings.
3. Property specification module (SysID-CHECK). This is the model checking part.
• Define initial marking and property identifiers as constant operators with the
following formats:
op init : -> Marking .
op property : -> Formula .

• Each initial marking and property are specified as equations with following
formats:
eq init = cinitial markings> .
eq property = <predicates> .
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Each module lately created must import necessary modules predefined by user or in
Maude to reuse those specifications or program. The rules in the structure and behavior
module (SysID) need to use operators defined in the model signature functional module
so the functional module (SysID) is imported in the structure and behavior module. The
predicate system module (SysID-PREDS) use sort S tate and logic operations predefined
in the Maude so functional module Satisfaction was imported. This module also use sig
nature functional module (Sysld) so the structure and behavior module (SysID-PREDS) is
imported. Finally property specification and checking module (SysID-CHECK) imports
predicates module (SysID-PREDS) and model checking module MODEL-CHECKER and
linear temporal logic module LTL-SIMPLIFIER.
In our translation, system signature such as sorts and operators are declared in the func
tional module. This translates the places/ports, sorts into algebra in Maude that will be used
in the system modules. The dynamic semantics of Petri net can be mapped to the rewriting
rules used in Maude. Computationally, the meaning of rewriting rules is to specify local
concurrent transitions that can take place in a system if the pattern in the rule’s lefthand
side matches a fragment of the system state and the rule’s condition is satisfied. In that
case, the transition specified by the rule can take place, and the matched fragment of the
state is transformed into the corresponding instance of the righthand side. Thus we can see
an amazing match between semantics of Petri net and rewriting logic. These are theoretic
aspect of the above translation algorithm.
The underlying theoretical background can be explained as follows. A rewrite specifi
cation IR consists of a single-sorted signature £2#, a set E% of equations over £2^, and a set
R& or labeled rewrite rules. A rewrite P : M -» N means that the term M rewrites to the
term N modulo

and this rewrite is witnessed by the proof term P. Apart from general

(concurrent) rewrites P : M —> N that are generated from identity and atomic rewrites by
parallel and sequential composition, rewriting logic classifies its most basic rewrites as fol
low: a one-step (concurrent) rewrite is generated by parallel composition from identity and
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atomic rewrites and contains at least one atomic rewrite, and a one-step sequential rewrite
is a one-step rewrite containing exactly one atomic rewrite.
The operational semantics of Rewrite specification extends the operational semantics of
membership equational specification by applying computational equations E^ and rewrite
rules

modulo the structural equations E^. The process net for the behavior model -

Petri nets - can be matched into the rewrite theory R. For instance, signatures and rewrite
rules can be mapped into the net specification and places, and transitions with their preand post-sets. Instead of using operational semantics, the work [144] demonstrated the
isomorphism between category Petri nets and category Rewrite theory.
5.5 Summary
This chapter demonstrated a model checking based software architecture verification and
validation method. The method is established on a general picture for the software archi
tecture verification and analysis method (SAVAM), and composed of several key steps. In
our work, the model we choose is SAM software architecture model, the model checker
is Maude model checker. Based on the SAVAM, we provided a systematic translation al
gorithm from SAM to Maude programming language. The background theory is rewriting
logic and membership equation logic.
With the property specified in the LTL, we classified properties in SAM architecture into
three main streams, two of them are discussed. The last group of properties is out of scope
of this dissertation, we skip it as future works.
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CHAPTER 6
VERIFICATION & VALIDATION IN IMPLEMENTATION

6.1

Introduction

To date, most architectural tools have focused on the simulation and analysis of archi
tectural models to exploit the semantic power of ADLs. At the same time, insufficient
progress has been made on supporting implementation of applications based on styles and
ADL models [142]. However, analysis of software architecture is not enough to generate
correct product due to two reasons. On one hand, not all properties can be verified at design
level because of the state space explosion problem, verification costs and characteristics of
open-system. On the other hand, a correct and valid software architecture design does
not ensure a correct implementation due to the error-prone characteristics of the software
development process.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the group focuse on providing software frameworks, often
through object-oriented reuse techniques such as design patterns and object hierarchies.
This approach has lead to creation of a variety of mediate techniques and associated com
mercial technologies for component-based development [14,185,199]. However, software
implementations resulting from such use of frameworks often differ widely from concep
tual models and lack adequate semantic underpinnings for analytic purposes.
6.2

Related Works

We can identify in the literature by two categories of works that are mostly related to
our research. The first one concerns the works that implementing software architecture de
scriptions automatically without considering the software correctness and software product
quality after release. The second one is composed of the works generating and weaving
runtime verification code into the implementation.
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Focusing on the first category, several ADL tools such as MetaH and C2 support code
generation that translates an ADL to a programming language with various strategies. In
Darwin [81], components, portals, and bindings were implemented as ordinary Java classes
and methods. The communication between component instances were designed as the
client-server pattern through message passing using Java RMI (Java Remote Method Invo
cation) mechanism. C2DRADEL [141], the development environment for Chiron-2 (C2)
architecture, was one of the successful works of Java or C++ code generation from soft
ware architectures. It provided both code generation and system analysis mechanisms.
MetaH [197] toolkit was designed to generate Ada code and provided system analysis
function modules such as schedulability and reliability etc. Unicon [186] and Weaves [87]
used “glue code” to integrate high level description with implementation. However, they
cannot enforce communication integrity [131,152] in the implementation that is necessary
to enable architectural reasoning about an implementation [19]. This is the main reason to
choose ArchJava as the target language in our work.
Considering the second category, among the existing works on runtime verification,
MaC [126] is the closest one to ours. MaC framework needs several inputs from users:
a monitoring script in PEDL that provides a mapping between high-level events used in
the requirement specification and low-level state information, a requirement specification
in MEDL that define properties in a special interval logic, and a system implementation.
Runtime checker generated from the requirement specification evaluates requirements over
the current event trace received from the event recognizer. Our work can be viewed as a
special case of MaC on software architecture descriptions, more specifically SAM models.
Therefore, we can obtain more benefits in terms of automation. In our work, monitoring
script and requirement specification is not necessary since they are either implicit or ex
plicit expressed in SAM models. Further more, the system implementation of SAM mod
els is also generated automatically. Unlike MaC framework, runtime verification systems
such as JPAX [92,95] currently support linear temporal logic, and some analysis algo
rithms and deadlock detection algorithm. Currently, our work does not implement such
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algorithms. However we extend the range of properties to be verified: a subset of first
order linear temporal logic formulae. Although this subset looks small, it actually covers
most of SAM properties such as response properties involving quantifiers. Monitoring Ori
ented Programming (MOP) [39] shows a different way to implement runtime monitoring,
where monitoring code is synthesized automatically from the requirement logic annota
tions before compilation and inserted into the appropriate places, it supports both on-line
and off-line monitoring. However, MOP requires that software developers have a deep un
derstanding of the code to catch all “critical” places manually, which is the issue we want
to avoid.
6.3

System Architecture

Our primary objective was to create a runtime environment that would simplify the real
ization, implementation, execution, and monitoring of SAM architectures while preserving
the properties specified in the model. To develop a methodology to reach this goal, we (1)
identify an automatic implementation of SAM models, (2) generate runtime verification
code from SAM properties, and (3) instrument or weave the runtime verification code into
the implementation.
Fig. 13 is the overview of the structure of our methodology. Our method has three levels:
design level, tool support level and implementation level, in terms of data flowing.
Design level handles the SAM model and its input format. Two different types of in
put are specified: SAM_XML and PNML. SAM models are expressed in an XML-based
interchange format (e.g. SAM_XML), which specifies the SAM structure, property speci
fications for components or connectors. Behavior model (Petri nets) are defined as PNML
(Petri Net Markup Language) [30] files, which specify Petri nets in an XML-based inter
change format. Although SAM supports any temporal logic and any kinds of Petri nets,
here only linear temporal logic and high level Petri nets are considered.
SAM Parser and the logic server, the tools we developed, fall in the tool support level.
The purpose of SAM Parser is to take the design level as input, by communicating through
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logic server and generate the function and monitoring code to be executed. This level will
be discussed in detail in the next subsection. All generated code forms the implemen
tation level. They work together for an integrated system of architecture realization and
runtime monitoring. Their output results, the runtime verification of architecture model
against system properties in the implementation level, are used to analyze the architecture
implementation and guide the application of the system design.
6.4

Translation from SAM to Java Construct

There is a growing awareness, both industry and academia, of the crucial role of formally
proving the correctness of safety-critical portions of systems. Most verification methods fo
cus on the verification of a design against requirements, and high-level code with respect to
a given design specification. However, if one is to prove that the high-level specification is
correctly implemented in low-level code, one needs to verify the translation which performs
the conversion from high-level specification to the low-level code. Verifying the correct
ness of translation is challenging because of the complexity and syntactic and semantic
diversity of the target architectures, as well as the sophisticated analysis and optimization
algorithms used in the process of translation. This is discussed in the next chapter.
Formally verifying a full-fledged general translation from a high-level specification to
an object oriented programming language is not feasible, due to its size, variety of source
and target languages, and, possibly, proprietary considerations. This dissertation proposed
an approach to validating the translation used in the SAM Parser, a runtime analysis tool
that verifies the high-level architecture specification SAM in the implementation.
6.4.1 Architecture Structure Translation
Architecture structure includes the entities: compositions, components, connectors,
ports, which are mapped into the corresponding entities in ArchJava. The mapping relation
is shown in the following Table 4.
From the Table 4., we can see that there is a one-to-one mapping from the elements of
SAM architecture structure to entities in the ArchJava programming language. Although
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Table 4: Mapping relation between architecture structure and ArchJava
ArchJava

SAM

Port

Composition C
Component Cm
-çyonnector
Incoming Port
’ Outgoing Port
Glued Port
Connected Port
Tokens

Component Class
Component Class
£0mp0nent
provides method within port modifier
“requires method within port modifier
connect pattern
connect pattern
Java Classes

"
port

ail composition, component, connector are mapped to component class in ArchJava, for
different concrete element in SAM Architecture structure, there is a corresponding compo
nent class after the translation.
In the ArchJava code, there is no structural difference between composition, and com
pound components. Since the components with the subcomponents are still compositions,
this translation is consistent with the definition in SAM specification. Secondly, there is
no difference between the translated component and connector since both are translated
into component classes in ArchJava. The difference exists whether or not the translated
component class is a flattened component/connector. In SAM specification, the component
and connector share the same architecture structure and behavior model definition. So this
translation design is consistent with the definition in SAM specification. Finally, the only
difference existed between translated codes of components is whether or not the component
is a flattened component.
Component class is the most important class in the ArchJava code since each compo
nent/connector in SAM has to have and only one component class. The system is started
when one of the component class is triggered and run. The implementation of Component
class is shown in the Table 5. Each component class is implemented as a thread, thus each
component class instance is self activated. When it is activated, a Net object is generated
for its behavior model - Petri net. Its behavior is registered which indicates the component
instance is a flat component in SAM.
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Table 5: Component Class definition in ArchJava

Component Class

FIELDS

METHODS

Subcomponent declaration;
Behavior behavior;

public Constructors {
Connect();
Subcomponents. add();
Subcomponents.startQ; //for flat component
Net declaration;
Register behavior;}
connect patterns for all ports,
ports declaration;
private sendMessageFromPortQ;
public run(); //for flat component

Port declaration

requires/provides port interface

provides port method im
plementation

public addMessage(String pt, Object msg)
public recvMessage(String pt, Object msg)
public removeMessage(String pt, Object msg)

From the Table 5, we can see the differences between flattened component and compo
sition (compound component) are:
1. If a component is a flattened component, there is no subcomponent instances in the
constructor, nor connectQ method invoked, which are numbered l.a, l.b, l.c;
2. If a component is a flattened component, there is no connect pattern defined, which
is numbered 2.
3. If a component is a flattened component, a Net instance must be declared and behav
ior model must be registered.
4. If a component is a flattened component, sendMessageFromPortQ method must be
overridden. This method has been declared in the template class.
5. If a component is a flattened component, run () method must be overridden. This
method is from the thread implementation.

75

It is worth to note that there is no definition for the requires port method in the Table 5.
In ArchJava programming language, the implementation of requires port method is defined
by the provides port method. The requires port method only provides an interface point
that can be used to connect with the corresponding provides port method. Furthermore,
each composition, component or connector in SAM will have one component class, thus
each component class in ArchJava will have one object after instantiation. We can say that
the number of architecture elements NAS and the number of component classes in ArchJava
Ncom are equal, e.g., NAS = Ncom. Since all architecture elements are uniquely identified
in SAM model, this result indicates that all component class instantiated once. In other
words, there is only one object instantiated for each architecture elements in SAM.
6.4.2

Behavior Model Translation

Each composition, component or connector has a Petri net as its own behavior model in
SAM specification. They connect to each other through ports. Finally these Petri nets form
a large Petri net through ports connection.
The behavior model (Petri net) is translated to Java code. In our implementation, we
define a template for both of the architecture and behavior model. Each concrete element
in ArchJava/Java code can inherit from these templates. In other words, for each Petri net,
we define some classes such as place, transition, arc, and some sorts etc.. Table 6. shows
the mapping relation between each pair of elements in SAM behavior model and Java code.
6.4.3

Property Specification

Property specification in SAM model is expressed by temporal logic formula. Each
associated property specifies a system behavior (structure) constraint for a component/connector. The atomic predicate in a property is a port holds some messages. During
the verification, property specification is used to regulate what the system behavior would
be. In the runtime checking code, this is implemented using Aspect! since it provides an
online instrument and brings less performance penalty. The property implementation is
discussed in the next section.
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Table 6: Mapping relation between Syntax of Petri net and Java

Petri Nets

Java
Java class (Place)

Interface
places

Fields:

Methods:

String name;
String id;
Marking marking;
Net net;

//a set of get methods for fields
1. getMarkingsQ;
2. getTokenNoQ
//a set of synchronous methods
1. addTokensQ
2. removeTokensQ
3. addMarkings()
4. removeTokensQ

internal places

Java Class (Place)
Java Class (Transition)

Transition

Fields:

Methods:

Net net;
String name;
String id;
Guard guard;

//a set of get/set methods for fields
1. IsEnabledQ//3
2. FireQ // fire this transition
3. getEnabledAssignmentQ
4. guardEvaluate() // call
guard, evaluated)
Java Class (Arcs)

Arcs

Fields:

Methods:

Net net;
String name;
String id;
Inscription insc;
Place place;
Transition transition;
boolean isFromPlace2Trans;

//a set of get/set methods for fields
1. enabledQ // 3
2. getVariables()
3. setlnscriptionQ
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6.4.4 Tool Support
SAM parser, the tool we construct, consists of three parts: Petri net parser, which im
plements Petri nets in Java code semiautomatically (automatic if Petri nets meet some re
strictions), SAM structure parser, which translates SAM structure such as components,
connectors and ports to ArchJava [19] code, and property parser that constructs runtime
verification code as aspects with the help from the logic engine. Different parts have differ
ent target programming languages. ArchJava is chosen as the target language in structure
parser because it is an extension to Java that seamlessly unifies software architecture with
implementation and uses a type system to ensure that the implementation conforms to ar
chitectural constraints. For more details about automatic generation of functionality code
of SAM models, please refer to [71,72],
The logic engine, Maude [132] in our case, is used to synthesize efficient algorithms
for checking linear temporal logic (LTL) formulae on a finite event trace. The algorithms
implemented in Maude are described in [177]. Both algorithms for past time LTL formu
lae and future time LTL formulae are synchronous and there is no need to traverse events
backwards. A middleware called logic server, which converts the generated algorithms to
the target programming language, is introduced between the Property parser and the logic
engine. A protocol between the Property parser and the logic server is defined to make the
Property parser independent from the logic engine. The property parser synthesizes gener
ated algorithms from the logic server for all properties defined in a component or connector,
and constructs an aspect, in which runtime verification code is defined and weaved into the
implementation of SAM models.
6.5

Runtime Verification on SAM

The purpose of runtime verification is to monitor, analyze and guide the execution of
programs. Traditionally the correctness of a model is verified at design level, runtime
verification provides additional correctness assurance at implementation level.
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Specific to our case, we need to monitor property specifications for each component/connector during model execution. These property specifications are described as
temporal logic formulae. Following subsections describe the approach to generate runtime
verification code for propositional and first order linear temporal logic formulae respec
tively.
6.5.1 Propositional Linear Temporal Logic Formulae
Algorithms proposed in [94] and [177] are adopted to evaluate future time LTL formulae
and past time LTL formulae on finite execution traces respectively. Both of these two
algorithms have been implemented in Maude, the chosen logic engine in our work.
The dynamic programming algorithm in [94] first enumerates sub-formulae of the input
formula that satisfies the enumeration invariant: any formula has an enumeration number
smaller than the numbers of all its sub-formulae. This algorithm is synchronous, i.e. it
reports a violation of a formula as soon as the first event making the formula fail is captured.
The algorithm in [177] is explored to evaluate future time LTL formulae. This algorithm is
also synchronous and suitable for online monitoring. The notion of binary transition tree
(BTT), a generalization of binary decision diagrams (BDD) [35], is introduced to minimize
the calculation of next state, which is in general time consuming task. More specifically,
this algorithm constructs from a LTL formula a binary transition tree finite state machine,
which can be used to analyze execution traces without the need for a rewriting system.
Therefore the algorithm can be implemented in traditional programming languages.
Fig.

14 shows the generated monitoring code by SAM parser for the composition

ECompany in the online shopping case study (Chapter 8). The body of the switch state
ment is the binary transition tree finite state machine, generated by the algorithm in [177].
The case number of the switch statement is also the state number. Current state is recorded
in a variable. This variable has different values to indicate different system states. State
-1 indicates that the formula is satisfied by the current event trace, while state -2 indicates
violation of the formula on the current event trace.
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Three different results can be returned from the execution of the monitoring code of a
formula: true, false and neither true nor false called unsure. True means the formula is
satisfied while false means the formula is violated. Unsure is an intermediate result, from
which we cannot tell if the formula holds or fails. The intermediate result can be returned
by the monitoring code of any type of formulae. If the monitoring code of a safety property
returns unsure, it means the safety property does not fail during the previous execution. For
a liveness property, unsure generally means it is not true during the previous execution. For
the past time LTL formulae, the unsure result actually indicates this past time LTL formula
does not fail during past.
6.5.2 Synthesis
In general, runtime verification consists of several parts: event script defining events
related with formulae, compilation and instrumentation tools that insert codes into source
or binary programs to capture events required in the event script, and runtime checker that
evaluates properties or formulae over the captured event trace during the execution of the
program. In our case, event script is implicit in SAM models due to its characteristics,
i.e. each property describes a kind of relationship between messages in different ports.
Therefore, runtime verification of SAM properties is and only is executed at the occurrence
of sending and receiving a message to or from concerned ports. The SAM parser illustrated
in section 1 is the tool that not only generates runtime checker automatically from SAM
properties, but also acts as the instrumentation tool to weave runtime checker into SAM
functionality code (also generated automatically by the SAM parser) through aspect, in
which implied events is defined explicitly as pointcuts.
Aspect-Oriented Programming allows us to dynamically modify models or implementa
tions to include code required for secondary requirements (in our case, it is runtime verifi
cation) without modifying the original code. In aspect-oriented programming, Aspect! [26]
in our case, aspects wrap up pointcuts, advice, and inter-type declarations in a modular unit
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of crosscutting implementation. Fig. 14, which is a part of generated aspect for composi
tion Consumer in Fig. 24, clearly shows the way to weave runtime verification code into
functionality code through aspects.
6.6

Summary

Over the past decade, many architectural modeling notations and analysis techniques
have emerged from the software architecture research community as a possible answer
to many of the problems inherent in large, complex, distributed software systems. How
ever, these architectural methods have not satisfiably addressed the relationship between
the abstract architectural models and concrete system realizations [142]. On the other
hand, a number of software interoperability technologies have emerged primarily from
industry [14,185,199] that provide solutions for combining implementation-level software
components with powerful system building tools. However, these technologies rarely used
the architectural models that typically precede the implementation and/or influence the key
properties of the realized systems.
In this paper, we have discussed our attempt in bridging the gap between the model-based
and implementation-based approaches as well as enhancing the quality of large scale, dis
tributed systems. We have coupled an explicit architectural model with an implementation
infrastructure through automatic code generation, accompanying the runtime monitoring
and verification of the implementation. In doing so, we have developed a generic mon
itoring approach that is used to enhance the quality of distributed component software.
The generality of the approach is achieved through using runtime monitoring technology,
i.e. automatically generating functional code, synthesize and weave runtime verification
code into the implementation through aspect oriented programming to implement software
architecture description automatically. We believe that a more reliable system can be ob
tained by combining formal analysis techniques at design level and runtime verification at
implementation level. We also extend the scope of runtime verification to a subset of first
order LTL formulae. Although the subset is small, it is enough for most SAM properties
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such as response property involving quantifiers. Finally, both the functional code and mon
itoring code are generated modularly. This code generation method is efficient and scalable
and the generation procedure is linear to the model size.
However, runtime verification technique has its own limitations which are discussed in
the following two aspects. In the code generation from SAM model, it is hard to generate
code from Petri net automatically [128]. Fully automatic code generation is only possible
when certain restrictions are enforced [71]. In the runtime verification, not all properties
can be verified during program execution. More specifically, safety properties can be ver
ified on a finite or infinite event trace to detect the violation, while liveness properties can
only be verified on a finite event trace to check if it holds.
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Figure 13: An Overview of Our Methodology
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—public aspect Model_Com_ECompanyMonitorAspect {
pointent MonitorPoint(); (call(void addMessage(String, Object))
—1
II call (void removeMessage(String, Object)));
P°*ntcut
after ( Model_Com_ECompany$C thisObject ) target(thisObject) && MonitorPoint() {
F_ECompany_ccErr_82_Exist(thisObject);
F_ECompany_ordNum_82_Exist(thisObject);
F_ECompany_checkout_8(thisObject);
F_ECompany_enough_8(thisObject);
—private boolean Model_Com_ECompany$C F_ECompany_l_2_2_hasResult = false;
private boolean Model_Com_ECompany$C F_ECompany_l_2_2_Result = false;

advice

helper variables

public void F_ECompany_l_2_2(Model_Com_ECompany$C thisObject) {
if (thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_hasresult)
return;
String info = "Formula F_ECompany_l_2: \n";
boolean Pcheckout_8 = (thisObject.isMessageContained( "checkout_8", "<001, checkout»"));
infor += "\tPcheckout_8" + "=" + Pcheckout_8 + "\n";
boolean Penough_8 = (thisObject.isMessageContained( "enough",
"<001,enough>"));

Ì«

infor += "\tPenough_8" + "=" + Penough_8 + "\n”;

e

•2

2
8

o

thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_$pre[0] = thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_$now[0] ;
thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_$pre[l] = thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_$now[l] ;
thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_$now[l] = PccErr_82 11 thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_$pre[l]
thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_$now[l] = thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_$pre[0] && ;
(! PccErr_82 II thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_$now[l]);

I
hl
£

if (! thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_$now[0]) {
thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_hasResult = true ;
thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_Result = false ;
info += "Formula F_ECompany_l_2_2 is violated! \n\n";
Log.recordPropertyStatus(info);
return;

S’
§
E.

thisObject.F_ECompany_l_2_2_hasResult = false;
info += "Cannot judge Formula F_ECompany_l_2_2 concurrently! \n\n";
Log.recordPropertyStatus(info);

public void Model_Com_ECompany$C.generateSummaryO {
I—}

Figure 14: Generated Aspect for Composition ECompany
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CHAPTER 7
TRANSLATION VALIDATION

7.1 Introduction
There is a growing awareness, both in industry and academic, of the crucial role of
formally proving the correctness of safety-critical portions of systems. Most verification
methods focus on the verification of a design against requirements, and high-level code
with respect to a given design specification. However, if one is to prove that the high-level
specification is correctly implemented in low-level code, one needs to verify the translation
which performs the conversion from high-level specification to the low-level code. Veri
fying the correctness of translation is challenging because of the complexity and syntactic
and semantic diversity of the target architectures, as well as the sophisticated analysis and
optimization algorithms used in the process of translation.
In this dissertation two translations have been developed in both design and implementa
tion level. The translation from SAM model to Maude program is necessary for the design
verification, while the translation from SAM model to Java construct is required for the
implementation verification. To validate the translation in the design level, we construct
a rewrite theory on a SAM behavior model from a stepwised relation between a proof
term in rewriting theory and a transition firing In the Predicate Transition net (PrT net). A
semantical consistency is proved between this rewrite theory and the PrT net.
Formally verifying a full-fledged general translation from a high-level specification to
an object oriented programming language is not feasible, due to its size, variety of source
and target languages, and, possibly, proprietary considerations. We proposed an approach
to validating the translation used in the SAM Parser, a runtime analysis tool that verifies
the high-level architecture specification SAM in the implementation.
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7.1.1 Translation Correctness
Generally speaking, software correctness is defined in terms of the desirable properties
of a system. The correctness of software design must be correct in all observable aspects
in correspondence with specification.
In the design level, we need to validate the translation from SAM model to the Maude
program. The correctness of the Maude code depends on the specification of the architec
ture model being consistent with the specification of Maude in both structure and behavior.
In other words, we need to show the semantical consistency between PrT net (behavior
model of SAM) and rewriting logic (the principle of the Maude system and function mod
ules). In section 7.3 we discuss how to prove the translation correctness from SAM model
to Maude program.
In the runtime analysis, we verify the system properties of the translated code to show
the correctness of the architecture model in the implementation. Thus the correctness of
the translated architecture depends on two aspects: 1) implementation correctness - the
correctness of code refers to whether the implementation satisfies the given property spec
ification. 2) The correctness of translation define whether the behavior of an implemen
tation agrees with that of specification. In the SAM Paser [71], we translated architecture
model to a java construct (ArchJava/Java/AspectJ) for software architecture model (SAM)
to automatically generate code and runtime checker. Runtime checker runs in parallel with
architecture model code to verify the implementation correctness against system properties.
In section 7.4 we discuss the correctness proof of translation from SAM to java construct
in the runtime analysis supported by prototype tool SAM Parser.
The translation correctness refers to the agreement of the translated code with its spec
ification, which is, in our case, a software architecture model. Therefore, describing the
software translation X as being correct is identical to stating that software translation X
meets all requirements imposed by the specifications [130]. In the formal method standing
point of view, translation correctness is meant to be the combination of consistency and
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completeness. Translation consistency refers to the dynamic behavior in the source is pre
served in the target. There are no internal contradictions, whereas translation completeness
refers to the situations where each entity in the source is correctly reflected and represented
in the target.
Definition 2 (Translation Correctness) Let X be a translation that maps a specification
Sp to a target construct T, X : §/? —> T. The specification Sp is a 3-tuple < A, B,C >,
where A denotes the architecture structure, B denotes the behavior of the specification, and
P denotes the constraints of a system. Let sem(spec) denotes the semantics of a specifica
tion spec € §p. The correctness of translation X is defined by two following aspects:
1. Consistency: sem(B) ~ sem(X(B)), where B e Sp /\X(B) e T, sem(C) ~ sem(X(C)),
where C e Sp A X(C) e T;
2. Completeness: Va e A3af € CP. such thatX(a) = a', andVb € B3br e T. such that
X(b) = b', andVc € A 3c' e iP. such that X(c) = c'.
7.2

Related Work

This work is an extension of the work in [71,72]. Work in [72] presents a method that
efficiently translates software architecture (structure and behavior) model to ArchJava code.
Work in [71] presented a methodology that translates structure, behavior and property of
software architecture model and compile to Java code for the runtime analysis. Work in [76]
extended the work in [72] to first order logic formula and applied to an embedded system
example. None of these works [71,72,76] validate the translations. Furthermore, the time
complexity of the translation algorithm is analyzed, which is linear to the size of the model.
Currently many research works have been done on the translation validation for the op
timizing compiler. The work in [157] covers some important aspects of transformation
verification of semantics preservation. The work in [205] deals with the translation val
idation using runtime analysis, but there is not correctness notion. Another related work
is [175] which proposed a comparable approach to translation validation, where an im
portant contribution is the ability to handle pointers in the source program. However, the
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method proposed there assumes foil instrumentation of the compiler, which is not assumed
here or in [157], The notion of correct translation that appears in [86] is similar to the one
in the work [172]. However, [86] did not deal with optimizations of compiler.
More weakly related are the works reported in [156] and [158], which do not purport to
establish foil correctness of a translation but are only interested in certain “safety” proper
ties. However, the techniques of program analysis described there are very relevant to the
automatic generation of refinement mappings and auxiliary invariants. Rival [176] presents
a methodology based on abstract-interpretation for certification of assembly code that uses
the analysis of the source code and the debugging information.
The work in [70] presents a framework for describing global optimizations by rewrite
rules with CTL formulae as side conditions, which allow for generation of correct opti
mizations, but not for verification of (possibly incorrect) optimizations. The correctness
is established in an imperative languages without procedures. The work in [83] proposes
a method for deploying optimizing code generation while correct translation between in
put program and code. They focus on code selection and instruction scheduling for SIMD
machines.
Somewhat similar to our approach, in the treatment of software specification syntax
transformation to the model checking programming language, is the work in [201]. There,
static analysis is used to validate the syntax, semantics and property translations, on which
software testing strategy is adopted to validate the translation. Preserving equivalence con
ditions was not checked in that work. Furthermore, this work focuses on static transforma
tions that are manually applied in system design, while the focus of our work is automatical
code generation using SAM Parser tool. The work in [120] describes a translation from tex
tual transition system to Petri nets. They validated the translation by proof of the translated
model are bisimularly equivalent with the source model based on the step by step compar
ison. Although it is a stepwise proof between translated model and the source model, The
soundness and completeness cannot be established because it is based on the semi-formal
explanation for the comparison by the natural language.
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7.3

Validation of Translation from SAM to Maude

First, we briefly survey a fragment of rewriting logic, that is relevant to our study. Then
we transform Petri nets into the rewriting logic. We finally define the correspondence
results between the standard SOS and the logic one, lifting it to the proved semantics.
7.3.1 Rewriting Theories and Deduction
The mapping of a Petri net model into a rewriting theory requires fairly sophisticated
algebraic techniques. As a first step, we recall the set-theoretical construction of the term
algebra for many-sorted signatures [84], In the following we first recall the rewriting logic
and membership equational logic.
Basic Definition
An equational logic is a pair (Z, E), where Z is a set of operations, also called its “syntax”,
and E is a set of equations of the form VXZ = f constraining the syntax, where X is some
set of variables and Z, t’ are well-formed terms over variable set X and operations in Z.
Equational logics can be many-sorted (operations in Z have arguments of specific sorts),
or even order-sorted (sorts with a partial order on them). Equations can be conditional or
unconditional. Conditions is a typically finite set of pairs u = u' over set of variables X.
Term rewriting is an approach related to the equational logic (Z, E) in which equations
are oriented from left to right, with the form VX.p -> q if /\jUi —> w', and called rewrite
rules. A rewrite rule can be applied to a term Z at any position where p is matched. A pair
(Z, R), where R is a set of rewrite rules, is called a rewrite system.
Rewriting logic [144] is a logic for concurrency. A rewrite theory is a tuple (Z,E,L,R),
where (Z, E) is an equational logic, L is set of labels, and 7? is a set of rewrite rules. Rewrit
ing logic therefore extend equational logic with rewrite rules, allowing one to derive both
equations and rewrites. Deduction remains the same for equations, but the symmetry rule
is dropped for rewrite rules. Rewriting logic is a framework for true concurrency [145]: the
locality of rules allows multiple rules to apply at the same time provided they don’t modify
the shared part. A formal definition of a labeled rewrite theory is given in the following.
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Definition 3 An many-sorted labeled rewrite theory R is a 4-tuple < Y,E,L,R > where
S is an many-sorted signature, E is a set of'E-equations, L is the set of labels, and R c
L x lfE(X)2 is the set of labeled rewrite rules.
We often write /: [s] -> [Z] if pZ] -> jV] for /: [5] -» [z] if [wj -> [vi]A„.A[«J -» [v*].
Rewrite rules in R may be understood as the basic rewriting steps of a theory, the build
ing blocks of the actual rewrite relation. More complex deductions can be obtained by
a finite number of applications of inference rules. We introduce a suitable signature for
building an algebra of labels, each element of the term algebra encoding a justification of
a rewrite. Out of all possible different ways to introduce such a signature, we follow the
lines of [49].
Definition 4 (rewriting step) Let R =< T,,E,L,R > be a rewrite theory, let Q. be the
signature containing all the labels r as suitable operators, with the corresponding arity
and sort given by the variables in R(r)
A proof term a is a term of the algebra T%(X) = T%jn(X) (We assume that there are no
clashes of names between the sets of operators).
A rewriting step is a triple < a, [5], [Z] > (usually written as a : [5]

[zp where a is a

proof term and [5], [Z] € T^e{X).
As argued in [144], “a rewrite theory is just a static description of ‘what a system can
do’; the behavior of the theory is instead given by the rewrite relation induced by the set
of rules of deduction”. Given a set of rewriting rules, we can derive a series of rewriting
theorems about the system. This procedure is called entailment and defined in the next
definition.
Definition 5 (Entailment) Let R =< Z,E,L,R > be a rewrite theory. We say that R
entails the rewriting step a : [s] —» [Z], written as R h a : p] —> [Z], if and only if it can be
obtained by a finite number of applications of the inference rules in Table 7.
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Table 7: Inference Rules
(reflexivity)

W 6 TEE(X)
[z]

(transitivity)

a : M -> [w],0 : [»]
<*;£ ■ [s] - [z]

(congruence)

: [5Z] -> [/,-]
/(ai,...,a„) : [/(.?!,...,s„)] -> [J(ii,...,/„)]

(replacement)

[z/],Æ hr: [i]-> [/]
r(«i,.: [s(/^/Ÿ)] -> [r(ŸfŸ)]

(equality)

E h s = u,a' : u -» w' ,E t- w' = t
a : s —> t

(composition)
(associativity)
(distributivity)

a : M -»
: [5]

[Z]

: [zz] - [Z]
[/]

a;C8;7) = (o';jg);y
/eS
/(ai ; fii,..., a„;/3n) =
,..., a„); f(fii,

Inference Rules
The deduction system in Table 7 was introduced in [144]. Some rules are very easily
to be understood, such as reflexivity, transitivity, equality, etc. Here we only explain one
of them, replacement rule, as an example. Replacement rule implies that the transition
relation is stable, that is, it is closed under substitution. Moreover, the associated rewriting
step describes the simultaneous execution of nested rewrites: Two subterms matching the
left-hand sides of two rules can be rewritten in parallel even if their roots are not disjoint,
i.t., if one is above the other, provided that they do not overlap.
Indeed, in [144] Jose Meseguer establishes a correspondence between deductions in
rewriting logic and concurrent computations, defining a model for a rewrite theory as
a system whose states are ^-equivalence classes of E-terms, and whose transitions are
equivalence classes of terms representing proofs in rewriting deduction, that is, concurrent
rewrites using the rules in R.
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The first five rules can be visualized in the Figure. 15 [147].

Transitivity

Congruence

Figure 15: Visualization of 5 Inference Rules

7.3.2 A theory for Petri nets
Given a PrT net N = (Net, Spec, Ins) [96], where
• Net = (P, T, F), where P, T are finite set of places and transitions, and P n T - <t>,
F = P x T U T x P is a set of flow relation.

92

• 5pec = (S, OP, Eq), signature E = (5, OP) where S is a set of sorts, and OP is a set
of operations on sorts 5 e S', Eq is a set of E-equations.
• Ins = ((f), L,R, Mq), where <f) : P -» CP(S) is a sort assignment function, L : F —>
Labels(X) is a sort-respecting labeling function of N (where X is the set of variables),
R : T —> Term(X) is a constraint mapping from each transition t e T to a boolean
logic formula Term(X), and Af0 : P —> MCONs is a sort-respecting initial marking
of AT.
we define a rewriting theory tRPrT = (E$, E-%, L%, R%) for each ingredient of PrT nets as
follows. If there is no confusion in the context, we refer iR simply as RPrT.
• Signature (E^,5^) with SiR is a set of sorts, and SR = SPrT, where SPrT denotes
the set of sorts in PrT nets, and Ex = Eprr, where E^y denotes signature in PrT
specification. We define a sort named marking in the Maude implementation, thus
we have marking € S-&.
• Ex = Eq.
• Lr is set of labels, which is defined by a function such that

: PUT —> f%U R%,

where fa denotes the operators on the signature E, if no confusion, we simply refer /
as/2.
- Vj? € P.L%(p) = fa, where / is defined as a mapping from sorts of p to the sort
marking, i.e., f s

marking, where 5 is the sort of the place p.

- Vi e T.L&(t) : a, where a is a rewriting step defined as a : pre(t) -> post(t) if
RPrT(t), where RPrT is the constraints defined in the PrT net, which is a mapping
function from transition T to the boolean terms TermoP,booi- pre(f) and post(t)
is the preset and the postset of transition t, respectively, and they are E-terms in
R-PrT- Vp € P.Mq(p) = L(p)(CONs), where CONs is a set of constants.
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• S' pec = (S, OP, Eq}, signature E = (S, OP) where 5 is a set of sorts, and OP is a set
of operations on sorts 5 6 S, Eq is a set of E-equations.
• Ins - (fi, L, R, Mq), where 0 : P —> T(5) is a sort assignment fonction, L : F
Labels(X) is a sort-respecting labeling fonction of N (where X is the set of variables),
R : T —> Term(X) is a constraint mapping from each transition t e T to a boolean
logic formula Term(X), and Mq : P

MCONs is a sort-respecting initial marking

of TV.
we define a rewriting theory iRPrT = (E^, P#, Lx, Rx) for each ingredient of PrT nets as
follows. If there is no confusion in the context, we refer 1R simply as *RPrT.
• Signature (E^,S^) with SR is a set of sorts, and SCR - Sprp, where Sprp denotes
the set of sorts in PrT nets, and E# = T,prT, where 'Eppp denotes signature in PrT
specification. We define a sort named marking in the Maude implementation, thus
we have marking G S
• Ex = Eq.
• Lx is set of labels, which is defined by a fonction such that L%:PuT
where

U Rx,

denotes the operators on the signature E, if no confusion, we simply refer /

as/z.
- Vp

g

P.Lx(p) - fx, where / is defined as a mapping from sorts of p to the sort

marking, i.e., f : 5 —> marking, where 5 is the sort of the place p.
- Vz € T.Lx(f) : a, where a is a rewriting step defined as a : pre(t) -» post(t) if
PPrr(Z), where RPrT is the constraints defined in the PrT net, which is a mapping
function from transition T to the boolean terms TermOp,booi- pre(t) and post(t)
is the preset and the postset of transition t, respectively, and they are E-terms in
RprT- V/? G PMq(p) = L(p)(CONs), where CONs is a set of constants.
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• Rr is defined by the firing rule for each transition t e T.^l e R,
- if Z is unconditional rule with the form Z: [p] -> [q], then we have p,q eS with
E-algebra, with p = pre(t) and q - post(t).
- if Z is conditional rule with the form I : [p]

[q] if fiQ where C, €

TermoP,booi(A) and Vv,- e C/.vz- € X, p and q are pre(t) and posit of t respec
tively., A,- Ci = gij, where

is constraint for transition t and gi>r e RPrT (a

constraint function defined in the PrT).
It is worth to note that

can be empty.

7.3.3 An interleaving correspondence
We state a claim that relates the semantics of PrT nets based on the rewriting theory iRPrT
with the dynamics stated in the Chapter 3. To this end, we need to define and characterize
a few classes of proof terms.
Definition 6 Let a be a closed proof term over the rewriting theory tRPrP. Then we have a
is
• is initial, if it is element ofsort S PrP.
• is enabled, if it is initial and contains occurrence of an operator in OP and E £ <E>.
• is one step, if it is enabled and contains no occurrence of M(p) with p e P and no
occurrence of composition operator •.
• is fired, if it is one step.
• is many steps, if a = ap

with 1 < n < E and each

is one step.

• is rewriting step, if it is many steps and all the one-step rewriting step is enabled.
In the following, we define the relation between an occurrence for a transition t e T of a
PrT net and a rewriting step a.
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Definition 7 An occurrence for a transition t e T of a PrT net N is a rewriting step at :

[/?]

M0f

Q)

following conditions:

• a transition t is initial, ifR(f) € Term(X) and at is initial.
• a transition t is enabled, if t is initial and at is enabled.
• a transition t is fired once under marking Mi and reach marking M2, ifat is one step.

This characterization is needed to prove the correspondence between PrT nets and rewrit
ing theory

given a PrT net N, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the

computation sequence of PrT net N and the rewriting theory ^.PrT.
Proposition 1 (One-step Correspondence) Let t e T be a transition in PrT net N, Mi
and M2 be two markings before and after t is fired, then a one step computation sequence
for PrT net N is Mi tM2.
IfTlprT entails an initial, one-step rewriting step a : (prefyfifi) -» {post(tfi(s}), then
there is a computation sequence MitM2 with (pre(ty)(s) € Mi and(post(t))(s) e M2 defined
for PrT nets.

Proof.
The proof has two steps on the definition of rewriting step.
• For any transition t & T, 3 M such that (prefffis) e A/i, and
• for any transition t eT, 3M such that (post{tfi(s) e Mi.
Based on the definition 4, we can conclude the above proposition.
endProof.
We already observed in previous definition that each place defines an ^-signature on
the set of sorts and the fixed sort marking as the operation/function with arguments. The
markings are connected by transition firing defined by the Petri net semantics [96]. Thus
we can conclude this section by the correspondence result between Petri net computational
sequence semantics and the rewriting theory semantics.
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Corollary 1 Let Mj and Mj be two markings ofa PrT net N. Then a computation sequence
entails a transition Mi to Mj iff3ffrT entails a rewriting step a : MfP) -» MfP).
Finally, next result lifts the correspondence to computations.
Proposition 2 (Computational Correspondence) Let

and Mcj be two markings of a

PrT net N. Then there exists a proved computation a = M^t^... tcj^MCj with source Mc®
and target Mcj iff RPrT entails an initial one step sequential rewriting step a = apam
with aq : L(pre(tif)(f) -» L{post(tif)(s) where i <k < j.
Proof.
This can be proved inductively on the computation sequence.
Base case: k - cO we have the computation sequence McotcoMrb from Proposition for
the One-step Correspondence, we have <2^ : L(pre(tff))(s)

L(post(tc0))(s).

Hypothesis Assumption: Suppose it is true for k = n where i < n < j the propo
sition for computational correspondence holds.

Then we have a = ap.,.;am with

: (pre(tk))(s) —> (post(tk))(s) holds. Because RPrP entails an initial one step sequential
rewriting step a = ap...; am, there exists one rewriting step ak : ap...; a, where i <k < j
and (Xi: (pre(tkf)(s) -> (post(tky)(s). We need to show for k = n + 1 it still holds.
If k = n + 1, we need to consider two situations:
• (1) one is that post(tn) = pre(tn+i);
• (2) postin') is not pre{tn+i). Because we use interleaving semantics for the PrT nets,
and in the rewriting theory, each rewriting rule can be executed concurrently, tn and
tn+i may be in a causal relation.
Based on the one-step correspondence, for each transition firing, we can have a rewriting
step, so for rn+i under some marking Mn, we have acn+i : (pre(/CM+i))(.s)) -> (post(tc»+i))(s).
For case (1), under the marking M„, based on the hypothesis assumption, we know that
(post(tn)) = (pre(tn+i)). From transition rule, the proposition holds.
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For case (2), there must be some transition th fired and make the proposition holds, i.e.,
let th be the transition in the hypothesis assumption, that is th = t„. Similarly, the proposition
holds.
endProof.
7.4 Validation of Translation from SAM to Java Construct
As discussed in Chapter 6, the translation from SAM model to java construct includes
three parts - architecture structure translation, behavior model translation, and property
translation. The target programming languages for the three parts are ArchJava, Java, and
AspectJ. The structure of the translation can be shown in the Figure 16.

Figure 16: An Architecture of Translation

Both ArchJava and AspectJ code are compiled to java code, they are synthesized with
java code during execution. The translated properties are used to generate the runtime
monitor to validate the system model. In this section, we only consider how to validate
the architecture structure and behavior model translation. These parts are highlighted in
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the Figure 16. As discussed in the introduction, the “validation” here means to show the
translation correctness of the java construct. Since ArchJava has be precompiled into java
code, so here we consider only the correctness proof of java implementation against the
SAM model. The proof methodology is shown in the Figure 17.

Figure 17: The Proof Methodology of Translation to Java Construct

The proof can be captured in the following steps (Fig. 17). First, some restrictions are
enforced on the sorts and variables for the PrT nets. These restrictions make the PrT net
fits for the java syntax, but do not have effect on the expressive power of the PrT nets,
which is discussed in the next section. Secondly, we simplified and represented the java
construct for each component/connector of SAM model into a sequential java assertion
language (COORE). This is simply represented by the arrow “syntactic translation” in Fig.
17. Thirdly, we construct a syntactic relation from the behavior model of SAM compo
nent/connector (a PrT net) to the COORE-like java assertion language. The operational
semantics for the java assertion langauge is given. This is simply represented by the arrow
“operational semantics” in Fig. 17. Moreover, we define the communication trace for the
java assertion language based on its semantics. Finally, a mapping relation is established
from the projection on the interleaving semantics of PrT net and projection on the commu
nication trace. This is simply represented by the arrow labeled as “projection mapping” in
Fig. 17.
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7.4.1 Interleaving Semantics of Restricted PrT nets
In this section, we first give some restrictions for the PrT nets. One of the reasons is with
these restrictions, we can automatically generate the behavior code for the SAM model.
These restrictions do not have effect on the expressive power of PrT nets. After that, we
give the sequential semantics of the restricted PrT nets and the firing rule for each enabled
and fired transition. The transition based firing rule are useful for the further analysis of the
semantics consistency.
The following restriction If imposed on the PrT nets:
1. The sorts of PrT nets are either Java primitive types (denoted by Dj^a) such as int,
boolean etc., or defined as a Java class (denoted by Djava~def). A product type PD can
be defined by either primitive type or user defined type or mixed, can be implemented
as a user defined class. Thus we have follows:
D ::= Djava\Djava-def\Dprod

Where Dprod = U(xZ))

2. The variables occurred in the label of an incoming arc of a transition have the same
type as the token sort of the incoming place.
3. The variables occurred in the label of an outgoing arc of a transition Is defined in the
label of an incoming arc of the same transition. In other words, only the label of an
Incoming arc can define new variables.
4. The trap places only appear in the places that have Set sort.
5. Each Set sort is assumed to have finite number of elements. Thus the substitutions
for each variable in the guard are finite since we model a closed system.
All the following subsections of this section refers restricted version of PrT nets based on
this definition. If there is no confusion we would use PrT nets Instead of restricted version
of PrT nets during this section.
An occurrence of a restricted PrT net Is defined by all substitutions of the variables in
the labels of the arc and the Boolean expressions in the guard and this set of substitutions
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make the evaluation of the guard true. For the first order formula, it can be infinite sets of
substitutions for a true evaluation of a guard. Thus for each restricted PrT net, it is possible
to have infinite number of process nets.
A semantics is a mapping that assigns to every element of a syntactic domain a meaning
or interpretation, i.e. an element of a semantic domain. Usually the semantics of Petri
nets is given by means of sequence of states - markings. Different markings indicate the
transition firing rules. This approach is known as an interleaving approach and it is based
on a single observer model in which the occurrence of events (transitions) is serialized even
for independent processes.
We can define the interleaving semantics using the sequence of markings with the occur
rence of corresponding transitions for each set of substitutions.
Definition 8 (Interleaving Semantics of PrT nets) The sequence a = M®toMiti...t„-.iM„
with n > 0 is called a finite interleaving execution starting with M® iff Vi e Nat and
0 <i <n and M_i “where Mj: P

T(St).

where St represents the set of sorts. The interleaving semantics of a PrT net is defined on
a sequence of fired transitions with markings. The state sequence a of a PrT net can be
either finite or infinite, depending on the system we modeled. Even though we restricted
the tokens in each Set to be finite, and the output tokens are produced to output ports
finally, the local infinite loop structure with some specific guard conditions can also enable
and fire a transition infinitely and thus generates infinite state of sequence. A definition of
interleaving semantics for the S/T systems was given in the Best’s book [28]. The markings
for the S/T systems [28] represents the data without sorts information and the transitions
do not have guard conditions.
It is well known that Petri net is a model having true concurrency as well as interleav
ing semantics. A common model for representing concurrent software is the interleaving
model, in which all of the events in a single execution are arranged in a linear order called
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an interleaving sequence. Concurrently executed events appear arbitrarily ordered with re
spect to one another. Most logics for specifying properties of concurrent systems cannot
distinguish between interleaving sequences in which two independent events are executed
in different orders. Because of this, all possible interleavings of such events are normally
considered. Due to this reason, we can say that there is no information loss in the interleav
ing model. In our work we choose the interleaving semantics because it has no information
loss and is wildly applied in practice.
To show the Java construct is correctly translated from SAM model, we use communi
cation history or trace defined in CSP [149] model to describe the execution path. First,
we simplify and reduce the java program for each component/connentor in SAM to a se
quential program. This program is represented by an assertion language with COORE-like
syntax [170], Then, we define the elements of a communication trace in this assertion
language based on its operational semantics. After that, a mapping relation is established
between the COORE-like syntax representation and the java construct to identify the corre
spondence between each element in the communication trace of an execution path and the
state in a PrT execution. Finally, we show that the correspondence between the communi
cation trace and the state sequence based on the mapping relation.
In the interleaving semantics of PrT nets, we examine each individual transition instead
of set of transitions during the execution. As markings represent a global state of the
system, during each transition firing, the state changing only effects the places that related
to the fired transition, i.e., preset and postset of the transition. Thus preset and postset of
a transition with the transition form a sequence that provides a local view for the system
execution.
We represent a firing for a transition t under marking M with binding a (occurrence
mode) as follows:
Let {pri,

be the preset of the transition t, {po\,...,pon} be the postset of the tran

sition /, for one execution path i of f, a be a binding of a set of variables related to t. For
some execution path i of /, we have the firing for a transition t as follows:
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{prl(a, 0,

(or, t), ...,pon(a, 01

The firing rule for each individual transition provides a local view for each place as well
as tokens in that place with regard to the transition. This definition provides a possible local
reasoning for the system on the interleaving semantics.
For instance, in the model of online shopping example (the User component of the
Onlineshopping example Chapter 8). Initial markings are given as in the figure in Chapter 8.
Suppose after some execution, there is a token in the input port uinfoReqS, then transition
h is enabled. Let the current marking be Mi, after t7 is fired, the marking is M2. The preset

of the transition t7 is in the marking Mi, and the postset of the transition is in the marking
M2. Let take a look at the marking of the preset and postset of the transition, we have the

sequence:
{UserID(uidj), ulnfo{uid^, uInfoReqfuidbReqf}t7
{UserlDiuid^, ulnfo(uidj), ulnfoRes-51 (uidb Res)}

Whenever the transition t7 is fired, the sequence
UserID(uid^), ulnfo(uid^), ulnfoReqfuidb Req)

would be in the marking Mi, and the sequence
UserID(uidj), ulnfo(uid,f ulnfoRes.,51 (uidb Res)

would be in the marking M2.
It is worth to note that every time the transition t7 is fired, and if the order of places is
fixed, the above firing pattern can be observed except for the tokens in some place might
be different.
7.4.2 Sequential Semantics of Simplified Java Construct

In this subsection, we first overview the features of the SAM and the java construct
generated from SAM Parser. Then we use a COORE-like syntax assertion language to
represent the java construct. The operational semantics for this COORE-like assertion
language is listed. Finally, the sequential semantics of the simplified java construct is
presented.
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Simplification of Java Construct
To fully automatically generate code of PrT nets from SAM Parser, several restrictions
has been made on the SAM behavior model [71]. The algorithm for the execution of
the generated code is highly dependent on the algorithm chosen for the transition firing.
Generally used algorithm for the transition firing can be breadth first or depth first searching
for all possible (enabled) transitions and construct a directed graph with a transition as a
node. In our implementation, we randomly choose one enabled transition and fire it. Each
time only one enabled transition is fired because we choose interleaving semantics.
Although the generated code is a multithreaded object-oriented program, if we view
each component class, the code for behavior model is executed sequentially in terms of
each fired transition. Since we use interleaving semantics for the java construct, and we
only choose the current path during the runtime checking, we can reduce a java construct
for a SAM component/connector to a sequential object oriented program.
All Aspect! and ArchJava code are finally compiled to the java before executed, we
can treat them as same as java code. Among component classes, the concurrent execution
of multithreaded program is implemented. In this proof, we only consider each compo
nent/connector’s behavior model - Petri net. Thus we did not discuss the concurrency in
the multithreaded program. Besides, the synchronized communication among objects is
used to reach the mutual exclusion. We simply choose a sequential object oriented asser
tion language that did not consider the synchronized methods. In our proof, we assume
the correctness of the synchronized methods in the java program. Finally, the data obser
vation modifiers (i.e. public, private, and protected) are not discussed and silently assume
to be correct during the program execution. Based on these concerns and since we choose
interleaving semantics, we simplify a java program for a component/connector’s behavior
model to a sequential program, and use a sequential assertion language to represent the
java program for each component/connector. The syntax for assertion language is adopted
from [170].
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An Assertion Language for Java Construct
In this part we describe a programming language [170] (COORE) that embodies the
object-oriented features and mainly resembles the features of the java construct output from
SAM Parser. This assertion language supports single-inheritance and subtyping as in Java
and C#. We use this syntax as an abstraction of our Java construct. The syntax of COORE
only describe the sequential OO programming language, it cannot cover concurrent aspect
used in Java construct. The following Table 8 is the syntax of COORE - a subset of java
programming language.
Table 8: COORE Syntax of Sequential Java Construct [170]
n e Prog ::= class*
class € Class
class C(e | extends D}{field* constr meth*}, where e de
notes empty sequence of tokens
field e Field

tu; where u is field identifier

t € Type ::= int | boolean | C 1 D |...
constr <= Constr ::= C(^){5] where

is a list of formal parameters

p e Parameter ::= tu where t is type of identifier u
meth € Meth ::= void m(/T){S}| t mfjf) {S return e] where e is a side effect
free expression
5 € Stat ::= y := t u | u := e \e.x := e' \S;S | u := newCfjf) | e.mff) | u :=
e.mfjP) \if (e)S else S 1 while (e) S
e e Expr ::= null | this I u | e.x | (C)e | e instanceof C1 ele : e | e = e | op(if)
op € Op an arbitrary operator on elements of a primitive type

As shown in the Table 8, the exception handling is not included in the syntax. For our
work, we only concern the features related with the model. Since exception handling is
a general function provided for programming langauge, we do not discuss it. Secondly,
interface classes and abstract classes are not covered in the above syntax. These features
facilitate the programming especially in the object oriented program. However, they are not
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concerned in the high level behavior model, in this case, we simply assume their correctness
in the java context. Finally, the main omission is concurrency. Since each component
class is implemented as a sequential program using interleaving semantics, this syntax can
describe the java construct of the SAM behavior model.
An operational semantics [169] for this assertion language is discussed as follows and
given in the Table 12 and Table 10.
In this simple object oriented programming language, a state is captured by two aspects,
a global state outside an object and a local state inside an object. A state is thus repre
sented by a pair (sk, h), where sk is a local variable function (in [169] called stack), a total
function that maps local variable to values, and h is object state function (in [169] called
heap), a partial function that maps each existing object to its internal state. Let £[c] be the
evaluation on an expression e. The expression evaluation is shown in the Table 12.
In the Table 12, origin(C, x) yields the origin of field x of an object of class C,

origin(C, x) =

C

if x € Fields(C)

origin(par(C), x) otherwise

where par(C) denotes the parent class of class C; it is undefined for class object, dom(i)
denotes the value domain of type t. [e] denotes the type of an expression e.
Additional rules of the operational semantics are given in the Table 10.
In Table 10, h.[o t-* init(C)] denotes the object state function that is obtained from h
by extending its domain with an object o when h(o) is undefined, OC = constr(C) (be
the constructor method declaration in class S),AfCi = w := eQ.m(ei,...,e„){S return e},
MC2 = mfa,

pj){S}, If = if(e) {Si} else {S2}, and Wh = while(e){S}„ init(t) denotes

the default value of type t according to following cases:
init(boolean) = false
init(int) = 0
init(C) = null
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Table 9: Expression Semantics [169]
Lfnulll(sk, h) = null
£[w]](.s'&,Â) = sk(u)
Z$e.xl(sk,h)

| h(y) (origin([e], x))(x) otherwise

£I(CWO) = {I ^Xtem(C)

r ±

//v = ±

£[e instanceof Cl(sk,h) = < true
ifv e dom(C)
( false otherwise

£flei?e2 : e3l{sk,h) =

± if Vj = ±
v2 ifv\~ true
v3 ifVi = false

£[Ê1 = dW) = { tr
f™se 'Otherwise

Zlop^,.... e„ W, h) = ( ¿(Vi.....vJ

zi

The first column is the evaluation on the statements, we use = represent define, LA =
Bfu := el, FA = £[e.x := e'l, and so on.
In the program defined in the COORE, we consider following as atomic actions:
1. Expression evaluation as atomic action. Thus the local variable set y and op all
atomic actions. In the semantics concern, we care about the elements that are related
to those appear in the SAM model, markings, transitions that form the state sequence.
In order to correctly implement these elements, objects are created and methods are
invoked. Expression evaluation is one of the fundamental steps in these operations,
which is related to the memory location, register allocation, etc.. We can simply
assume it is correctly implemented without any interruption because it is far from
106

being visualized in the high level model. Thus we consider it as an atomic action
with regard to those high level elements that are related to SAM model.
2. We also consider assignments as atomic actions. Assignment is a notorious issue
in the analysis of programming langauge semantics due to side effects. To avoid
side effects in the multi-tasks environment, the assignment much be executed as an
uninterruptible atomic action, so that only one task at a time can execute any part of
it.
An object’s observable communication trace can be defined by the history of all com
munication events between the object and its environment, which represents an abstract
view of its state, readily available for reasoning about past and present behavior. Let Obj
be the set of object id, Meth be the set of methods, S be the set of statements. We define
communication events as follows.
Definition 9 (Communication Event) A communication event of an object o € Obj
(where Obj is the set of object id) is defined by a tuple < 0^,02,m > such that 0^,02 £ Obj
and Oi ï 02, m E Meth.
Communication events are the ingredients of the communication trace, which is defined
as follows.
Definition 10 (Communication Trace) Let Prog be the set ofjava construct program for
a SAM component/connector translated by SAM Parser. Class is the set of classes defined
in the Prog, Field, Meth are the set offields and methods defined in a class class 6 Class
respectively. We use lower case to represent elements in a set, e.g., a method meth e Meth.
The communication trace ct(Prog) in the java construct is composed of a sequence of
communication events. We define the communication trace ofjava construct constructively
in Table 11:
Next, we give an operational semantics [169] for this assertion language as follows.
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A state is represented by a pair (sk,hf where sk is a local variable function (in [169]
called stack), a total function that maps local variable to values, and h is object state func
tion (in [169] called heap), a partial function that maps each existing object to its internal
state. Let £ [e] be the evaluation on an expression e. We have the expression evaluation in
the Table 12.
In the Table 12, origin(C, x) yields the origin of field x of an object of class C,
.

.

x

f <2

origin(C, x) = <
( origin(par(C), x)

if xe Fields(C)
otherwise

where par{C) denotes the parent class of class C; it is undefined for class object, domft)
denotes the value domain of type t. [e] denotes the type of an expression e.
7.4 J

Mapping Relation

During the execution of the java construct, each component class is instantiated as one
object in the implementation. This indicates that there is only one instance for each component/connector in SAM model. In reality, in the java construct, following the above op
erational semantics for the sequential oo program, there are many internal methods, fields,
assignments, expressions in the output communication trace. That is because we are work
ing on the real program that contains many detailed execution steps. As shown in the
example for the communication trace of transition tq in the component User, we can say
that the communication trace for even one fired transition can contain many information
that is barely to matched the transition firing rule. In order to make the output communica
tion trace of the java construct more concise and neat, we choose the key methods, fields
and necessary expressions as a compact set for each necessary element in the SAM model.
The elements in SAM model and the related compact set are listed in the Table 13.
As discussed before, a firing rule for a transition includes the preset and postset of the
transition. If we fix an order on the places then after each firing of a transition, we can get
the same sequence for the same transition under different markings except for the tokens
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In places. Each Input place object is evaluated based on the Index of the input place vector,
the updating of the each output place object is done based on the index of the output place
vector. We can use the index of vector as the order for places.
From Table 13, we define the mapping relation / as a function that maps each element
in the set of places P, set of transitions T, and tokens CONs In a PrT net N to the cor
responding entities in the communication trace. Let e be an element defined in the set
E = PU T U CONs, we have Ve e E,f(e)

e

ct(N). For instance, f^uInfoReqAS”} =

ct^InfoReqAAN) E ct(ProgUser).
For one token structure, although we specify the sort of the token as a Set In java, it is
implemented as a vector in java construct. The Vector class implements a growable array
of objects. Like an array, it contains components that can be accessed using an integer
index. However, the size of a Vector can grow or shrink as needed to accommodate adding
and removing items after the Vector has been created [5]. As an object instantiated and
evaluated in the java semantics, it Is consistent with that of the one token structure.
The implementation of Set in java is not synchronized [5]. If multiple threads access a
set concurrently, and at least one of the threads modifies the set, it must be synchronized
externally. This is typically accomplished by synchronizing on some object that naturally
encapsulates the set. Synchronizing objects will bring some notorious issues especially in
the debugging. This happened for both TreeSet and HashSet. The second reason is that
in most of cases the vector is enough for the Implementation since vector can provide the
searching and indexing functions. These functions are what we need in the coding. Thus
in our functional code, we implemented this as vector.
7.4.4 Correspondence
To reflect the firing rule for each transition in the PrT net, it needs to extract the necessary
information that is relative to the firing rule for each transition, i.e., the preset and postset of
the transition as well as the transition (identification) itself. How to identify each transition
and its pre- and postset on a communication trace is the first issue that needs to be solved.
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The projection concept on a communication trace can help in this case. In this work, first I
define the projection on a communication trace generated from a PrT net.
Definition 11 (Projection on a Communication Trace) Given

a

PrT net N

=

(Net, Spec, Insc) with net structure defined as Net = (P,T,F), its communication
trace is ct(N). Let S be the set of elements defined the java construct, The projection Proj
of communication trace ct(N) on the set S, Proj(ct(N),S), is the sequence arising from
ct(N) when all literals not contained in S are deleted.
For the SAM example with a component User and port id
Proj(ct(User), {‘‘ulnforJS'}) = ..PuInforA5" ..Pulnfor.15"...).
Corollary 2 Given a PrT net N = (Net, Spec, Insc) with net structure defined as Net =
(P, T, F), its communication trace is ct(N). Let S\t be the set ofpreset and postset of tran
sition tw.r.t. thejava construct, i.e.,
‘S'k = {< pri,Pri-contains(tkri) >,< prm,prm.contains(tkrm >),
< poi,Poi-contains(tko\) >,..., < pon, pon.contain s(tkon) >,
<t,t.fire() >}
F\t be the firing for transition t defined in the section 3.1. f be the mapping function
defined in the section 3.3. We have Proj(ct(N),S\t) = /(FJ/).
Finally, we can lift each transition firing rule in the Java construct to the state sequence
for a PrT net in the SAM model.
Proposition 3 (Sequential Consistency) Given a PrT net N = (Net, Spec, Insc) with net
structure defined as Net = (P, T, F), its communication trace is ct(N).
For each transition t e T of a restricted PrT net N, the firing rule for the transition t is
denoted as F|is let SN\t be the set ofpreset andpostset of transition t as well as transition t,
i.e., SN\t =

iPri,

Prm, Pol,—, Pon, 4

o' = MqîqMi ...tn^Mn be a state sequence defined in

Definition 2, then we have
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Proj(a,SN\t) = Fl,
We say a java construct is semantically consistent with its high level PrT net model if
Pro](ct{N),S\t) = f(Proj((r,SN\fi), where f is the mappingfunction defined on the section
33.
Proof
From the firing for a transition t, based on the Corollary, we can derive that the proposi
tion is true,
endProof
7.5

Discussion

In our communication trace, we did not consider the object initiation and object comple
tion, which was discussed in the work [112]. That work [112] is to proof the correctness of
an 00 programming language CORE, while our work assume these OO features are true
silently.
7.5.1 Interleaving Semantics vs. Causal Semantics
There are generally three types for the dynamic behavior of a Petri net model [28], The
first one is called the interleaving semantics, which looks at the set of occurrence sequences
of a model. The second one is called the causal semantics, which looks at all processes run
simultaneously. The third one is called parallel semantics, which is a mixed version of the
above two. It comprises the full set of behaviors including all interleavings and all causal
processes. Whereas the causal semantics is favorized in Petri net theory [Rei86] because
of its ability to handle concurrency, the area of applications is dominated by interleaving
semantics because of their easy and straight-away definition. Usually, simulation tools
for Petri nets generate totally ordered sequences of transition occurrences and thus are
based on interleaving semantics. In terms of the Restricted PrT nets and its high level
process nets, the causal semantics are the maximum set of all the process nets, while the
interleaving semantics are the minimum set of the process nets. The equivalence between
causal semantics and interleaving semantics of Petri nets can be proved by bisimulation
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among the set of the process nets. The idea is to associate to a causal firing sequence a
linearizable occurrence net. Many works have been done on some types of Petri nets [28].
7.5.2 Granularity
It is not surprising that since the very beginning of the design of parallel algorithms
and parallel computation formalisms, a great deal of research effort has been devoted to
interpreting parallel computation in more familiar, sequential terms. The classical example
of this “sequential way of thinking” in computer science is the nondeterministic sequential
interleaving semantics of concurrent computation.
In this context, a natural question arises: Given a parallel computing model, can its (log
ically) concurrent execution always be replaced by such nondeterminism, so that any given
concurrent behavior can be faithfully reproduced via an appropriate choice of a sequential
interleaving? The answer is Yes, provided that we simulate concurrent execution via se
quential nondeterministic interleaving at a sufficiently high level of granularity of the basic
computational operations.
In the mapping relation, we regulated the expression and operations as atomic actions.
Following question is “is that fine enough for the computation to simulate the behavior
of SAM?”. If we consider each value in the stack, the operations on the stack cannot be
reflected in the mapping relation. In other words, we cannot find an image in the mapping
function for these operations.
On the other side, if we consider a coarse communication trace in the implementation,
for instance, we only consider the object instantiation during runtime execution. Then we
cannot get the knowledge of the tokens related with a place. We proved that the sequential
semantics of the java construct can capture the sequential behavior of Restricted PrT nets,
so we can say that the granularity for the analysis of java construct is fine.
According to the granularity level of the Petri net specification of a software system,
the values of the measures below may change. For instance, at the topmost granularity
level, one might represent a whole system by means of a Petri net with a single transition,
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whose input places represent the initial states of the processes of the system, and whose
output places represent the final states of the processes. At lower granularity levels, the
same system may be represented by a Petri net with a large number of places, transitions,
and arcs. In this chapter, we are here interested in the definition of measures for a Petri
net specification, so we assume that the specification has already been written. It is the
specifier’s responsibility to write a specification in such a way as to represent the modeled
software system accurately. The granularity issue becomes important when empirically
validating these measures for the internal attributes against measures for external attributes.
Sensible comparisons between different specifications require that only specifications at
close granularity levels be compared.
7.5.3 State-based vs. action-based
The formalisms employed in sate space methods may be roughly divided into two
categories, state-based and action-based methods. State-based methods include model
checking of many temporal logics that use Kripke structures and similar models. Actionbased methods include many process algebraic methods, where Labeled Transition Sys
tems (LTSs) are used as a model. State-based formalisms discuss the system properties
on the global state of the system, whereas action-based formalisms talk about the interac
tion among the system components. More, action-based semantics is unsatisfiable because
of incapability to express fairness [124]. This is why some properties may be harder to
express using just one approach.
In the work of Lamport in 1985 [124], he pointed out the difference of the system prop
erty specification between these two methods. The discussion of the underlying reason of
the benefits for each method was presented by simple examples. Different actions or events
may trigger systems or processes to the states, while it is hard to identify the behaviors of
these systems/processes since states are same in the state-based specification. Similarly,
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same action may reach the different states of systems or processes, while it would diffi
culty to identify the two processes since the actions are same by using only action-based
specification.
In our work, The Petri nets’ behavior is identified by the sequence of states with the
transition firing ordered. This is the mixed version of both state- and action-based. We
believe the above issues for the single approach can be avoided. However, the temporal
logic is a state-based approach that is used to describe system properties based on the state
changing. Since behavior is specified by the combined version, we can say that the property
is true when the property is held by the system.
7.6 Summary
This chapter presented two approaches to the correctness proof on the semantic con
sistency for translation validation from software architecture specification translation to
Maude program and object-oriented program (Java).
In the translation validation from SAM model to the Maude program, we construct a
rewrite theory (ÎR3^) for a given PrT net (AQ stepwisely. For the constructed rewrite the
ory

the semantic consistency is proved on the interleaving semantic of the PrT net

and the proof term (a) of the rewrite theory based on the inference rules. In this proof
each component/connector of a SAM model is considered as a subsystem and described
by a rewrite theory and a PrT net. The main advantage is the stepwise comparison be
tween rewrite theory and PrT net is established. The future work can be the proof of the
bisimulation between them.
In the translation validation from SAM model to the Java program, we described the
translation validation in four steps - a restricted version of PrT nets with its interleaving
semantics is provided, the communication trace for java construct is defined, a mapping
relation is established between the restricted PrT nets and java construct, and a consistency
proposition is derived. The main advantages are 1) the weak bisimulation can be derived
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due to stepwise sequence construction; and 2) a possible extension to the multithreaded
programs can be applied for the same approach to prove the correctness of OO programs.
This translation validation approach has few restrictions. It does not consider the syn
chronization of multithreaded components since the formal proof is established based on
a sequential java assertion language (COORE). Some reduction is made to fit for this java
assertion language. Secondly, exceptions in the target code as well as their semantics are
not considered due to the same reason as before. Many of our generated code have the
exception handling, such try-catch block. In our discussion, this part is ignored to simplify
the validation. Since these cause only programming language and implementation-oriented
issues, which are not closed related with the architecture specification, it is reasonable to
ignore the exceptions. Furthermore, the fairness of the communication trace for the java
construct is not considered. Finally, the ability of our approach to check correctness of
algebraic simplifications is limited by the power of the decision procedure employed by
the SAM Parser tool we use.
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Table 10: Operational Semantics of COORE [169]

T .

__________ £[e]QA,A) ï ±________ ____
< w := e, (sk, h)>-> (sk[u
£MOA, A)], A)
£MQA, A) = o € f±, m/ZZ} £[[e']lpA, h) = v ± origin([e], x) = D
< e.x := e',(s,h) >—» (s,h[o.xD h-> v])
o = (C, id) h(o)is undefined
£feJpA,A)^±V/e{l.,.w}
constr(C) = C(pi, ...,pn){S}
< S,(sk[this,pi, ...,p„
o, Vi,v„],A.[o h» init(C)]) >—» (sJfh')
< u := new C(e\,e„), (sk, h) >—> (sk[u o], h')
£MPA5A) = 0 = (C,AZ)
£M(<Ä) = Vi * ±, Vi € {1...W}
meth(C, m) = t m(pi, ...,pn){S return e}
< S,(sk[this,pi, ...,p„ h-> o, Vi,v„], A) >-» (skfh')

MCl

mc2

£MPA\ao = v*±

< u := eQ.m(ei,e„), (sk, h) >—» (sk[u

v], h')

£[e0]lpA, h) = o = (C, id)
£M« A) = v¡ #= ±, Vz € {1...«}
meth(C, ni) = t m(pi, ...,p„){S return e]
< S,(sk[this,pi,h» o, vbv„], A) >-* (skfli)
< u := eludei,en), (sk, h) >—» (sk, h')

Si;S2

< Si, « A) >-* (sk", h") < S2, (sk", A") >— (sk', A')
< Si;S2,(sk,h) >-> (sk^h')

Ifi

£M(sk, A) = true < Si,(sk, A) >—» (slf h')
< if(e)Si else S2^(sk,h) >-> (skfh')

Ifi

£[e]]OA,A) = true <Si,(sk, A) >—> (sk',h')
< if(e)S i else S2, (sk, A) >—> (skf W)

Whx

£MpA, A) = false
< while(e)S, (sk, h) >—> (sk, A)

Whi

£MpA,A) = true
<S,(sk,h) >~* OF, A")
< while(e)S, (sk", h") >-> (sk', h')
< while(e)S,(sk,h) >—> (skflï)
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Table 11 : Communication Trace

ct(Prog) = ct(clos$*)
ct(class) = ct{construct){ct{field^)\; et(meth*)),
where ;; denotes possible interleaving order among methi and fieldi
ct(construcf) = ct(o = (C, id))ct(ei)ct(pi, ...,pn
ct(field*) = ct{fieldi)...ct{fieldn), where n e Nat
ct(meth*) = ct(methi)...ct(meth„), where n e Nat
ct(meth(C, m)) = ct(o = (C, id))ct(ei)ct(S)ct(e),
where meth(C, m) = t m(eyen){S return e}
ct(meth(C, m)) = ct(o = (C, id))ct(ei)ct(S).,
where meth(C, m) = voidm(ei,...»e„){5}
S ielse S2) = ct(e)(ct(Si) U c/(S2))
ct(while(e) S) = (ct(e)ct(S))*
ct(Si;S2) = ct(Si)ct(S2)
et(u := e.mÇÊ)) = £(w :=
ct(u := newCÇÊ)) = £[«:= «ewC("^)]|
ct(u := e) = £[w := e]
ct(e) = £[el
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o, v,,...» v„)

Table 12: Expression Semantics [169]

eir v ?
¿'ILe.xJKM,«)

i 1
(fv € {«wZZ,±}
I h(v) (origin([e], x))(x) otherwise

Ettowil
i -L
i/v=J£[e instance/)/C](si,/i) = < true i/v e dom(C)
[ false otherwise

S[ei?e2

£D>i =

( ± // vi = ±
< V2 ifVi = true
1 v3 ifVl = false
e2J{sk,h) = | true if Vi = v2
false otherwise
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Table 13: A Mapping Relation of Elements in Component/Connector of SAM model

SAM
Model

Java Construct

Communication Event

place p^)

Object id pi with
type of Place
Pj.contains(ii)

< pi, contains(tk) >

object id h with
type of Transition
Z/.iiredO

< thfired§ >

transition

Guard g

int
String
boolean
Product

Object if g with
type of Guard
g.guardEvaluate(
Vector pv )
int
String
boolean
user-defined class

< g,guardEvaluate(Vectorpv) >

int
String
boolean
user-defined class
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CHAPTER 8
CASE STUDIES

8.1

Introduction

We have realized and implemented the integrated framework on several different scale
examples. This chapter will demonstrates the application of the integrated framework to
these examples. First, we apply the integrated framework to a small but illustrative example
- a coffee machine. Second, we apply the integrated framework to a network security
protocol under attack scenario. Third case study is an online shopping example. This case
study shows the advantages for the deadlock checking in the design level for the integrated
framework. Finally, we check and monitor an embedded system - a cruise control example
using this integrated framework. In addition, an extension of SAM model on the service
oriented architecture (SOA) named SO-SAM is demonstrated with an example. Moreover,
an UML architecture description for the web system connects the SO-SAM model with
the integrated framework by an image processing example. This demonstrated the method
from UML architecture description for the web system to the SO-SAM model and the
verification through the integrated framework.
8.2

Coffee Machine

Our first running example is a coffee machine from [195]. Fig. 18 shows a simplified
SAM model of coffee machine. In SAM, there should have a component CoffeeMachine, a
composition CoffeeMachine, and a hierarchical mapping from the component to the com
position. However, in order to make the figure more straightforward, we integrate these
three parts and still call the composition CoffeeMachine. Thus, the composition CoffeeMa
chine has ports that actually belong to the component CoffeeMachine. The connection
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between a port of the composition and a port of its subcomponent is called glue, which is
actually defined in the hierarchical mapping.
moneycm

coffeetype cm

CoffeeMachine

Figure 18: SAM Model of Coffee Machine
From this figure, we can see the coffee machine itself is modelled as a composition
CoffeeMachine, which has three sub components: CMInterface, CoinHandler, and BrewingFacility. Behavior models of these components are demonstrated in Fig. 19, Fig. 20,
and Fig. 21.
Composition CoffeeMachine has four ports: money„cm, coffeetype~cm, changement, and
ready.enjoy.cm, which are glued with ports in component CMInterface'. money.cmi, cof
feetypemCmi, changejcmi, and readyjenjoyjcmi respectively. A message in one port is im
mediately flowed to another port if they are glued. The direction of a message flow is
determined by the direction of glued ports:incoming ports or outgoing ports. So whenever
there is a message in the port moneyjem, it is passed to the port money.cmi immediately.
Property specifications for each component/connector in SAM is defined by LTL formu
lae. Some heuristics of how to specify temporal properties are given in [97], Following is
a property of component CoffeeMachine:
□ ({money_cw(80) A coffeetype jcm(2j)
<>(coinJ)ack..cm(80)V
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(p = {requestjch ►-♦< int, int >,price w< int, int >,
coffee-requestjch h» int, coin .back i-> int,
save f->< int, int >, pay-returnjch i-» boolean}
Mo = {requesL.ch
{}, price i-* {< 1,50 >, < 2,75 >
<3,100 >}, coffeej-equest-ch w {}, coinJbackjch
i—■> {}, save i-» {}, pay,returnjch t-* {}}

Figure 19: Behavior of Subcomponents - CoinHandler - in CoffeeMachine

(coin.back.cm(5) A coffeej,eady(l))))
In the above formula, the atomic predicates specify the tokens contained in a port of a
component. For example, atomic predicate money_cm(80) is true if the port money.cm of
component CoffeeMachine has a message 80. Since in SAM, a port refers to a unique place
with the same name in the behavior model of the component, the atomic predicate also
means the place money.cm contains a token 80. Therefore, the above formula specifies the
situation that when a customer inserts 80 cents into the coffee machine and chooses coffee
type 2, the coffee machine either returns 80 cents or gives the customer 5 cents change and
a cup of coffee.
This formula can be expressed in a more general way as follows, which means the user
will either get his coffee and change or get his money back whenever he inserts coins and
choose coffee type 2. The expression Port(money.cm actually specifies a type as the sort
assigned to port money.cm.
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ip = {requestjch t-»< int, int >, price h->< int, int >,
coffee-request-ch i-> int, coin-back
int,
save t-»< int, int >, pay-returnjch h» boolean}

Mq = [request-ch i-» {}, price i->

{< 1,50 >, < 2,75 >

< 3,100 >}, coffee-requestjch {},coin-back^ch
t-» {}, save h» {}, pay-return-ch h» {}}

Figure 20: Behavior of Subcomponents — BrewingFacility — in CoffeeMachine

Vw €

Port{money-cm), □(

{money-cm{m} A coffeetype

—>

O( {change-cm{m} Mready.enjoy.cin{\y) V
{readyjenjoy-.cm{l) A w > 75
Achange-.cm{m - 75)) V
{ready..enjoy-.cm{l) A m == 75)) )
In the work of property patterns [59], a set of categories is listed for the finite state verifi
cation of the non-timing systems based on more than five hundreds examples. Mainly there
are two groups discussed - occurrence pattern and order pattern. Occurrence patterns talk
about the occurrence of a given event/state during system execution, while order patterns
talk about relative order in which multiple events/states occur during system execution.
The supported formalisms of these patterns include LTL, CTL, GIL, QRE, and others. The
following formula 3 is the application of the bounded existence pattern in the occurrence
pattern group.
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)

<p = {requestjch »-»< int, int >, price h-»< int, int >,
coffee.requestjch i~» int, coinJback h-» int,
save h*< int, int >, pay.return -ch boolean}
Mq = {request.ch i-> {}, price (--»{< 1,50 >, < 2,75 >
<3,100 >},coffee.request-ch t-» {}, coinJback^ch
i-» {},save i-» {}, pay-return.ch i~» {}}

Figure 21: Behavior of Subcomponents — CMInterface — in CoffeeMachine

Vm, t € Port(coffee-request-cti), □(
(coffee-requestJbf(f) A O coffeeserve-cmi(ty) —»
((-> (coffee-request-ch(i) A ^coffeeserve-cmi(ty) U
(coffeeservejcmi(i) V ((co/fee-request-bf(t) A ~>coffeeserve-cmi(t))U
(coffeeserve.cmi(t) V ((-¡coffee-request-bf(t) A -icoffeeservesmi(tf)U

@)

(coffeeserve-cmi(t) V ((co/feesequest-bf(t) A -icoffeeserve-cmi(t))U
(coffeeserve-cmi(t) V (-^coffeesequest-bf(t)M
coffeeserve-cmi(ty))))))))))

8.2.1

Model Checking

All above properties are true after run on the Maude model checker. Besides, we also
tried several properties specified in the constrained chain property patterns and response
chain patterns [59]. The results can be returned within 1 - 4ms at most. The main reason for
the efficient result on the model checking of coffee machine example is this is a sequential
system that the transition can be fired in order. The sort of port money-cmi can take a
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product token with two integer elements. Since there is not user identifications specified,
whenever both integer elements match the pair defined in the place price, the transition
enough can be fired, otherwise not,enough will be fired. This is corresponding to the re
condition statements in the programming language, which is a sequential statement.
We define the size of the system using the number of process nets. Since process nets
are defined on the initial markings, the size of the system n can be defined as the number
of initial tokens in the initiate place. For instance, in the coffee machine model, the size of
the system can be specified by the number of initial tokens in the port money,cmi. In this
experiment, when n = 4 we cannot get the result. The system is running out of memory.
8.2.2 Runtime Verification
As a result of executing SAM parser, lots of files are generated to implement Petri nets
and SAM. Table 14 shows the distribution of generated files. From this table, we can see
even for this simple example, more than 200 java classes are generated to implement Petri
nets. The reason for this is due to the most important principle for the SAM parser: The
generated code is kept simple to understanding and modifying if necessary. In order to
implement SAM, one ArchJava file is generated for each component, connector or compo
sition. A component/connector class in ArchJava introduces several java classes, which are
decided by the number of ports contained by the element. One thing we have to point out
is that composition CoffeeMachine has no behavioral model. Its behavior is decided by its
sub-components and sub-connectors.
Each fired transition is recorded by three parts: pre-condition, the transition name and
id, and post-condition. For example, the following step means transition input is fired. As
a result of the firing, token 85 in place money.cmi, and token 2 in place coffeetype,cmi
are consumed, and token < 85,2 > and 1 are added to place request,cmi and place sig
respectively.
<money_cmi={85},coffeetype_cmi={2}>
—--Transition iutput(input)----->
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Table 14: Summary of Generated Files
# of Generated Files

For PN Implementation

For SAM Implementation

CoffeeMachine

0

1

CMInterface

12

1

CoinHandler

27

1

BrewingFacility

16

1

CELCMI

6

1

O'LBF

6

1

BF.CMI

6

1

Templates

14

7

Sort

1

0

Total

88

14

<request_cmi={<85,2>}, sig={l}>

During the experiment, the maximum number of the size of the system we checked is
six (« = 6). The result for the same formula can be output normally. The time and the size
of system relation on the property 3 is listed in the Table 15.
8.2.3 Discussion
From the results of using model checking and runtime verification on the coffee machine
example, we can summarize as follows.
1, In the small size of system, model checking is much more efficient.
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Table 15: Relation between Size and Time of Coffee Machine Example
System Size n

Time Consumed (ms)

1

3424

2

3743

3

3744

4

4221

5

4771

6

4769

2. When the model checker is out of space, runtime checker can still work well on
properties.
3. The time consumption of the runtime checker is not linear to the size of system.
Although the time consumption of the runtime checker is not linear to the size of the
system, it is still reasonable in terms of processors cost and resources for PC machine.
When the program and the runtime checker are running on a machine, the performance for
the system will be evaluated by the workload from monitor, storage, register, and others.
These factors override the effects from the number of process nets because we only check
the current execution path. In other words, in the multiprocessor machine, the performance
of the runtime verification may not be able to improve efficiently due to the above factors.
This also illustrates the reason that the time consumption of the runtime checker is not
linear to the size of the system.
From the above summarization, we can say that runtime checker can be a complementary
to the model checker when the size of the system is becoming huge.
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8.3

Network Security Protocol Under Attack

8.3.1 Scenario Introduction
E-commerce and enterprise systems can be secured in many different ways from simple
use of password to digital authentication. State-to-state ENC (STS-ENC) protocol [57],a
version of the authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [51], is to provide de
sirable security attributes in the network communication. The immunity is achieved by
allowing the two parties to authenticate themselves to each other by the use of digital sig
natures and public-key certificates.
But this is not strong enough to immune from malicious attacks. Public key substitution
attacks [31] on the protocol is an attack on a key agreement protocol that mislead one
principal to false beliefs. An participant A ends up believing she shares a key with

and

although this is in fact the case, B mistakenly believes the key is instead shared with an
entity /-> = A We use A

B to represent that A sends a message intended for B, but

intercepted by intruder I. This attacks can be described in the following message sequence
(A for Alice, B for Bob and I for intruder Ink):
1. AO:A^B
2. AfI':I-»B
3. JW2: B *-> A
4. Ml': I-*A
5. AG: A^B
6.

A,afA
l,arA

Certs, cfB, EK(SB(cfB,(fAy)
CertB,cfB,EK{SB(tfB,cfA))
CertA,EK{SA{^A^B))
Cer^E^S^,^

where CertA =

is A’s certificate containing A’s identifying informa

tion, A’s public key PAi and a trusted authority 7”s signature

st

over these information.

SA(x) is A’s signature on x using her secret key. Ek(M) is encryption over message M
using a symmetric key encryption scheme with key K = arAxrB, which is the ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman shared secret key. rA and rB are the number picked up randomly by A and
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B respectively. In this message sequence, steps 1,3, and 5 establish the normal communi
cation between A and B without intruder.
The series of steps indicate an intruder Ink successfully impersonate Alice to communi
cate with Bob. The communication starts from Alice sending a message Ml to Bob, which
is intercepted by Ink. Intruder Ink uses Pj as its own public key, to impersonate Alice to
get the shared key with Bob. After Ink intercepts message Ml, he impersonates Alice and
sends a modified message Ml' with his identifying information to Bob. When Ink receives
the message M2 from Bob, he sends message M2' to Alice without modification. Thus
when Alice sends out the message M3, he intercepts and decrypts it with the shared key,
and sends the faked message M3' with his certificate to Bob.
8.3.2

SAM Model of Network Security Protocol Under Attack

The top level of SAM model of STS-ENC protocol under attack scenario is demonstrated
in Fig. 22. There are one component TrustedAuthority, three compositions Alice, Intruder,
and Bob denoted by rectangles, and five connectors in this level. Due to space limit, the
mappings from compositions to subcomponents and behavioral specifications are omitted.
Because each connector behaves just like a data pipe, we simply explain components func
tionalities in the following.
The functionalities of component TrustedAuthority can be listed into the followings.
First, given identifying information and a public key TrustedAuthority can calculate a cer
tificate, second, TrustedAuthority can check if a certificate is valid or not by comparing
the public and private keys based on the calculation. The composition Alice is responsible
for sending message Ml, receiving message M2', checking the validation of message M2',
and sending message M3. The compositionIntruder/Ink intercepts message Ml, substitutes
identifying information, sends message Ml', intercepts message M2, sends message M2',
intercepts message M3, substitutes certificate and sends message M3'. The composition
Bob is responsible for receiving message Ml', sending message Ml, receiving message

M3', and checking the validation of message M3' according to previous information.
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In SAM, components communicate with each other through ports represented as semicir
cles. An incoming port, represented by a semicircle inside of the component, only receives
messages from other components at the same hierarchy, like port m2J.A of composition
Alice in Fig. 22. Similarly, an outgoing port, represented by a semicircle outside of the
component, only sends messages to other components, like port m2joJ of composition
Intruder in Fig. 22. Therefore, composition Intruder can sends a message M2' from the
outgoing port m2 joJ to the incoming port m2 JA of the composition Alice through the
connector PA J.
8.3.3 System Properties
In SAM model, we have to make sure that compositions Alice, Ink, and Bob behave as
expected from STS-ENC protocol. In other words, composition Alice first sends message
Ml, then receives message Ml', and finally sends message M3. This can be expressed by
the following formulae on composition Alice:
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O(«3_o_^(< Certs,Ek(S a((PA,<PB)) >))
[*](w2_z^(<

(4)

CertB,(PB,EK(SB((PB,(PA)) >)
A,(PA >)))

(5)

W(M3_O^(< CertB,EK(SA(<rA,</By> >) <*>(w2J_J(<

CertB,(Pb,Ek{Sb{(Pb,cPa^ >)))

(6)

The atomic predicate in above formula is in the form Port(m), which is evaluated true if
specified port contains the message m. For example, predicate m 1 _o_^(< A, arA >) is true if
the port ml-O-A of composition Alice has a message < A, cPA >. Our work supports future
time linear temporal logic and past time linear temporal logic. Formula 8 is a future time
LTL formula, while formulae 5 and 6 are past time LTL. In above formulae, <>, [*], and
(*) are future time operator eventually, past time operator SometimelnThePast (sometime
in the past), and AlwaysInThePast (always in the past) respectively.
Similarly, we can specify formulae for compositions Bob and Ink to guarantee the cor
rectness of their behavior. In addition to these formulae, another formula
O(S uccQrue))

(7)

on composition Bob is defined to indicate if STS-ENC protocol can be attacked by the
public key substitution attack, where Succ is a outgoing port of a sub component of com
position Bob. In other words, if formula 7 is satisfied, it means Alice thinks she shares a
key with Bob, but Bob thinks he shares a key with third party Ink.
8.3.4 Model Checking
All above properties are true after run on the Maude model checker. Besides, we also
tried several properties specified in the constrained chain property patterns and response
chain patterns [59]. The results can be returned within 0 - 8ms.
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8.3.5 Runtime Verification

The SAM model of STS-ENC protocol totally has 3 compositions, 16 components, 20
connectors, 312 ports, and 36 high level Petri nets with 290 places, 116 transitions and 331
arcs. It takes about 10 seconds for the SAM parser to generate the implementation of SAM
model of STS-ENC protocol on a P4 2.4Ghz machine with 512MB RAM. The generated
implementation has 491 files, and it is executable without any modification. Most of them
(419) is the implementation of components or connectors behavior (Petri nets). The reason
of generating so many files is due to the most important principle for the SAM parser: We
have to make the generated code easy to understand and minimize the cost of modification.
It takes about 96 seconds for the generated implementation to execute and verify above
10 formulae. The execution of the generated implementation fires transition 114 times, i.e.
almost one transition is fired every second. Most of the time is spending on the searching of
the enabled transition and valid assignments to variables. Comparing the time consuming in
the model checking method, the runtime verification is not efficient enough. However, the
code can be manually optimized for critical transitions by overriding methods that judge
if a transition is enabled. Most important is the runtime verification does not have state
explosion problem with the large systems. The analysis of the formulae is simply discussed
in the following.
From the log file generated in the execution of the implementation, the formula 7 is true,
which means that the well-known public key substitution attacks on STS-ENC protocol is
viable. In other words, Alice wants to share a public key with Bob. But in fact, Bob shares a
public key with Ink. From the log file, we also can see that the formula 8 holds. However,
the evaluations of formulae 5 and 6 are neither true nor false. This seems strange at
first since the purpose of runtime verification was to check if formulae are satisfied or not.
However this result is correct because these two formulae are past time LTL, which are
supposed to be always satisfied. In other words, runtime verification code only reports
exception for past time LTL formulae if it is violated, just like code in Fig. 14. Therefore,
the unsure results for formulae 5 and 6 indicate that there are no violation detected. This
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means these formulae hold during the program execution, which assures the behavioral
correctness of Alice, Ink, and Bob.
8.4
8.4.1

Online Shopping
Scenario Introduction

In this section we present an application of this approach to the basic electronic com
merce process of online shopping with credit card transaction [74]. However, this ap
proach is domain independent, i.e. SAM Parser does not depend on a particular domain of
discourse but rather on fundamental definitions of an ontology that captures what a compo
nent and a connector are. The online shopping scenario is a well familiar scenario that used
for many companies for their online sale systems. Different systems have different GUI,
but they share the same functionalities. The Fig. 23 is a simple description of the online
shopping scenario example.
Fig. 23, adapted from [6] and [204], describes online shopping processing in a free
natural language, while an accompanying pictorial scheme provides the details of electronic
shopping that precedes the payment processing.
The description in Fig. 23 concerns details of the shop system, which is the focus of
the e-business depicted in [204]. The two modules - the front platform for the user for
the graphically and textually representation of shopping operations and the back platform
for the retailer for organization and billing, etc. are separated into 5 blocks of services Customer, ShoppingCart, Warehouse, OrderProcessing, and CreditCardProcessing. The
retailer bank is a simple entity in the online shopping system and we do not concern the
black box financial organization of business company. In what follows, we examine the
SAM specification constructed, translated code and verification process to study several
unique features of SAM Parser.
8.4.2

SAM Model of Online Shopping System

The top topology of an online shopping system specified in SAM model is demonstrated
in Fig. 24. Each description block is captured in a component (or a composition). The
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Customer
Customer rrowses on the web tor some products d.cwn m the website
Toe uistoiner clicks on the AddToShoppingCan button (hyperlink), winch is taken through
a secure shopping cart software and checkout process <hosted on Payment Online secure
servers) where credit card transaction information tan be entered. After processing the
the credit card online, authorization responses are then returned to the customer to show
the transaction status. If the transaction is successful die customer confirms this
transaction, the system generates die order and shipping information and informs die
customer through an email or browser. Otherwise, the transaction is failed, and the error
message is generated and shown to the customer through browser.

Browse
catalogue

Customer

V

ShoppingCart
Shopping cart keeps a list of a customer's items and indexes each item When the checkout
button sends the message to the cart, ail items of the customer (identified by customer ID)
will be sent to the retailer’s online platform.

Warehouse
The web keeps ail avaiable information of the products of retailers, such as product name,
category, price, etc.. If the quantity of a required item exceeds die storage in the warehouse,
the whole transaction is discarded. Otherwise, order can be generated.

Orderprocessing
The web calculates the total price of all items that a customer requested, and pre t-!-d >t"-.
the customer information such as credit card number, credit line, expiration dale, it then
sends the form of credit card information out and waits for response.
if the credit eatd
information is valid, the order is processed and the related information, i.e., order number,
is sent to the customer. Otherwise, the transaction is failed.

V

CreditCardProcessing
The authorisation department checks die cidht card mfonnation '.nth ,t> the ca-d iuo rot
been reported stolen and there is sufficient credit on the e„rd Then reports to the retailer company.

Retailer's
bank

Merchant

RetailerBank
The service provided here is collection or refunding mon< - li»m or b k >o, u»i.’ii’ei

Figure 23: Natural language description of electronic shopping System

compositionsv (different concept from the composition in SAM, we subscript with a letter
v) between e-services are defined by connectors. Vertically, components/compositions in a
lower level can form a composition in the upper level. For instance, block Customer and
ShoppingCart is modeled in the component Customer and component Cart, and both com
ponents form a composition User in the topology of SAM. In the composition User, a cus
tomer can browse the web, choose category, select and checkout items. In addition, a user
can also adjust the order and cart list. All these internal behaviors are represented by the
refined inner components or Petri nets. Description blocks Warehouse and OrderProcessing are specified in the component Warehouse and Order, which form another composition
E-Company. An E-company can evaluate user requests, confirm or reject user requests,
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submit user information forms and generate orders, etc.. Finally, the component PaymentProcess captures the behavior of the description block CreditCardProcessing. Description
block RetailerBank is simply represented in the component RetailerBank.
Customer
1 User

J-j-

5

*

E-Company
2
Warehouse
7

request 27

response 15

|

1

response
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--------

shipEmail 15

i
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--------- o
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„
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uInfoReq_82
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addToCart_5 addToCart_56delFlCatt_56

O
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) uInfoRes_8
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-----o-----W
addToCart 65
addToCart 6 delFrCart_6
checkout_6Q
Cart
6

) checkout_8
") prdLCt_8
ehargeRetjB
ccAuth 82
backChBk_82
ccErr_82
ccK^»

prdLCt_61

NET
----- —-----

. . ____ ,
- uid, req, categi
chargeR, t_24
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{shipEmail.lS) = ®(snipEmail.2l) =< md, ship >
\uInfoReq.\5i = <$>(ulnfoReq.2\) =< uid,uReq >
\uInfoRes.l2) = ®(uInfoRes-2$) =< uid, name, ccNum, limit, ccExp >
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--------------------- ,JL,------\ordNum.\5) - 9(ordNumd21) =< uid,ordNum >
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\ccRes32) - <b{ccRes.2X) =< uid, ccNum, ccS talus >
<tbackCh„43) = <t>(backCh-3) =< uid, ccNum, totP >
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>t-

"V-------T?——QcEJr_21 ccAtth_23 “Rp-28
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)bachCk_3

ccRes_32

PaymentProcess
3

Figure 24: SAM Architecture of online shopping scenario

In SAM, components communicate with each other through ports represented as semicir
cles. .An incoming port, represented by a semicircle inside of the component, only receives
messages from other components at the same hierarchy, like port response-! 5 of compo
sition User in Fig. 24. Similarly, an outgoing port, represented by a semicircle outside of
the component, only sends messages to other components, like port response^! of com
position E-Company in Fig. 24. Therefore, composition E-Company can sends a message
P from the outgoing port response-21 to the incoming port response-15 of the composition
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Customer through the connector 7_2. Therefore, ports in SAM pass messages that are re
quired or demanded by a service. These passing messages are used to describe the service
composition^
In SAM, connector behaves as a communication channel between components. Ports
gear a connector and a component together - an outgoing port in a component is an in
coming port in the communicated connector. In this case, connector is a pipe to convey the
data between services and a link to compose different service component. This behavior is
defined by a transition connected between an incoming and an outgoing port. The whole
version of SAM model of online shopping example is shown in the Appendix F.
8.4.3 System Properties
The basic requirements for the online shopping system are correctness, robustness and
reliability. Since in this dissertation, the correctness property is the only concern of the
software systems, all the system properties of each example listed is derived based on the
correctness. For instance, if a user request to browse a product, a proper statement for the
product is shown up; if a user put a “checkout” requirement, either (s)he gets the order
information or is rejected because of payment issues (invalid credit cards, incorrect pass
words, system errors, and others), in the later case, an error message is popped up to the
user. In SAM model, we have to make sure that compositions User, and E-Company be
have as expected from description in Fig. 23. In other words, if the composition Customer
obtains a message m2 =< uid, pname, category, price > in the port response_15(w2), it in
dicates that sometime before the customer sent out a message ml =< uid, pReq, category >
through port request.l2(ml). This can be expressed by the following formulae on the com
position Customer:

<Rresponse_\ 5(< uid, pname, category, price >))

(8 )

^request-\2(< uid, “pReq", category >) ->
^(responsed. 5(< uid, pname, category, price >)))
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(9 )

The atomic predicate in above formula is in the form Port(m), which is evaluated
true if specified port contains the message m.

For example, predicate requestU2(<

uid, pReq, category >) is true if the port requestA2 of composition User has a message
< uid,pReq, category >. Our work supports future time linear temporal logic and past time
linear temporal logic. Formula 8 is a future time LTL formula, while formula 9 is a past
time LTL. In above formulae, O, □, and 0 are future time operator eventually, and past time
operator SometimelnThePast (sometime in the past), and AlwaysInThePast (always in the
past) respectively.
There are many key system properties need to be enforced. We list three of them for the
composition Customer and E - Company as follows.
1. Selective response property. When a customer sends a checkout request with prod
ucts (s)he wants, eventually (s)he gets either an order and shipment information or
the error response on this payment process. The formula is

ndcheckout-Y2(< uid,ilcheckout" >)A
prdLCt-Y2(< uid, pname, category, price, quantity >)) —>
(OiordNumA 5(< uid,ordNum >) A
shipEmaiL\5(< uidCshipEniail” >)) V
chkoutErrAS{< uid, “ccErr" >)))

(10 )

2. Conjoined reverse reasoning property. This property is to reason reversely from the
current to past about the result. The features for this property is 1) it started with the
current state which is true; 2) it is a past time temporal logic formula; 3) it involves
several components and their relation is conjunction. For instance, when a customer
receives an order information, we can reversely deduce that first the customer got a
response on a request for the product(s), second the customer provided his/her credit
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card information sometime before, finally the customer got the shipment information.
The LTL formula for this property is

a((ordNumA5(< uid,ordNum >) -> ^(({request A2{< uid,lipReq",category >)
<$responseA5(< uid, pname, category, price >)) A ®shipEmailA5(< uid,CishipEmaU" >) A
(uInfoReqA5(< uidCuReq" >) —> <>ulnfoResA2{< uid,name, ccNum, limit, ccExp >))))) (11 )

3. Cause-and-effect property. This involves more than two components/compositions,
and there is a timing order between each two. For instance, the E-Company request
to authorize a customer’s payment information (credit card form). After component
PaymentProcess responses, the E-Company sends out either an order and shipment
information or the credit card error information to the component Customer. The
LTL formula for this property is

u(ccAuthd23(< uid, name, ccNum, limit, ccExp, tprice >)
O(cc/?es_28(< uid,ccStatus >) —>
O(cc£rr_21(< uid,llccErr” >) V

(shipEmailA5(< uid, “shipEmail" >) A
ordNumd2U< uid,ordNum >)))))

(12 )

8.4.4 Model Checking
The basic requirements for the online shopping system are correctness, robustness and
reliability. We use model checker of Maude [47] to validate the SAM model of the online
shopping example against its properties. Before experiment, we translate the SAM model
to the Maude program. The translation algorithm is shown in the Chapter 7. The translated
code is shown in the Appendix B.
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The results output from Maude are true for all the above formulae. Most the above for
mulae are liveness properties. We do not have deadlock freedom properties in this case.
However, we did detect a deadlock in the model. The deadlock was located in the compo
nent Order, which is in the E-Company service, from the ccPrevalid place to the ccAuth
port. After we fix the deadlock problem all properties are verified. The interesting readers
can refer to paper [77] for details.
Besides, we also tried several properties specified in the constrained chain property pat
terns and response chain patterns [59]. The results can be returned within 0 - 13ms. When
the size of the system n = 5 we cannot get the result. The system is running out of memory.
8.4.5 Runtime Verification
The translation of SAM model and generated code of verification takes about 1.5 seconds
for the SAM parser on a P4 2.4Ghz machine with 512MB RAM. The generated implemen
tation has 280 files, and it is executable without any modification. Most of files are the
implementation of components or connectors behavior (Petri nets). The statistic data is
shown in Table 16. The reason of generating so many files is due to the most important
principle for the SAM parser: We have to make the generated code easy to understand and
minimize the cost of modification. It takes about 9.6 seconds for the generated implemen
tation to execute and verify 8 formulae involved four compositions or components. The
execution of the generated implementation fires transition 31 times, i.e. almost one transi
tion is fired every second. Most of the time is spend on the search of enabled transition and
valid assignments to variables. The code can be manually optimized for critical transitions
by overriding methods that judge if a transition is enabled.
From the log file, we also can see that the formulae 8 , 10 , 12 holds. However, the
evaluations of formulae 9 is neither true nor false. This seems strange at first since the
purpose of runtime verification was to check if formula are satisfied or not. However this
result is correct because these two formulae are past time LTL, which are supposed to be
always satisfied. In other words, runtime verification code only reports exception for past
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Table 16: Statistic Data of Generated Files
ArchJava
Files

Aspect!
Files

Java
Files

Properties

Tÿpes

Folders

Total
Files

14

6

273

8

17

30

291

time LTL formulae if it is violated, just like code in Fig, 14. Therefore, the unsure result
for formula 9 indicate that there are no violation detected. Same reason for the formula
11 . This means these formulae hold during the program execution, which assures the
behavioral correctness of Customer, E-Company, and PaymentProcess.
During the experiment, the maximum number of the size of the system we checked is
six {n = 6). The result for the same formula can be output normally. The time and the size
of system relation on the property 12 is listed in the Table 17.
Table 17: Relation between Size and Time of Online Shopping Example
System Size n

Time Consumed (ms)

1

3117

2

3434

3

3449

4

3771

5

4111

6

4219
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8.5
8.5.1

Cruise Control System
Scenario Introduction

This section introduces the case study cruise control system. It deals with a simplified
cruise control (CC) example adapted from [85]. The purpose of a cruise control system [85]
is to accurately maintain the driver’s desired set speed, without intervention from the driver,
by actuating the throttle-accelerator pedal linkage.
We assume an automatic transmission vehicle. When turned on by the driver, a cruisecontrol system (CCS) automatically maintains the speed of a car over varying terrain. The
CCS can be turned on by pressing Start button, and enabled by pressing SetSpeed button.
Resume button will enable the CCS at the last maintained speed when the brake is released.
The cruise control function is disabled when the brake or accelerator pedal is pressed.
Pressed once Resume button can increase the speed with lmph and the SetSpeed button
can decrease the speed with lmph when the cruise control function is enabled. The cruise
control system should be automatically disabled when the speed is below 25mph and above
90mph, For the detail information, please refer to [76].
8.5.2

SAM Model of CC System

The top topology of an Cruise Control system specified in SAM model is given in Fig.
25. In the Fig. 25, we do not label every entity in the model because of visibility Issue
and space limitation. The labeled elements are those necessary in the presentation. In
this model we describe the resuming, cruising, accelerating and decelerating states in the
composition CruiseController, other behaviors, such as actuator, sensor are captured in
other components or composition. Some component might be very simple, such as Engine,
we only modelled the data flowing or repository in that component.
8.5.3

Properties of the System

After studying models and the errors discovered during the model validation, two main
property categories have been selected:
1. Structural properties: this kind of properties is closely related to the topology of
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Figure 25: SAM Model of Cruise Control System

the model. These properties can be directly verified on the SAM model without
animating the execution. These properties are necessary conditions that ensure the
feasibility of the software. If one of them is not fulfilled, we can assert firmly that
the system will not behave well.
2. Behavior properties: the dynamic feature of these properties means that they are
related to state changing of the system. The evaluation of the dynamic properties are
based on the behavior description - Petri nets. Its verification is achieved on a set
of places describing a possible evolution of the system. Among these properties, we
cite the following properties:
• Deadlock freedom checks whether an instance will stay in a state forever. If that
case happens, the deadlock occurs and the system cannot program normally.
For instance, whenever you request for resuming, the last maintained speed is
retrieved and finally the system maintain the car at the last speed and set the last
speed as current speed.
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u(p}x(LastSpeed) -* Op\x{CurrentSpeed))

(13)

• Livelock freedom checks different transitions can finally be fired so that the
state will change. For instance, after pressing Resume button, the system either
accelerating the speed by lmph or retrieving the last maintained speed depend
ing on which guard condition is satisfied, e.g.,

°(Pa(spd)

(p^kspd, cruiseStatus) V p2
o5(spd, cruiseStatus)))

(14 )

3. Nonfunctional properties: In the realm of embedded systems, the most important
non-functional properties are energy, timeliness, and dependability. In this case, we
only consider some dependency properties.
8.5.4 Runtime Verification
The SAM model of Cruise Control System totally has 3 compositions, 10 components,
11 connectors. It takes about 4 seconds for the SAM parser to generate the implementation
of SAM model of Cruise Control System on a P4 2.4Ghz machine with 512MB RAM. The
generated implementation has over 100 files, and it is executable without any modification.
Most of them is the implementation of components or connectors behavior (Petri nets).
The reason of generating so many files is due to the most important principle for the SAM
parser: We have to make the generated code easy to understand and minimize the cost
of modification. It takes about 56 seconds for the generated implementation to execute
and verify 8 formulae. The execution of the generated implementation fires transition 114
times, i.e. almost one transition is fired every second. Most of the time is spend on the
search of enabled transition and valid assignments to variables. The code can be manually
optimized for critical transitions by overriding methods that judge if a transition is enabled.
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From the log file generated in the execution of the implementation, the formula 13 is
true, which means that whenever the resuming signal comes the cruise control status will
be entered finally and the system maintains last speed. From the log file, we also can see
that the formula 14 holds. However, the evaluations of some formulae are neither true nor
false. This seems strange at first since the purpose of runtime verification was to check if
formulae are satisfied or not. However this result is correct because those formulae are past
time LTL, which are supposed to be always satisfied. In other words, runtime verification
code only reports exception for past time LTL formulae if it is violated.
8.6 Service Oriented Software Architecture Model (SO-SAM)
Web services are emerging as a promising technology for the effective automation of
inter-organizational interactions. By web service, we mean a self-contained, internetenabled application capable not only of performing business activities on its own, but also
possessing the ability to engage other web services in order to complete higher-order busi
ness transactions.
A web service-oriented system refers to a system that integrates multiple web ser
vices automatically and transparently. The basic principles of service oriented architec
tures (SOAs) consist in modularizing functions and exposing them as services, which are
typically specified using standard languages and interoperate through standard protocols.
While several established and emerging standards bodies (e.g., [1,2,7,9,10] and others)
are rapidly laying out the foundations that the industry will be built upon, there are many
research challenges behind web services that are less well-defined and understood [9] for
the large number of web service application design and development.
SOAs will not scale without significant mechanization of service discovery, service adap
tation, service composition, and service monitoring; as well as data, protocol, and process
mediation. Recent efforts around service-oriented architectures provide even increased ur
gency for the above mentioned fundamental requirements for any scalable and economic
software solution. In parallel, the textual specification is not suitable for formal methods
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such as computer aided verification. With computer aided verification, in particular model
checking, it would be possible to decide crucial properties such as dependability of transac
tions, composability of processes, soundness, etc.. For a formal treatment, it is necessary to
resolve the ambiguities and inconsistencies of the language which occurred particularly due
to the hierarchical (esp. bottom-up) design and the unification of rather different services
in the composition.
Currently most research focuses on the integration and automatic composition of web
services but pays less attention to the analysis of whole structure and behaviors of web ser
vices. Recently, a number of Web Services-oriented Architecture Description Language
(WSADL), such as Web Services Description Languages (WSDL) [10], Web Services
Flow Language (WSFL) [108], Business Process Execution Language for Web Services
(BPEL4WS) [1], Web Service Choreography Interface (WSCI) [9], XLANG [148], and
others, have been developed and applied in both the academic and industry. However,
these WSADLs either merely focus on static descriptions of web service functional activ
ities as a whole, or concentrate only on the behavioral integration between web services.
Furthermore, none of these current WSADLs support dynamic verification and monitoring
of the integrated system.
Finally, web service design and composition is a distributed programming activity. It
requires software engineering principles and technology support for service reuse, spe
cialization and extension such as those used, for example, in component based software
development. Although web service provides the possibility for offering new services by
specialization and extension instead of designing them from scratch, to this date there is
little research initiative in this context.
SAM [198] is an architectural description model based on Petri nets [153] well-suited
for modeling distributed systems and temporal logic [137] for specifying system proper
ties. In this section we propose a service-oriented architecture model, SO-SAM, which
extends SAM to the web service applications and overcomes the drawbacks of current web
service description languages. SO-SAM is an executable specification language based on
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the Predicate Transition Net (PrTN) [153] and the temporal logic [137] specification of
system properties. Supporting modem software engineering philosophies equipped with
component-based notations, SO-SAM provides an approach to specify and monitor the dy
namic composition of web services and integration of service-oriented systems. SO-SAM
model introduces the concept of component web to facilitate the idea of web service reuse,
specialization, extension and online evolution.
8.6.1 SO-SAM Specification
In order to specify both the static and dynamic architectural features of a web servicesoriented system, we proposed a Service Oriented Software Architecture Model (SO-SAM)
[74] as an executable architectural specification language. Two web service components
are composed through connectors. SO-SAM specifies a web services-oriented software ar
chitecture as a set of connected architectural components described by PrT nets and service
properties described by temporal logic formulae. The architectural components correspond
to functional units in the system. With the hierarchical nature of SAM model one archi
tectural component may in turn be composed of several smaller architectural components.
The entire system can be viewed as a highest-level architectural composition, which is also
a component. Each architectural component is either statically or dynamically realized by
a web services component. Architectural components are connected to each other via XML
message passing through Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [7]. The behavior of the
connection is specified by SAM architectural connectors. The message passing mediates
the interactions between architectural components via the rules that regulate the component
interactions. In the model, connectors carry the tasks of service compositions. Thus the
model supports both executable and dynamic web service compositions.
Definition 12 (SO-SAM) Service-Oriented Software Architecture Model, SO-SAM, is de
fined by a set of components Cm, a set of connectors Cn, and a set of constraints Cs, e.g.
SO-SAM = < Cm, Cn, Cs >, with following regulations:
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• Two components can communicate with each other only through connectors, which
model service integration.
• The message in each port is defined in the XML format and passed through SOAP
protocol.
• The componentfollows the definition of WSDL or XML.
• The dynamic behavior of a component is defined by a service net, which is focusing
on its internal operational nature.
In Chapter 6, we know that the ports in each component are either input ports or output
ports. In the extension to web applications, ports are used to transfer messages among
services, same as in SAM model. However, we regulate messages as a tuple with the
information of service name, service description, location, URL, etc., so that the message
carries service information.
A component is composed of the above ports that carry service information, behavior de
scription and property specification. The behavior of a component is defined by a Petri net,
which is called a service net. In the service net, tokens in a place has to have specific sort
to be consistent with the above port and message definition. A basic component is one that
does not have sub-components and non-empty connectors, otherwise, it is a composition.
A composition is a composite service. The relation between a composition and its subcom
ponents and connectors is defined by a mapping function f. Mapping function f is a set of
maplets from super component(connector)’s identities to sub-components’(connectors’).
Service integration can be done through connectors. Connectors have the same definition
as in SAM. The Petri net for a connector is a regular petri net that describe the integration
and composition of services. A connector cannot be a composition.
Definition 13 (Port) Ports in SO-SAM are communication interfaces of each services and
graphically represented by semi-circles. Messages in ports are modeled by tokens. The sort
ofeach token is defined by two parts, service sort S s and data sort Sd- Service sorts are, but
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not limited to, S Name, SDesc, Loc, URL, where SNome is the name of the service, SDesc
is the service description, Loc is the service location and URL is the Uniform Resource
Locator, data sort is the regular sort defined in SAM [96].
Thus we have sort S ofa port is defined by
S^Ss,SD

Service sort S$ is a service query indicating a service name, location, description, URL,
etc.. Service sort must be carried by all tokens in the service net.
Definition 14 (Service Component) Each component C'm in SO-SAM is defined by a tuple,
component name ClmID, mapping function f, set ofports Pt that is composed of the set of
input ports Ptj and the set of output ports Pto, the set of initial ports Ptini € Pt, the set of
finial ports Ptf„i 6 Ph a service net SN, and a set of temporal logic formulae S T, e.g.,
~<

fcmID^hnh Ptfni, Ptiniernaj,

Sdes,SN,ST>,
where fcmiD

a mappingfunction : ClmID —» subClmID, and CmID and subCmID denote

the set of components and subcomponents respectively. If fyjD -

then Clm is a basic

component and cannot be further refined. Ptini,Ptf„i, Ptinternai are set of initial, final and
internal ports. Sdes is a service description.
Initialports are represented by dash line bold halfcircles, andfinalports are represented
by solid line bold halfcircles. Each set ofinitialports in a service component must connect
to a set offinal ports in another service component through a connector, and vice versa.

In the component, each service must be started from one set of initial ports, but can be
ended at multiple finial ports separately. This is because a service can reach different final
states but starts at the same condition.
Definition 15 (Service Net) A service net is a Petri net defined by 8-tuple, SN =<
P, T, F, <[, R, L, Mq,

>, where

• P, Tare finite set ofplaces and transitions; F isflow relation: PxTuTxP.
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• (f) is sort assignment: P -> ¡p(S) ( [96]), but sorts S are extended to carry service
information.
• The final ports Ptf„i of a service net communicate with a set of initial ports Piini of
another service net through a connector.
• R (guardfunction), L (labelfunction), and Mq (initial markings) follow the definitions
in the paper [96].
•

is place mappingfunction,

: Pt —> P

where each sort must contain Ss- Mapping function

associates each port to a place

in the service net. It is a one-to-one mapping function, because in the SAM model the
place and ports share the same name, and two ports between upper level and lower level
share the same name. It is also an onto mapping function because all places that are
identified as communicators to the other service nets will not be increased for a basic
service component.
Definition 16 (Web Service) A web service is defined by a basic component or a
composition (collection of components and connectors) or a tuple such that <
Sid, f, Sdes, Pt,SN,ST > where
• Sid is the service which is equivalent to OmID. When a service component has more
than one services, each service must contain its service component’s ID.
• mappingfunction f is equivalent to fc^iD syntactically. The difference is the mapping
function fc> ID for service component should concern behavioral refinement, while in
each service we only concern a flattened component where the ports that inherited
from service component are the only mapping concern in f.
• Sdes is the service description which can be represented by WSDL,
• andPtini U Ptfni ~ Pt. Since it is a basic service, not a composite service (i.e. service
component) Paternal =
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• ST is a subnet of ST that is defined in the service component, and so is S N.
The behavior of each web service S1 in SO-SAM is defined by a service net SN, which
must starts when the initial ports Ptini has messages and ends when the final ports receive
messages. The properties are defined using a set of temporal logicformulae S T.
The composition ofdifferent web services can be modeled by connectors.

8.6.2 Service Composition
Because services are simple units used for building distributed applications, we cannot
talk about them without talking about service-based applications - specifically, how these
applications are built based on the service view and how services should behave together
within them based on the discovering and binding functions. The applications will use
services by composing or putting them together. An architecture for service-based appli
cations has three main parts: a provider, a consumer, and a registry. Providers publish or
announce their services on registries, where consumers find and then invoke them. Figure
26 provides a general architectural model for Web services, which forms the basis for an
SOA.

Figure 26: A General Service Oriented Architecture

In this section, we explain how the service component and connector work together to
create service compositions. As shown in the Figure 26, there are three stages among the
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three participants of service composition: publishing the service descriptions, discovering
the matching services, and binding the required services. We address these in the following.
The publishing stage involves service description, static syntax checking, and compat
ibility checking. The output of this stage is a service identified with its ID and service
description.
Each service requested can be satisfied if we find the services that match the required
constituent services either completely or partially. For service discovery, it is important
to find an appropriate service with the right capability. Service discovery relies on the
following steps:
• Functional analysis: this is to check the selected service’s behavioral capability in
terms of the functions they provide to determine whether or not this service can
perform the completely or partially the requested service task.
• Semantic analysis: during this period, we compare the descriptions of the requested
service with the retrieved services from the repository in terms of service contents
and decide how closely they are related. High degree related service will be chosen.
In this stage how to define the semantic of a service and service composition is quite
difficulty. A service composition in a large distributed system can involve highly
complicated sequential and parallel communications. In the SO-SAM model, each
service can be described by a Petri net behaviorally and its composition is further
distributed on a component-based architecture. This method provides a good solution
for this issue.
• Syntactic analysis: Each service has a precise syntax definition for their interfaces
and operations. In this stage we need to check the service syntax and determine how
they can be combined to achieve the requested higher-order service.
We use ® to denote sequential composition, || denote parallel composition. Based on the
SO-SAM model, we define the sequential and parallel composition as follows.
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Definition 17 Sequential Composition ofServices can be defined as following:
A service S is a sequential composition of two services S1 and S2, i.e., S - 51 = S2,
where
S =< S/D, f, Sdesi Ptf SN,S T >
51 -< SiD^f^des^PtiiSNx^STi >, and
52 —< S/£>2, f2,S¿eS2,Pti,SNi,ST\ >, and
• Sid - S JDn> the composed service ID is the combination ofeach service’s ID,
• f ~f\~ fif„, U fi - fiifnl, where fifnl and f2fnl denote the Ptfnh and Ptfnh mapping in
the fi and f2 respectively,
• Sdes ~ Sdes\

Sdes^t

• Pt ~ Pt\ U Pt2, where Ptini — Pt^, Ptfnj = Ptfn{2, andPtinternal

= Ptfnh

U Ptiniv

• SN = SNdJSNfiJ {pWait}> where pwait is a connecting place between two sub-services
Si andS2,
• ST cannot be defined as STi U ST2 since they are not equivalent to each other.
Since sequential composition of two services S i and S2 has an ordering relation, i.e., it
could be S j concatenating with S2 or vice versa.
It is worth to note that after the sequential composition the composed service (S) prop
erty is not the simple union of each sub-service (Si, S2) property because the atomic for
mula of each property is the initial and final ports while these ports in the new service is not
the union of each sub-services (S i, S2). Place pwait is necessary because each sub-service
has to communicate with outside through their ports, the internal communication of the
two services can be done by a place connecting two transitions in two sub-services to hold
the information of the previous one and provide service data to its following one. Finally,
the union of Petri nets can be defined as the merge of places with the same name.
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Definition 18 Parallel Composition ofServices can be defined as following:
A service S is a parallel composition of two services S1 and S2, Le., S = S 1||S2, where
5^< SIDJ,Sdes,Pt,SN,ST>
51 -<

>, and

52 =< S¡D2,f2,SdeS2,Pt\,SNi,S7\ >, and
• Sid - S iDn> the composed service ID is the combination of each service ’s ID,
• f ~ fiC f2, where f„i = f„ii U fini2> and ffii = ffnix U ffni2,
• $des ~ $desi

$ des2>

• Pt = Ph U Pt2, where Ptini = Ptinh U Ptini2, Ptfnl = Ptfnh U Ptfnh, and Ptinternai = O,
• SN = SNi U SN2 U Pcomm, where Pcomm is a set of communication places between
two sub-services Si and S2, if the two services have communication, otherwise, we
have
SN±SNiUSN2,
• It can be defined ST = ST\C ST2if two sub-services do not have communication.
The basic services composition is described in one service component. In parallel, for
the two service components, we can also define sequential composition.
Definition 19 Sequential Composition of Service Component can be defined as following:
A service component SC is a sequential composition of two service components SCI
andSC2, SC = 50 = SC2, where
SC =< Cid, fc, Ptini, Ptfnl, Ptinternai,
Sdes,SN,ST >,
SCi =< CiDi,fc\,Ptinh,Ptfnh,Ptinternaix,
Sdesi,SNi,STi >, and
SC2=< ClD2, fc2, Ptinh, Ptfnh, Ptinternait »
SdeS2, SN2, ST2 >, and
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• C/d = CjDi2, the composed service component/composition ID is the combination of
each service component’s ID,
• fc - fa “
fCim2

• S ¿es

= *S*desi

u fc2 ~ fc2fnl, where fCini = fcinii, fc/n, = fcfnh, and fCi„ternal fcinternal ]

J"Cintemai2

des2>

• Pt = Pti u Pt2 - Ptf„h - Ptini2> where PtM = Ptinh, Ptfni = Ptfnh> and Ptinternai =
Ptfnl\ U Ptini2 U Ptintemali U Ptinternal
• SN = SNi USN2 U No,, where SNCni2 represents the Petri nets of the connector Cni2
between service components SCl and SC2
• ST cannot be defined as STi U ST2 since they are not equivalent to each other.
It is worth to note that there is not a necessary ordering relation between two service
components. When we denote the sequential composition of two service components, we
need to consider the connector between them, i.e., SC = SCI = SC2 = SCI = Cni2 =
SC2.
8.6.3 A Case Study on the SO-SAM Model
The top topology of an online shopping system specified in SOSAM model is given in
Fig. 24. Each description block is captured in a component (or a composition). Each composition/component captures a service with the start and end ports. For instance, service
Customer and ShoppingCart is modeled in the component Customer and component Cart,
and both components form a composition, a composite service, User in the topology of SO
SAM. In the composition User, a customer starts from request to browse the web (through
port request-5T), then choose category, select and checkout items. Finally it ends at either
getting the order and ship information (port ordNum.15 and shipEmaiLS) or payment errors
(port chkoutErr-5). In addition, a user can also adjust the order and cart list. All Internal
operations are represented by the refined inner components, service nets and connectors.
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Description blocks Warehouse and OrderProcessing are specified in the service component
Warehouse and Order, which form another composite service E-Company. An E-company
starts at port requestC27 to evaluate user requests, and confirm or reject user requests, then
submit user information forms and generate orders, etc.. Finally, the service component
PaymentProcess captures the behavior of the description block CreditCardProcessing. De
scription block RetailerBank is simply represented in the service component RetailerBank.
Since SO-SAM model keep the port same as that in the SAM model, the properties spec
ified for the online shopping example are still valid in this SO-SAM model. The interesting
aspect about this case study is that we can formally verify and validate service composi
tion through the SO-SAM model. Furthermore, the SO-SAM model provide an integration
among services.
8.7 Application on UML Architecture Description of Web Systems
Web systems are self-descriptive software components which can automatically be dis
covered and engaged, together with other web components, to complete tasks over the In
ternet. The importance of web system architecture descriptions has been widely recognized
in recently year. One of the main perceived benefits of a web system architecture descrip
tion is that such a description facilitates system property analysis and thus can detect and
prevent web design errors in an earlier stage, which are critical for web systems. Software
architecture description and modeling of a web system plays a key role in providing the
high level perspective, triggering the right refinement to the implementation, controlling
the quality of services of products and offering large and general system properties. While
several established and emerging standards bodies (e.g., [1,2,7,9,10] etc.) are rapidly
laying out the foundations that the industry will be built upon, there are many research
challenges behind web system architecture description languages that are less well-defined
and understood [107] for the large number of web service application design and develop
ment.
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On the other hand, Unified Modeling Language (UML), a widely accepted objectoriented system modeling and design language, has been adapted for software architecture
descriptions in recent years. Several research groups have used UML extension to describe
the web system’s architecture ( [29,100]). However, it is hard to detect the system prob
lems, such as'correctness, consistency [101] and others, of the integration of Web services
without a formal semantics of web services architecture.
Currently, although a software architecture description using UML extension contains
multiple viewpoints such as those proposed in the SEI model [164], the ANSI/IEEE Pl471
standard, and the Siemens [103]. The component and connector (C&C) viewpoint [187],
which addresses the dynamic system behavioral aspect, is essential and necessary for sys
tem property analysis.
To bridge the gap between web system architecture research and practice, several re
searchers explored the ideas of integrating architecture description languages (ADLs) and
UML [40,61,62,140]. Most of these integration approaches attempted to describe ele
ments of ADLs in terms of UML such that software architectures described in ADLs can
be easily translated to extensions of UML. There are several problems of the above ap
proach that hinder their adoption. First, there are multiple ways to describe ADLs in terms
of UML [79], each of which has advantages and disadvantages; thus the decision on which
extension of UML to use is not unique. Second, modifications on UML models are difficult
to be reflected in the original ADL models since the reverse mapping is in general impos
sible. Finally, the software developers are required to learn and use specific ADL to model
software architecture and use the specific extension of UML, which is exactly the major
cause of preventing the wide use of ADLs. Currently, there is less work involved to apply
these methodologies to the web systems.
In this section, we present an approach opposite to the one mentioned above and apply
this approach to the web applications, i.e. we translate a UML architecture description
into a formal architecture model for formal analysis. Using this approach, we can combine
the potential benefits of UML’s easy comprehensibility and applicability with a formal
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ADL’s analyzability. Moreover, this approach is used to formally analyze the integration
of web services. The formal architecture model used in this research is named SO-SAM,
an extended version of SAM [97], which is based on Petri nets and temporal logic; and
supports the analysis of a variety of functional and non-functional properties [99], Finally,
we validate this approach by using model checking techniques.
Algebraic High-Level Nets
An algebraic high-level net integrates Petri net with inscription of an algebraic specifi
cation defining the data types and operations. Instead of specifying a single system model,
an algebraic Petri net represents a class of models that often differ only in a few parame
ters. Such a compact parameterized description is unavoidable for modular specification
and economic verification of net models in the dependable system design.
Generally

speaking,

an

algebraic

high-level

(AHL)

nets

N

=

(5PEC, A, X, P, T, W+, W~, cond, type) consists of following parts:
• An algebraic specification SPEC - (S, OP,E), where SIG = (S, OP) is a signature,
and E is a set of equations over SIG;
• A is an SPEC algebra;
• A is an family of S-sorted variables;
• P is a set of places;
• T is a set oftransitionssuch thatPt\T = Q;
• Two functions W+, W~ assigning to each t e T an element of the free commutative
monoid 1 over the cartesian of P and terms of SPEC with variables in X.
• cond is a function assigning to each t € T a finite set of equations over signature
SIG.
1A set M with an associative operation * and an identity element for that operation is called a monoid. A
commutative monoid is a monoid in which the operation is commutative. A commutative monoid is a free
commutative monoid if every element of M can be written in one and only one way as a product (in the sense
of *) of elements of subset P M.
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type is a function assigning to each place a sort in S.
Component and Connector View

Component and connector view was one of the four views proposed in [103,104], which
is described as an extension of UML. The component and connector view describes ar
chitecture in terms of application domain elements. In this view, “the functionality of the
system is mapped to architecture elements called components, with coordination and data
exchange handled by elements called connectors.” [103]
In the component and connector view, components, connectors, ports, roles and proto
cols are modelled as UML stereotyped classes. Each of them is represented by a special
type of graphical symbol, as summarized in Fig. 27. A component communicates with
another component of the same level only through a connector by connections, which con
nect relevant ports of components and roles of connectors that obey a compatible protocol.
In addition to the connections between components and connectors, ports (roles, resp.) of
a component (connector, resp.) can be bound to the ports (roles, resp.) of the enclosing
component (connector, resp.).
8,7.1

An Image Processing Example

In order to present the approach we use an image processing example used in the dis
tributed web application that was adapted from [103]. Fig. 28, 29, 30 from [103] shows
a concrete and complete component and connector view, which is the running example
of this section. Fig. 28(a) is a configuration of ImageProcessing component. Fig. 28(b)
shows another aspect of the configuration. Both of them are UML class diagrams and
model different aspects of the system. From these two figures, we can see the component
ImageProcessing contains two components: Packetizer and ImagePipline, and one con

nector PacketPipe. The ports of component ImageProcessing, rawDatalnput, acqControl,
and framedOutput are bound to ports rawDatalnput of component Packetizer, acqCon
trol and framedOutput of component ImagePipeline respectively. Component Packetizer

communicates with component ImagePipeline through connector PacketPipe. Component
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Figure 27: UML Extension for component and connector View

Packetizer and connector PacketPipe is connected by a connection between port PacketOut
and role source, which obey (conjugate) protocol DataPacket. Component ImagePipeline
and connector PacketPipe is connected by a connection between port Packetln and role
dest, which obey (conjugate) protocol RequestDataPacket. Being a conjugate means that
the ordering of the messages is reversed so that incoming messages are now outgoing and
vice versa.
Fig. 28 alone is not enough to illustrate component and connector view since only
components and connectors of the system and corresponding connections among them are
demonstrated. Additional diagrams are needed to define protocols and functional behavior
of components and connectors. A protocol, represented by a stereotyped class, is defined
as a set of incoming message types, a set of outgoing message types and the valid message
exchange sequences. The valid message exchange sequence is represented by a sequence
diagram. Fig. 29 shows the definition of RawData, DataPacket, and RequestDataPacket
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(b) Protocols for Packetizer and PacketPipe

Figure 28: Structural Aspect of Component and Connector View
protocols. From Fig. 29(c), we can see protocol RequestDataPacket has one incoming
message: packet(pd), and three outgoing messages: subscribe(c), desubscribe(c), and requestPacket(c) where c,pd are parameters of messages. In order to communicate with
object B based on protocol RequestDataPacket, object A first sends object B a message
subscribe(c) where c indicates the sender A. Then a message requestPacket is sent to B
to request a packet. Later, object A may receive a packet pd from B. The symbol

in

the figure indicates that the pair of message requestPacket and packet(pd) may occur many
times. Finally, object A sends a message desubscribe(c) to B to stop requesting packet.
The behavior of components/connectors may be described formally by UML statechart
diagrams, for example the behavior of component Packetizer and connector PacketPipe
in Fig. 30. Statechart diagrams describe the dynamic behaviors of objects of individual
classes through a set of conditions, called states, a set of transitions that are triggered by
event instances, and a set of actions that can be performed either in the states or during
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Figure 29: Protocols in Component ImageProcessing
the firing of transitions. From Fig. 30(b), we can see the statechart diagram of connector
PacketPipe contains two states: waiting and “assign packet to ready client” and seven tran
sitions. When connector PacketPipe receives an event subscribe(c), it invokes its operation
AddClient(c) although we do not know exactly the functionality of this operation. When
the connector receives an event packet(pd), it saves the packet pd. And the response of
connector PacketPipe to an event requestPacket(c) is up to the condition: the client c has
read current packet or not. If yes, the connector treats it as a request for next packet; oth
erwise it sends current packet to client c through an event c.packet(pd). If all clients have
read current packets, the connector updates its packet queue and enter state "assign packet
to ready client” in which the connector sends current packet to clients that has submitted
their requests. If all requests are processed, the connector return to state waiting. As we
can see from this figure, connectors and components mainly handle incoming messages of
protocols they obey (conjugate).
8.7.2 Transformation From Component & Connector View
Component and connector (C&C) view [187] has been the main underlying design prin
ciple of most ADLs [142], which is also a major view type in several software architec
ture documentation models supporting multiple architecture views such as SEI [164] and
Siemens [103]. C&C view is essential and necessary for system dependability analysis
since it captures a system’s dynamic behavioral aspect. SO-SAM model and component
and connector view share a set of common terms such as components, connectors, and
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Figure 30: Behavior of Elements (UML)
ports. Therefore it is straightforward to map them to the counterparts in SO-SAM. How
ever, due to the meaning difference and various formal methods to describe elements’ be
havior, the concrete mapping procedure is not that easy. This section shows a method [75]
to construct a complete and executable SO-SAM model from a component and connector
view.
A component (connector, resp.) in component and connector view is mapped to a com
ponent (connector, resp.) in SO-SAM model. It is easy to understand from structural as
pects. However, the behavior mapping is complex since different formal methods are used
to model behavior. UML statechart diagrams are used to model behavior in component
and connector view, contrasting with Petri net model in SO-SAM. Fortunately, the previous
work [55] showed that it is possible to transform statechart diagrams to Petri net models. In
UML statechart diagrams, method invocations and relationships between variables are im
plicit in the elements’ structure. For example, in Fig. 30(a), the conditions PacketNotFull
and PacketFull, and relationship between variable rd and pd is not illustrated explicitly.
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However, such information has to be expressed explicitly in order to obtain a complete and
executable Petri net. In order to bridge the gap, we utilize algebraic high level nets [65],
a variant of high level Petri nets, to model behavior of elements. This method is possible
because SO-SAM model does not specify a particular Petri net model as its formal founda
tion. We use algebraic specifications [63] to capture structures of elements obtained from
UML statechart diagrams because algebraic specifications are abstract enough that no ad
ditional information about implementation detail is assumed, and they are also powerful
enough to represent implied information about components or connectors. Although the
work [55] is for SAM architecture model, we can still use it and adapt it to the SO-SAM
model since they share the same net structure. The main differences exist in the service
sorts in the net specification, initial and final ports in the net specification and net inscrip
tion. The following rule gives us a general idea to derive components or connectors in
SO-SAM.
Rule 1 (Component and Connector) A Component (connector, resp.) in component and

connector view is mapped to a component (connector, resp.) in SO-SAM according to
following steps:
Step 1 An algebraic specification, which specifies the abstract interface of the component

(connector, resp.), is generated from a UML statechart diagram. The idea to con
struct algebraic specification is described later.
Step 2 Construct a complete and executable algebraic high level netfrom the UML state-

chart diagram according to the approach in [55] and the generated algebraic spec
ification. There is a special place in the generated algebraic high level nets that
contains element information and provides necessary information for transitions.
Step 3 A component (connector, resp.) with a UML statechart diagram in component and

connector view is mapped to a component (connector, resp.) with an algebraic high
level net in SO-SAM.
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While it is inherently impossible to prove the correctness of the transformation, we have
carefully validated the completeness and consistency of our transformation rule. First, from
structure point of view, concepts of components or connectors in component and connector
view and SO-SAM are the same. Both of them support composition, binding with enclos
ing element, and they can have their own behavior and communication channels-ports or
roles. Therefore, the main functionalities of components or connectors in component and
connector view are presented in SO-SAM counterparts. Second, algebraic specification
can be used to specify modular, more specific classes [64]. Therefore, the implied infor
mation of statechart diagrams, i.e. the operations and their properties can be correct and
fully specified by algebraic specifications. Since functions of algebraic specifications only
define what to be done, no additional implementation information not implied in statechart
diagrams is introduced. Finally, our previous work [55] and others work [180] have shown
that the behavior described by statechart diagrams can be folly captured by corresponding
Petri nets.
The idea to obtain algebraic specifications from UML statechart diagrams is as fol
lows: For each element (component and connector), its algebraic specification defines
a sort, called elementsort, like packetizer for component Packetizer and packetpipe for
connector PacketPipe.

If a data type of parameters is not defined by a primitive al

gebraic specification, a new algebraic specification is imported.

Such a imported al

gebraic specification generally defines only one sort, like Packet for component Packe
tizer. Each action of transitions in a UML statechart diagram is considered as a func
tion such that: action-name : elementsort x parameterssortJist —> element-sort. Here
parameterssortJist includes service sorts as well. For a guard condition of a transition, a
function from elementsort (with necessary parameter sorts) to boolean is added. For each
variable that is defined in the element (i.e. the variable is not defined in the related events),
a function like GetVariableTypeName : elementsort —> elementsort x VariableType 2
2This is actually the abbreviation of two functions: GetVariable : elementsort —» VariableTypes and
UpdateElement : elementsort -» elementsort since these two functions are invoked sequently in the
example.
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is specified. The properties of these functions can be constructed as equations if they are
implied in the UML statechart diagrams, like guards PacketNotFull and PacketFull cannot
hold at the same time.
From the above idea, we know that the algebraic specification for component
Packetizer contains four functions, two of them correspond to guard conditions:
-.PacketNotFull(),-.PacketFullO : packetizer —> book, and one is obtained from
actions\-.AddRawData{d) : packetizer x rawdata —> packetizer, and one from undefined
variable: -.GetPacketQ : packetizer

packetizer x packet. In these functions,

is used

to indicate a variable placeholder, bool is a sort defined in primitive algebraic specification
Bool [63], and sorts rawdata and packet are defined in imported algebraic specifications
Packet and RawData respectively, which are defined by users and normally only one sort
{rawdata, packet resp.) is specified.
With these algebra specifications, we can generate corresponding algebraic high level
nets according to Rule 1. Fig. 31 shows the generated Petri nets from UML statechart
diagrams in Fig. 30. Each generated Petri net has three special places: RECV containing
messages from environment, SEND temporarily storing messages generated for its envi
ronment, and the place whose name is the same as its element’s name (here, Packetizer and
PacketPipe resp.), holding the abstract structural information of the element. In additional
to these three places, there is a corresponding place indicating current status for each state
in statechart diagrams, for example, places idle,waiting, init-packet and add-data for the
same name states. A special token in these places indicates if the corresponding state is
active. Place RECV sends events from external environment to places that are interested in
the event. In Fig. 31(a) place idle and waiting are interested in event dataReady and rawdata(rd) respectively. If state idle is active and an event dataReady is available, transition
is fired. As a result, an event requestData is added to place SEND, and place waiting
becomes active. State addjdata becomes active if state waiting is active and an event rawdata(rd) is available. At the same time, the token in place packetizer is changed to another
one through operation -.AddRawData{2) of algebraic specification Packetizer.
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Components and connectors in component and connector view are connected through a
connection if they are enclosed directly by the same element and the corresponding ports
and roles obey (conjugate) a compatible protocol. Therefore, the mapping from ports
or roles in component and connector view to ports in SO-SAM is actually the mapping
from relevant protocols describing behavior of ports or roles to ports of SO-SAM components/connectors. However, ports in SO-SAM models have their own characteristics. A
port in SO-SAM model is a place that has either no incoming arcs or no outgoing arcs. In
other words, the communication between ports is unidirectional. Therefore, a protocol in
component and connector view, which consists of a set of incoming message types, a set of
outgoing message types and the valid message exchange sequences, is mapped into a set of
interface places (To avoid confusion, we use interface places to refer to ports in SO-SAM
model). The type of tokens in an interface place is OIDxOIDxMES SAGE.TYPE, where
OID is a set of unique identification number for each instance of the element, which spec
ifies sender and receiver of a message, and MESSAGE.TYPE is the set of message types of
the protocol (Here we ignore the parameters of messages for brief). Rule 2 specifies how
to map a port/role in component and connector view to interface places in SO-SAM.
Rule 2 (Ports and Roles) A port (role, resp.) of a component (connector, resp.) in com
ponent and connector view is mapped to a set of interface places of the corresponding
component (connector, resp.) specified by Rule 1: For each protocol that the port (role,
resp.) obeys (conjugate), each kind of incoming messages is mapped to an incoming (out
going, resp.) interface place of the component (connector, resp.) with the name of the
message type; and each kind of outgoing messages is mapped to an outgoing (incoming
resp.) interface place ofthe component (connector, resp.).
Initial andfinal ports can not be obtainedfrom the UML architecture description directly.
We provided two possible solutions:
• One is extending C&C view with new UML stereotypes initialPort and finalPort.
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This would bring a direct transformation from C&C architecture to SO-SAM. The
problem is this also bring more complexity into UML architecture description.
• Another is manually adding the specification for these ports according to the system
architecture description. For instance, we can say dataReady andRawData as initial
port andframeout andfinal port in this case.
A port (role, resp.) of an element is actually -roughly speaking- a “channel” that for
wards messages of specified types either from element itself to environment, or from envi
ronment to element. In Rule 2, a token represents an occurrence of an message of specified
type, and the direction of a message is specified by the place containing the token - incom
ing or outgoing. Therefore, the mapping in Rule 2 conserves the main structural features
of ports/roles and related protocols, and the reverse mapping exists, which ensures the cor
rectness of the rule.
The behavior of a protocol, defined by UML sequence diagrams to demonstrate valid
message exchange sequences, actually specifies possible sequences of relevant messages
along time axle. A sequence of protocol messages illustrates their occurrence order, which
can be specified by a set of temporal constraints, the basic predicates of which are the names
of interface places obtained through Rule 2. For example, from Rule 2, we know port
RawData of Packetizer is represented by two incoming places dataReady and rawData,
and one outgoing place requestData. We use predicate dataReady(<sid, rid, mdataRead)i>) to
describe if place dataReady contains a token representing an event dataReady that is sent
to rid by sid.
In order to construct temporal constraints, we consider two elements communicating
with each other through a protocol, for example RawData. First we only consider a pair
of adjacent events, for example DataReady and requestData. For this pair of events, it
means if an event DataReady occurs, then an event requestData must occur some time
later, which is described by a temporal formula:

V <sid, rid, m^, n(dataReady(<sid, rid, m^) —» OrequestData(<sid, rid, mpf)
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(15)

However, this temporal formula cannot reflect the situation implied in the sequence
diagram of the protocol: no other events of the protocol can occur between events
dataReady and requestData.

In order to describe this implied property, we have a

reasonable assumption at architecture level that the communication media is reliable, no
message is lost and no need to resend a message. Therefore, another temporal formula is
introduced to address this missing situation:

V <sid, rid, my>, C(dataReady(<sid, rid, my-) —> -i(( O dataReady(<sid, rid, my-))V

requestData(<rid, sid, my) V rawData(<sid, rid, mry-))VcrequestData(<sid, rid, my))

(15)

This formula is a safety property in first order temporal logic. This temporal formula
means if an event of dataReady occurs, no other events such as dataReady, requestData
and raxvData can occur before the first event of requestData. Predicate o dataReady{<
sid, rid, my>) is used to guarantee that the temporal formula is satisfied at the time the event
dataReady occurs. Therefore, given a sequence diagram of a protocol with n messages, we
can obtain (n - 1) * 2 temporal formulas.
In addition to the consideration of one session of a protocol, we have to inspect the
relationship of two adjacent sessions of the same protocol between two objects, i.e. one
session can start only after the previous session ends. Such a relationship is specified by a
temporal constraint:

V <sid, rid,mry-,a(rawData(<sid, rid, mry-) —> -^(dataReady(<sid, rid, my-)v

requestData(<rid, sid, my) V ( O rawData(<sid, rid, mry-)))UdataReady(<sid, rid, my-))

(16)

Although we think the above generated constraints are strong enough, there is still one
more case we ignored: the first session of a protocol in a running system may starts with
any messages but the first message. For example, a session of protocol RawData starts
with message dataReady, and then obeys relevant part of the sequence diagram. We can
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see this session satisfies the above temporal formulas, but conflicts with the behavior of
the protocol. Such a case can be avoided in three different ways, and the choice of them is
up to users. One is to introduce a temporal predicate basetime that holds only at the time
“zero”, and a new temporal formula:

n(basetime —» ->{dataReady{<sid, rid, mà>) V requestData(<rid, sid, m,>)v
rawData(<sid, rid, mrj>))UdataReady(<sid, rid,

(18)

The second method is to introduce a past time operator such as “eventually in the past”.
The final way is to prove that system structure guarantees that such case cannot happen.
Thus, from the above discussion, a sequence diagram for a protocol is mapped to a set of
temporal constraints.
The following rule is used to construct a set of constraints for components or connectors
according to the above discussion.
Rule 3 (Constraint) For each protocol that a port (role, resp.) obeys (conjugate), a set of
constraints, generatedfrom the corresponding sequence diagram according to the above
discussion, is added to the property specification of corresponding components (connec
tors, resp.) . When a constraint is added to a component (connector, resp.), sid or rid
in tokens (the choice is up to the direction of corresponding message) is substituted by
the actual identification number of the component (connector, resp.) since the component
(connector, resp.) can only receive messages sent to itself.
A sequence diagram of a protocol specifies possible message communication sequences.
However, it is impossible to limit the firing sequences of transitions in Petri nets to meet
specified occurrence sequences of tokens in places. Although we cannot specify the fir
ing sequences of transitions, but we can prove that if each possible firing sequence meets
the behavior of a protocol. From the above discussion, we can see the generated set of
temporal formulas exactly realizes the behavior of a protocol - the message sequences.
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By adding these temporal formulas as property specifications to components/connectors
obeying the protocol, inconsistencies between behavior of elements and protocols can be
easily detected. Since the behavior mapping in Rule 1 is complete and consistent, we know
the detected inconsistencies also exist in the original model, i.e. Rule 3 is complete and
consistent.
We may obtain a component (connector, resp.) with a behavioral model, and related ports
and constraints according to Rules 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Next task is to get a complete
component or connector, i.e. ports of a component or connector has to be integrated with
its behavior model. Rule 4 is used to guide such a procedure, and Rule 5 establishes the
connection between components and connectors.
Rule 4 (Integration) The interface places, i.e. ports of a component (connector, resp.) in
SO-SAM are integrated into its behavior model with the previous generated algebraic high
level nets according to the following steps:
Step 1 Each incoming interface place is connected to place RECV through a transition,
firing of which transmits tokens in the incoming place that are sent to the instance of
component or connector to place RECV unconditionally.
Step 2 Each outgoing interface place is connected to place SEND through a transition,
which forwards tokens of a special type in place SEND to the outgoing place.
Rule 5 (Connection) From Rules 2 and 4, ifthere is a connection between ports ofa com
ponent and a role of a connector, then generated behavior models of the component and
connector share a set of places that corresponds to the protocol they obey (conjugate).
Therefore, to establish the connection between a component and a connector in SO-SAM,
we merge these shared interface places because an incoming (outgoing, resp.) interface
place in the component has an outgoing (incoming, resp.) counterpart in the connector
such that they contain messages of the same type, and vice versa.
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In component and connector view, relationships between ports and behaviors are not
specified explicitly. A port forwards incoming messages to the queue of the component/connector, which provide events for its behavior - the statechart diagram. The statechart diagram sends messages to its environment through a port. In Rule 4, place SEND
serves as output queue and place RECV is input queue. The forward action is represented
by the firing of transitions connecting place SEND, RECV and other interface places.
Therefore Rule 4 captures the communication between ports and the corresponding be
haviors in component and connector view.
Due to the space limitation, we cannot specify the transformation of binding and mul
tiplicity. However, such transformations are similar and straightforward. Fig. 32 shows
the final result of generated SO-SAM model from the running example. In order to give
a concise description, algebraic specifications and internal parts of behavioral models are
omitted.
In Fig. 32, components, for example component Packetizer and component ImageProcessing are represented by solid rectangles, while connectors such as PacketPipe are
represented by dashed rectangles. The Petri nets enclosed by rectangles are the behavior
models of components or connectors. Semicircles on the edge of rectangles are places that
represent ports derived from relevant protocols. An inside semicircle indicates an incoming
place that only receives tokens from environment, while an outside semicircle indicates an
outgoing place that only sends tokens to environment. For example, component Packetizer
has two incoming places dataReady, rawData, and one outgoing place requestData. These
three places are derived from protocol RawData according to Rule 2. Component Packe
tizer and connector PacketPipe is connected through Rule 5. The binding between compo
nents and its enclosing component is implemented as a transition between corresponding
places, which only forwards tokens from one place to another according to types of places
(i.e. incoming or outgoing). For example, transition /} j forwards tokens in place dataReady
of ImageProcessing to place dataReady of Packetizer, while transition t\3 forwards tokens
in place requestData of Packetizer to place requestData of ImageProcessing.
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Finally, we give an execution path of component ImageProcessing. Let component
Packetizer be in state idle, connector PacketPipe in state waiting, and place ImageProcessing.dataReady contains a token representing message dataReady. This initial condition can
be represented by the initial marking (ImageProcessing. dataReady, Packetizer. idle, PacketPipe.waiting). Here we only list related places (not including places such as packetizer
and PacketPipe) that contain tokens, and ignore concrete token values that can be derived
from context. We also assume that a packet consists of only one raw data, i.e. operation
PacketFullQ will be true if AddRawDataQ is invoked once. Table 18 shows the execution
of communication based on protocols RawData and DataPacket. This example demon
strates the application of this method.
8.7.3 Validation of the Approach
The SO-SAM model allows formal validation of a service net against system constraints
and property specified on its abstraction represented by a component or connector. Here,
validation means that the developer can animate the specification by providing initial mark
ings and checking if the responses meet the expected results. Validation of SO-SAM is
based on the precise syntax and semantics of Petri net formal language and temporal logic.
The validation will cover the topology and dynamic behavior of the Petri net as well as
temporal logic formulae. Here we simply introduce how to translate SO-SAM model to the
Maude [47] language. For the details, please refer to the work [77].
Translation from SO-SAM to Maude
Step 1. Translation to the functional module: generate the sorts operators used in the
functional modules for the model signatures. This step translates each place, sorts, mark
ings in a Petri net into the corresponding part in Maude’s functional module.
Step 2. Translation to the system modules: there are three types of system modules,
one is for the model signature that corresponds to the architecture structure and dynamic
behavior of the model, one is for the mapping to the predicates, and one is for the model
checking, which includes the property specification.
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Table 18: A Path of Executing Protocols RawData and DataPacket

Fired Transition

Step

Marking of Component ImageProcessing

1

idle, ImageProcessing.dataReady, PacketPipe.waiting

2

idle, Packetizer.dataReady, PacketPipe.waiting

3

idle, Packetizer.RECV, PacketPipe.waiting

4

idle, PacketPipe.waiting

5

Packetizer.waiting, Packetize.SEND, PacketPipe.waiting

6

Packetizer.waiting, Packetizer.requestData, PacketPipe.waiting

'¡3

7

Packetizer.waiting, ImageProcessing.requestData, PacketPipe.waiting

unspecified transition

8

Packetizer.waiting, PacketPipe.waiting

unspecified transition

9

Packetizer.waiting, ImageProcessing.rawData, PacketPipe.waiting

'¡2

10

Packetizer.waiting, Packetizer.rawData, PacketPipe.waiting

Z110

11

Packetizer.waiting, Packetizer.RECV, PacketPipe.waiting

12

Packetizer.waiting, PacketPipe.waiting

13

Packetizer.add_data, PacketPipe.waiting

14

Packetizer.initiaLpacket, Packetizer. SEND, PacketPipe.waiting,

15

Packetizer.idle, Packetizer. SEND, Packetpipe.Waiting,

16

Packetizer.idle, Packetizer.packet, PacketPipe.waiting

<1,3

17

Packetizer.idle, PackePipe.RECV, PacketPipe.waiting

4,

18

Packetizer.idle, PacketPipe.waiting
Packetizer.idle, PacketPipe.waiting
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1. Each basic component and connector are defined as a system module (SysID) with
the declaration of variables and necessary rules and operators. Each composition is
specified as a system module that including its sub-components and connector that
are predefined as a module. All guard conditions in a transition are a (un)conditional
rule.
2. Each place is mapped to an operator in the predicate system module (SysID-PREDS).
The connection between operators and predicate is established by an equation.
3. Model checking module (SysID-CHECK) is mainly for the initial marking and prop
erty specification.
In the translation, system signature such as sorts and operators are declared in the func
tional module. This translates the places/ports, sorts into algebra in Maude that will be used
in the system modules. The dynamic semantics of Petri net can be mapped to the rewriting
rules used in Maude. Computationally, the meaning of rewriting rules is to specify local
concurrent transitions that can take place in a system if the pattern in the rule’s lefthand side
matches a fragment of the system state and the rule’s condition is satisfied. In that case,
the transition specified by the rule can take place, and the matched fragment of the state is
transformed into the corresponding instance of the righthand side. Thus an amazing match
between semantics of Petri net and rewriting logic can be observed. These are theoretic
aspect of the above translation algorithm.
Results
The basic requirements for the image processing in the distributed web applications are
correctness, robustness and reliability. We use model checker of Maude [47] to validate the
SO-SAM model obtained from UML architecture description against system properties.
After studying models and the errors discovered during the model validation, two main
property categories have been selected:
1. Structural properties: this kind of properties is closely related to the topology of
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the model. These properties can be directly verified on the SO-SAM model without
animating the transactions. These properties are necessary conditions that ensure the
feasibility of the state transitions. If one of them is not fulfilled, we can assert firmly
that the communication between ports in UML description cannot happen.
2. Behavioral properties: the dynamic feature of these properties means that they are
related to state changing of the system. The evaluation of the dynamic properties are
based on the behavior description - Petri nets. Its verification is achieved on a set of
places describing a possible evolution of the system. All four properties in section
8.7.2 fall in this group.
The results output from Maude are true for all the above formulae. Most the above formulae
are safety properties.
8.8

Summary

This section introduced four case studies on the integrated framework. From the ex
periment results for all case studies, we can tell that the runtime verification do provide
a complementary for the model checking to avoid the state explosion problem. Further
more, we demonstrated extension of the SAM model on the web services with a case study.
Finally, we show the model checking application on the UML architecture description.
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p’=p.AddClient(c)

(b) Petri net for PacketPipe

Figure 31: Behavior of Elements (PrT Nets)
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION

9.1 Summary
We have presented an integrated framework for the software architecture model veri
fication in the design level. Software architecture model can be verified in two levels design and implementation level. In the design level model checking tool is adopted to ver
ify and analysis software architecture model. In this dissertation we gave an architectureindependent software architecture verification & analysis method (SAVAM). The method is
instantiated by the application of Maude model checker on the SAM software architecture
model. Software architecture verification & analysis method (SAVAM) processes a general
systematic and stepwise system verification on the design level. During this method, two
important steps are identified - translation and analysis. The design level verification can
provide correctness for the software architecture model.
In the implementation level model verification the runtime verification technique is
adopted to verify and the analysis architecture model. Runtime formal analysis is well
applied in the program verification in the implementation. This technique can be adapted
to the architecture model verification after the mapping relation between the model and the
programming language is established. Therefore, one of the key step for the implemen
tation level model verification using runtime analysis is to translate the model to the pro
gramming langauge, in our case the target programming language is ArchJava/Java/AspectJ
construct. Furthermore, a logic engine for the property verification is used, in our case we
choose core Maude to convert each LTL formula to the Buchi automaton. Thirdly, the
converted properties are instrumented by Aspect! to the program. Finally, a prototype
tool - SAM Parser - is developed that uses ArchJava/Java/AspecU construct and the LTL
formula as input and executes runtime checker and the monitored program in parallel to
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verify system properties in the implementation level. Compared with design level verifi
cation, implementation level verification ensure the translated code of the model correct.
The common feature is verifications in both level check the system against the properties
specified in temporal logical formulas.
Two translations from software architecture model are validated based on the interleav
ing semantics of Petri nets. The validations show the correctness of the translation based
on the defined criteria, translation correctness. Without the correctness of the translations
it will not make sense for the verification in the implementation level. Even though we
can say the code holds the specified properties, but we cannot sure the code is same as
the model. Two approaches are presented for the these translations. The first approach is
to show the correctness of the translation from SAM model to the Maude program. This
approach established a stepwise comparison between the state sequence of SAM behavior
model (a PrT net) and the rewriting steps of a rewrite theory constructed from the behavior
model (a PrT net). Then a consistency relation can be proved based on the inference rules
of the rewrite theory. The second approach is to show the correctness of the translation
from SAM model to the java program. First, the java construct for a component/connector
in a SAM model has to be restricted to fit for the automatic code generation from the pro
totype tool - SAM Parser. Then this approach uses a sequential object oriented program
language (COORE) syntax to represent the java program. Based on the given operational
semantics of the COORE programming language, we define the communication events and
constructively define the communication trace on the syntax of the COORE programming
language. Moreover, a mapping function between the PrT nets and the java program is
defined. Finally, a consistency proof between the PrT nets and the communication trace
is established based on the mapping function and the projection of the firing rule for a
transition.
It is worth to note that translation validations are not redundant for the runtime analysis
applied in the code. The runtime analysis is used to verify the system when the model
checking is not able to do it after the system size is increased.
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Finally, we re-identify the significance of the integration framework to ensure the quality
of software systems in the design level. One of the advantages of model checking is the
exhaustive state space searching for the model. The notorious issue for the model checking
is state explosion. Compared with the model checking, runtime analysis is checking the
current execution path of a running program against certain properties. The advantage of
runtime analysis is that it scales well, and does not suffer the state explosion problem. One
issue is it only overlooks the current execution path. Another issue is runtime verification
is not good at checking the safety properties due to the infinite execution trace. In this
dissertation we demonstrated the integration through the complementary between runtime
analysis and model checking on the verification of the software architecture model in the
design. This is further confirmed in several case studies.
9.2 Future Work
The integrated framework performs model checking and runtime analysis on the soft
ware architecture model in the design. We have explored the state explosion problem and
the verification of liveness properties during case studies, however, the categorization of
different properties and domain systems need to be further analyzed in a future work.
The engagement between model checking and runtime analysis technique highly de
pends on the system domain and properties specified. Deep analysis and classification of
properties and their patterns can identify the engaging point between model checking and
runtime analysis. This also can be an extension to the research of the dissertation “An
Integrated Framework for Ensuring the Quality of Software Design.”
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APPENDIX A
MAUDE CODE FOR COFFEE MACHINE

The following is the functional module for the coffee machine example demonstrated in
the Chapter 8:

fmod CM-SIGNATURE is
protecting INT .
sort Marking .
op _ : Marking Marking -> Marking [assoc comm id: null] .
op null : -> Marking .
op
op
op
op
op
op
op

request-ch : Int Int -> Marking .
price : Int Int -> Marking ,
save : Int Int -> Marking .
pay-return-ch : Bool -> Marking .
coffee-request-ch : Int -> Marking ,
coin-back-ch : Int -> Marking .
IntToMarking : Int -> Marking .

***(brewing facility)
op coffee-request-bf : Int -> Marking .
op ready-bf : Bool -> Marking .
op storage : Int Int -> Marking .
op pay-return-bf : Bool -> Marking .
op coffee-serve-bf : Int -> Marking .

***(CMInterface)
op request-cmi : Int Int -> Marking .
op money-cmi : Int -> Marking ,
op coffeetype-cmi : Int -> Marking .
op sig : Bool -> Marking ,
op ready-cmi : Bool -> Marking .
op change-cmi : Int -> Marking .
op coin-back-cmi : Int -> Marking .
op coffee-serve-cmi : Int -> Marking .
op ready-enjoy-cmi : Int -> Marking .
endfm
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The following is the system module for coffee machine example demonstrated in the
Chapter 8:

mod CM is
including CM-SIGNATURE .
vars money type cost capacity : Int .
var r ; Bool .
crl [enough] :

request-ch(money, type) price(type,cost)
=>
coffee-request-ch(type) save(money, type) price(type,cost)
if money >= cost .

crl [not_enough] :

request-ch(money, type) price(type,cost)
=>
coin-back-ch(money) price(type,cost)
if money < cost .

crl [change] :

save(money, type) price(type,cost)
=>
coin-back-ch(money - cost) price(type,cost)
if money > cost .

crl [not_change]

if money

save(money, type) price(type,cost)
=>
price(type,cost)
-== cost .

rl [return] :

:

pay-return-ch(false) save(money, type)
=>
coin-back-ch(money) .

crl [consume] :; coffee-request-bf(type) ready-bf(true) storage(type, capacity)
—>
coffee-serve-bf(type) pay-retum-bf (true)
storage(type, capacity - 1)
if capacity >= 1 .
coffee-request-bf(type) ready-bf(true) storage(type, capacity)
crl [alert] :
=>
pay-retum-bf (false) storage (type, capacity)
if capacity == 0 .

rl [input] :

money-cmi(money) coffeetype-cmi(type)

request-cmi(money, type) sig(true) .
rl [take_cup] : sig(true)

rl [back_coin] :

ready-cmi(true) .
coin-back-cmi(money)
=>
change-cmi(money) .
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rl [send_coffee] :

rl
rl
rl
rl
rl
rl

[tl]
[t2]
[t3]
Ct4]
CtS]
[t6]

coffee-serve-cmi(type)
=>
ready-enjoy-cmi(type) .

request-cmi(money, type) => request-ch(money, type) .
coin-back-ch(money) => coin-back-cmi(money) .
coffee-request-ch(type) => coffee-request-bf(type) .
pay-retum-bf(r) => pay-retum-ch(r) .
ready-cmi(r) => ready-bf(r) .
coffee-serve-bf(type) => coffee-serve-cmi(type) .

endm

The following is the atomic predicates of coffee machine example demonstrated in the
Chapter 8:

mod CM-PREDS is
protecting CM .
including SATISFACTION .
subsort Marking < State .
***(CMHandler)
op Prequest-ch : Int Int -> Prop ,
op Pprice : Int Int -> Prop .
op Psave : Int Int -> Prop .
op Ppay-retum-ch ; Bool -> Prop .
op Pcoffee-request-ch ; Int -> Prop .
op Pcoin-back-ch : Int -> Prop .
***(CMBrewingfacility)
op Pcoffee-request-bf : Int -> Prop .
op Pready-bf : Bool -> Prop .
op Pstorage : Int Int -> Prop .
op Ppay-retum-bf : Bool -> Prop .
op Pcoffee-serve-bf : Int -> Prop .

***(CMInterface)
op Prequest-cmi : Int Int -> Prop .
op Pmoney-cmi : Int -> Prop .
op Pcoffeetype-cmi : Int -> Prop .
op Psig ; Bool -> Prop .
op Pready-cmi : Bool -> Prop .
op Pchange-cmi ; Int -> Prop .
op Pcoin-back-cmi : Int -> Prop ,
op Pcoffee-serve-cmi : Int -> Prop .
op Pready-enjoy-cmi : Int -> Prop .

vars

money type cost capcity : Int .
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var
vars

bool : Bool .
ml m2 : Marking .

eq
eq
eq
eq
eq
eq

ml
ml
ml
ml
ml
ml

request-ch(money,type) m2 |= Prequest-ch(money,type) = true .
price(type,cost) m2 1= Pprice(type,cost) = true .
save(money,type) m2 |= Psave(money,type) = true .
pay-retum-ch(bool) m2 |= Ppay-retum-ch(bool) = true .
coffee-request-ch(type) m2 |= Pcoffee-request-ch(type) = true .
coin-back-ch(money) m2 |= Pcoin-back-ch(money) = true .

eq
eq
eq
eq
eq

ml
ml
ml
ml
ml

coffee-request-bf(type) m2 |= Pcoffee-request-bf(type) = true .
ready-bf(bool) m2 |= Pready-bf(bool) = true .
storage(type, capcity) m2 |= Pstorage(type, capcity) = true .
pay-retum-bf(bool) m2 1= Ppay-retum-bf(bool) = true .
coffee-serve-bf(type) m2 |= Pcoffee-serve-bf(type) = true .

eq
eq
eq
eq
eq
eq
eq
eq
eq

ml
ml
ml
ml
ml
ml
ml
ml
ml

request-cmi(money, type) m2 1= Prequest-cmi(money, type) = true .
money-cmi(money) m2 |= Pmoney-cmi(money) = true .
coffeetype-cmi(type) m2 |= Pcoffeetype-cmi(type) = true .
sig(bool) m2 |= Psig(bool) = true .
change-cmi(money) m2 |= Pchange-cmi(money) = true .
coin-back-cmi(money) m2 |= Pcoin-back-cmi(money) = true ,
coffee-serve-cmi(type) m2 1= Pcoffee-serve-cmi(type) = true .
ready-enjoy-cmi(type) m2 1= Pready-enjoy-cmi(type) = true .
ready-cmi(bool) m2 1= Pready-cmi(bool) = true .

endm

201

APPENDIX B
MAUDE CODE FOR ONLINE SHOPPING

The following is the functional module for online shopping system demonstrated in Chapter
8:

fmod ONLINE-SIGNATURE is
protecting INT .
protecting STRING ,
protecting IDENTICAL .
protecting RAT ,
sort Marking ,
op __ : Marking Marking -> Marking [assoc comm id: null]

.

op null : -> Marking ,
***(Component User)
op ordNumS : String Int -> Marking .
op cancelOrdSl : String String Int -> Marking .
op delFrCart56 : String String Int -> Marking .
op addToCartS : String Int -> Marking .
op chkoutCt56 : String String -> Marking ,
op checkouts1
: String String -> Marking .
op chkoutErrS
: String String -> Marking .
op shipEmailS
: String String -> Marking .
op ulnfoReqS : String String -> Marking .
op ulnfoResSl : String String String Int String -> Marking .
op request51 : String String String -> Marking .
op responses : String String String Int -> Marking .
op addToCart56 : String String String String Int Int -> Marking .
op notenough5 : String String -> Marking .
op UserlD : String -> Marking ,
op ulnfo : String String String Int String -> Marking ,
op
op
op
op
op

category : String -> Marking .
prd : String -> Marking .
addToCartBt : String -> Marking .
quantity : Int -> Marking .
prdList : String String String Int -> Marking .

op
op
op
op

cartList : String Int -> Marking .
accept : String String -> Marking .
delFrCartBt : String -> Marking .
cancelBt : String -> Marking ,
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op place1 : String -> Marking .
op place2 : String -> Marking .
op place3 : String String -> Marking .
***(Component Cart)
op addToCart6 : String String String String Int Int -> Marking .
op addToCart65 : String Int -> Marking .
op delFrCartG : String String Int -> Marking .
op checkout6 : String String -> Marking ,
op prdLCt61 : String String String Int Int -> Marking .
op cartDb : String Int String String Int Int -> Marking .
op cartlndex : Int -> Marking .
op delPlace : String Int -> Marking .
***(Component Warehouse)
op response72 : String String String Int -> Marking .
op request7 : String String String -> Marking .
op chkout7 : String String -> Marking .
op prdLCt7 : String String String Int Int -> Marking ,
op paySucc7 : String String -> Marking ,
op shipEmail72 : String String -> Marking .
op enough78 : String String -> Marking .
op notenough72 : String String -> Marking .
op cancelToWh7 : String String Int -> Marking .
op prdDb : String String Int Int -> Marking .
op waitWh : String String -> Marking .
***(Component Order)
op prdLCt8 : String String String Int Int -> Marking .
op checkouts : String String -> Marking ,
op enough8 : String String -> Marking .
op uInfoReq82 : String String -> Marking .
op uInfoRes8 : String String String Int String -> Marking .
op paySucc87 : String String -> Marking .
op ordNum82 : String Int -> Marking .
op chargeRet82 : String Int Int -> Marking .
op cancel0rd8 : String String Int -> Marking .
op cancelToWh87 : String String Int -> Marking ,
op backChBk82 : String String Int -> Marking .
op ccErr82 ; String String -> Marking .
op ccRes8 ; String String -> Marking .
op ccAuth82 : String String String Int String Int -> Marking .
op
op
op
op
op
op
op

price : String Int -> Marking .
ulnfWait : String String Int -> Marking .
ccPreValid : String String String Int String Int -> Marking .
ccGet : String String -> Marking .
ordNumWait : String String Int -> Marking ,
ordNumGen : Int -> Marking .
ordDb : String Int Int -> Marking .

***(Component PaymentProcess)
op ccAuth3 : String String String Int String Int -> Marking .
op ccRes32 : String String -> Marking .
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op backChCc3 : String String Int -> Marking .
op
op
op
op
op

ccAuthor : String String Int String Int String -> Marking .
cStolen : String String String -> Marking .
cOutlmt : String String String -> Marking .
cExp : String String String -> Marking .
cPass : String String String -> Marking .

***(Component RetailerBank)
op backChBk4 ; String String Int -> Marking
op chargeRet4 : String Int Int -> Marking .
op backChCc43 : String String Int -> Marking
op retailerBk : String Int Int -> Marking .
endfm

The following is the system module for online shopping system demonstrated in Chapter
8:

mod ONLINE is
including ONLINE-SIGNATURE .
vars uidl uid2 uid3 cat ccExp name pname ccNum f fl f2 k ru rp d ac kc : String .
vars catl cat2 eg namel name2 ccNuml ccNum2 ccExp1 ccExp2 ccStatus ; String .
vars ordNm ordNml ordNm2 index limit price q mindex ql q2 limit1 limit2 balance :
Int .
vars price1 price2 : Int .
vars b : Bool .
***(Component User)
rl [t5_6] : ordNumS(uidl.ordNm) => orderList(uidl,ordNm) .
rl [t5_12] : cancelBt(f2) => place2(f2) .
rl [t5_ll] : delFrCartBt(fl) => placel(fl) .
rl [t5_9] : accept(uidl,"checkout") => place3(uidl,"checkout") .
rl [t5_l] : response5(uidl,pname,cat,price) => prdList(uidl,pname,cat.price) .
rl [t5_3] : addToCartS(uidl,index) => cartList(uidl,index) .
rl [t5_S] : UserlD(uidl) category(cat) => request51(uidl,"pReq",cat) UserlD(uidl)
rl [t5_lQ] : cartList(uidl,index) => accept(uidl,"checkout") .
crl [t5_5]

:

crl [t5_4] :

crl [t5_8] ;

crl [t5_7] :

UserlD(uidl) cancelBt(f2) orderList(uid2,ordNm)
=>
cancel0rd51(uidl,f2,ordNm) UserlD(uidl)
if f2 == "cancel" and uidl == uid2 .
UserlD(uidl) delFrCartBt(fl) cartList(uid2,index)
=>
delFrCart56(uid2,f1,index) UserlD(uidl)
if fi === "del" and uidl === uid2 .
UserlD(uidl) accept(uid2,k)
=>
checkout5l(uid2,k) chkoutCt56(uid2,k) UserlD(uidl)
if k === "checkout" and uidl === uid2 .
uInfoReq5(uidl.ru) ulnfo(uid2,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp)
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crl Ct5_2] ::

=>
uInfoRes51(uid2,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp)
if uidl === uid2 and ru === "uReq" .
UserlD(uidl) prd(pname) addToCartBt(f) quantity(q)
prdList(uid2,pname,cat,price)
=>
addToCart56(uid2,f,pname,cat.price,q) UserlD(uidl)
if uidl === uid2 .

***(Component Cart)
crj [t6_l] :
addToCart6(uidl,ac,pname,cat,price,q) cartlndex(mindex)
=>
cartlndex(mindex + 1) cartDb(uidl,mindex,pname,cat.price,q)
addToCart65(uidl,mindex)
if ac == "addCart" .
crl ft6_2]

'■

crl [t6-3] :

cartDb(uidl,mindex,pname,cat,price,q) delFrCart6(uid2,d,mindex)
delPlace(uid2,mindex)
if uidl === uid2 and d === "del" .
cartDb(uidl,mindex,pname,cat,price,q) checkout6(uid2,kc)
=>
prdLCt61(uid2,pname,cat,price,q)
if uidl === uid2 and kc === "checkout" .

***(Component Warehouse)
crl Ct7_O] : request7(uidl,f,catl) prdDb(pname,cat2,price,q)
=>
response72(uidl,pname,cat1,price) prdDb(pname,cat2,price,q)
if catl == cat2 and f == "pReq" .
crl [t7_10] : chkout7(uidl,f) prdLCt7(uid2,pname,catl,price,ql)
prdDb(pname,cat2,price,q2)
=>
enough78(uidl,"enough") waitWh(uidl,"wait")
prdDb(pname,cat2,price,q2 - ql)
if (uidl === uid2 and catl === cat2 and q2 > ql) ,
crl [t7_.ll]

crl [t7_2] :

: chkout7(uidl,f) prdLCt7(uid2,pname,catl,price,ql)
prdDb(pname,cat2,price,q2)
notenough72(uidl,"notenough") prdDb(pname,cat2,price,q2)
if (uidl === uid2 and catl === cat2 and ql > q2) .
paySucc7(uidl,f1) waitWh(uid2,f2)
-->
shipEmail72(uidl,"shipEmail")
if uidl === uid2 and fl === "paySucc" and f2 === "wait" .

***(Component Order)
crl Ct8_0] : prdLCt8(uidl,pname,cat,price,q) checkouts(uid2, f 1) enough8(uid3,f2)
=> price(uid2,price)
if fl === "checkout" and f2 === "enough" and
uidl === uid2 and uidl === uid3 .
crl Ct8_2] : ulnfWait(uidl,fl.price) uInfoRes8(uid2.name,ccNum,limit,ccExp)
=>
ccPreValid(uidl.name,ccNum,limit,ccExp.price)
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rl Ct8_3] ;

crl [t8_4] ;

rl [t8_5]

:

crl [t8_6]

:

crl [t8_7]

:

ccAuth82(uidl,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp,price)
if uid2 === uidl .
ccPreValid(uidl.name,ccNum,limit,ccExp.price) ccGet(uidl,f)
=>
ordNumWait(uidl,"wait",price) paySucc87(uidl,"paySucc") .
ordNumWait(uidl,f1,price) ordNumGen(ordNm)
=>
ordNumGen(ordNm + 1) ordDb(uidl,ordNm,price) ordNum82(uidl,ordNm)
chargeRet82(uidl,ordNm,price)
if fl === "wait" .
ccRes8(uidl,"ccPass")
=>
ccGet(uidl,"ccPass") .
ccRes8(uidl,f)
=>
ccErr82(uidl,f)
if f === "ccErr" .
ordDb(uidl,ordNm,price) cancel0rd8(uid2,f»ordNml)
=>
backChBk82(uid2, f, price) cancelToWh87(uid2,f,ordNm)
if f === "cancel" and uidl === uid2 and ordNm == ordNml .

rl [t8_l]

:

price(uidl.price)
=>
uInfoReq82(uidl,"uReq") ulnfWait(uidl,"wait",price) .

***(Component PaymentProcess)
crl [t3_81] : ccAuth3(uidl.name1,ccNuml,limit1,ccExp1.price)
ccAuthor(name2,ccNum2,limit2,ccExp2,balance,ccStatus)
=>
cStolen(uidl,ccNuml,"stolen")
ccAuthor(name2,ccNum2,limit2,ccExp2.balance,ccStatus)
if namel == name2 and ccNuml == ccNum2 and ccStatus == "stolen" .
crl [t3_82]

: ccAuth3(uidl.name1,ccNuml,limit1,ccExp1.price)
ccAuthor(name2,ccNum2,limit2,ccExp2,balance,ccStatus)
=>
cOutlmt(uidl,ccNuml,"outlimit")
ccAuthor(name2,ccNum2,limit2,ccExp2.balance,ccStatus)
if namel == name2 and ccNuml == ccNum2 and price + balance > limit2 .

crl [t3_83]

; ccAuth3(uidl,namel,ccNuml,limitl,ccExpl.price)
ccAuthor(name2,ccNum2,limit2,ccExp2.balance,ccStatus)
=>
cExp(uidl,ccNuml,"expire")
ccAuthor(name2,ccNum2,limit2,ccExp2.balance,ccStatus)
if namel == name2 and ccNuml == ccNum2 and ccExp2 < ccExp1 .

crl [t3_Q4]

: ccAuth3(uidl,name1,ccNuml,limitl,ccExp1,price)
ccAuthor(name2,ccNum2,limit2,ccExp2,balance,ccStatus)
=>
cPass(uidl,ccNuml,"ccPass")
ccAuthor(name2,ccNum2,limit2,ccExp2,balance,ccStatus)
if namel == name2 and ccNuml == ccNum2 and
ccStatus =/= "stolen" and price + balance <= limit2 and ccExpl

rl [t3_l]

:

<= ccExp2 .
cStolen(uidl,ccNuml,f)
=>
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rl [t3_2]

:

ccRes32(uidl,f) .
cOutlmt(uidl,ccNuml,f)

rl [t3_3]

:

ccRes32(uidl.f) .
cExp(uidl,ccNuml,f)

rl [t3_4]

:

ccRes32(uidl.f) .
cPass(uidl,ccNuml,f)
=>
ccRes32(uidl.f) .

***(Component RetailerBank)
crl [t4_Q] : backChBk4(uidl.f.pricel) retailerBk(uid2,ordNm,price2)
=>
backChCc43(uidl.f,pricel)
if uidl == uid2 and pricel == price2 and f === "cancel" .
chargeRet4(uidl,ordNml,pricel) retailerBk(uid2,ordNm2,price2)
=>
retailerBk(uidl,ordNml.pricel)
if uidl ■=/-- uid2 or ordNml =/== ordNm2 .

crl [t4_l] :

***(Connector
rl [tl2_l] :
rl [tl2_2J :
rl [tl2_3] :
rl Ctl2_4] :
rl [tl2„5] :
rl
rl
rl
rl
rl

[tl2_6]
[tl2_7]
[tl2_8]
Ctl2_9]
[tl2_18]

:
:
:
:

1-2)
request51(uidl,f,cat) => request7(uidl,f,cat) .
response72(uidl.pname,cat.price) => response5(uidl.pname,cat.price)
shipEmai172(uidl.f) => shipEmai15(uidl.f) .
uInfoReq82(uidl.f) => ulnfoReqS(uidl.f) .
u!nfoRes51(uidl.name,ccNum,limit,ccExp) =>
uInfoRes8(uidl,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp) .
ordNum82(uidl.ordNm) => ordNum5(uidl,ordNm) .
cancelOrdSl(uidl.f.ordNm) => cancel0rd8(uidl.f.ordNm) .
checkout5l(uidl.f) => chkout7(uidl,f) checkout8(uidl.f) .
ccErr82(uidl,f) => chkoutErr5(uidl.f) .
: prdLCt61(uidl,pname,cat,price,q) =>
prdLCt7(uidl,pname,cat,price,q) prdLCt8(uidl,pname,cat,price,q) .

***(Connector 5-6)
addToCart65(uidl,index) => addToCart5(uidl,index) .
rl Ct56_l] :
addToCart56(uidl,f.pname,cat.price,q)
rl [t56_2] :

rl Ct56_3]
rl [t56_4]

:
:

***(Connector
rl [t78_l] :
rl Ct78_3] :
rl [t78_4] :

addToCart6(uidl,f,pname,cat,price,q) .
delFrCart56(uidl.f.index) => delFrCart6(uidl.f,index) .
chkoutCt56(uidl,f) => checkout6(uidl.f) .
7-8)
enough78 (uidl.f) => enough8(uidl.f) .
paySucc87(uidl,f) => paySucc7(uidl,f) .
cancelToWh87(uidl,f,ordNm) => cancelToWh7(uidl.f,ordNm) .

***(Connector 2-3)
rl (t23_U : ccAuth82(uidl,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp,price) =>
ccAuth3(uid 1,name, ccNum, limit, ccExp,price) .
rl I«3_2] : ccRes32(uidl,ccStatus) => ccRes8(uidl,ccStatus) .
***(Connector 2-4)
rl (t24_l] : backChBk82(uidl.f.ordNm) => backChBk4(uidl,f.ordNm)
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ri [t24_2]

:

chargeRet82(uidl.ordNm,price) => chargeRet4(uidl,ordNm,price) .

***(Connector 3-4)
ri [t34_l] : backChCc43(uidl,f.price) => backChCc3(uidl,f.price) .
endm

The following is the predicate module of online shopping system demonstrated in the
Chapter 8:

mod ONLINE-PREDS is
protecting ONLINE .
including SATISFACTION .
subsort Marking < State .
***(Component User)
op PordNum5 : String -> Prop .
op PcancelOrdSl : String String Int -> Prop .
op PdelFrCart56 : String String Int -> Prop .
op PaddToCartS : String Int -> Prop .
op PchkoutCt56 : String String -> Prop .
op Pcheckout51 : String String -> Prop .
op PchkoutErr5 : String String -> Prop .
op PshipEmail5 : String String -> Prop ,
op PuInfoReq5 : String String -> Prop .
op PuInfoResSl : String String String Int String -> Prop .
op Prequest51 : String String String -> Prop .
op Presponse5 : String String -> Prop .
op PaddToCart56 : String String String -> Prop .
op Pnotenough5 : String String -> Prop .
op
op
op
op
op
op
op

PUserlD : String -> Prop .
Pulnfo : String String String Int String -> Prop .
Pcategory : String -> Prop .
Pprd : String -> Prop .
PaddToCartBt : String -> Prop .
Pquantity : Int -> Prop .
PprdList : String String String Int -> Prop .

op
op
op
op
op

PcartList : String Int -> Prop .
Paccept : String String -> Prop .
PdelFrCartBt : String -> Prop .
PcancelBt : String -> Prop .
PorderList : String Int -> Prop .

op Pplacel : String -> Prop .
op Pplace2 : String -> Prop .
op Pplace3 : String String -> Prop .
***(Component Cart)
op PaddToCart6 : String String String String Int Int -> Prop .
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op
op
op
op
op
op
op

PaddToCart65 : String Int -> Prop .
PdelFrCart6 : String String Int -> Prop .
Pcheckout6 : String String -> Prop .
PprdLCtöl : String String String Int Int -> Prop .
PcartDb : String Int String String Int Int -> Prop .
Pcartlndex : Int -> Prop .
PdelPlace : String Int -> Prop .

***(Component Warehouse)
op Presponse72 : String String String Int -> Prop .
op Prequest7 : String String String -> Prop .
op Pchkout7 : String String -> Prop .
op PprdLCt7 : String String String Int Int -> Prop .
op PpaySucc7 : String String -> Prop .
op PshipEmail72 : String String -> Prop .
op Penough78 : String String -> Prop .
op Pnotenough72 : String String -> Prop .
op PcancelToWh7 : String String Int -> Prop .
op PprdDb : String String Int Int -> Prop .
op PwaitWh : String String -> Prop .
***(Component Order)
op PprdLCt8 : String String String Int Int -> Prop .
op Pcheckout8 : String String -> Prop .
op Penough8 : String String -> Prop .
op PuInfoReq82 : String String -> Prop .
op PuInfoRes8 : String String String Int String -> Prop .
op PpaySucc87 : String String -> Prop .
op PordNum82 : String -> Prop .
op PchargeRet82 : String Int Int -> Prop .
op Pcancel0rd8 : String String Int -> Prop .
op PcancelToWh87 : String String Int -> Prop .
op PbackChBk82 : String String Int -> Prop .
op PccErr82 : String String -> Prop .
op PccRes8 : String String -> Prop .
op PccAuth82 : String String String Int String Int -> Prop .
op
op
op
op
op
op
op

Pprice : String Int -> Prop .
PuInfWait : String String Int -> Prop ,
PccPreValid : String String String Int String Int -> Prop .
PccGet : String String -> Prop .
PordNumWait : String String Int -> Prop .
PordNumGen : Int -> Prop ,
PordDb : String Int Int -> Prop .

***(Component
op PccAuth3 :
op PccRes32 :
op PbackChCc3
op
op
op
op
op

PaymentProcess)
String String String Int String Int -> Prop .
String String -> Prop .
: String String Int -> Prop ,

PccAuthor : String String Int String Int String -> Prop .
PcStolen : String String String -> Prop .
PcOutlmt : String String String -> Prop .
PcExp : String String String -> Prop .
PcPass : String String String -> Prop .
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***(Component RetailerBank)
op PbackChBk4 : String String Int -> Prop .
op PchargeRet4 : String Int Int -> Prop .
op PbackChCc43 : String String Int -> Prop .
op PretailerBk : String Int Int -> Prop .
vars uidl uid2 uid3 cat ccExp name pname ccNum f fl f2 k ru rp d ac kc : String .
vars catl cat2 eg namel name2 ccNuml ccNum2 ccExp1 ccExp2 ccStatus : String .
vars ordNm ordNml ordNm.2 index limit price q mindex ql q2 limit1 limit2 balance :
Int .
vars price1 price2 : Int .
vars ml m2 : Marking .
***(Component User)
eq ml ordNumS(uidl,ordNm) m2 |= PordNum5(uidl) = true .
eq ml cancelOrdS1(uidl,f,ordNm) m2 |= Pcancel0rd51(uidl,f,ordNm) = true
eq ml delFrCart56(uidl,f.index) m2 |= PdelFrCart56(uidl,f.index) = true
eq ml addToCart5(uidl,index) m2 |= PaddToCart5(uidl,index) = true .
eq ml chkoutCt56(uidl,k) m2 |= PchkoutCt56(uidl,k) = true .
eq ml checkouts 1(uidl,k) m2 |= Pcheckout51(uidl,k) = true ,
eq ml chkoutErr5(uidl.f) m2 |= PchkoutErr5(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml shipEmail5(uidl,f) m2 |= PshipEmail5(uidl,f) = true .
eq ml uInfoReq5(uidl.f) m2 |= PuInfoReqS(uidl.f)
true .
eq ml ulnfoResSl(uidl,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp) m2 |=
PuInfoRes51(uidl,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp) = true .
eq ml request51(uidl,f.cat) m2 |= Prequest51(uidl,f,cat) = true .
eq ml response5(uidl,pname,cat,price) m2 |= PresponseS(uidl,cat) = true .
eq ml addToCart56(uidl,f,pname,cat,price,q) m2 |= PaddToCart56(uidl,f,cat)
eq ml notenough5(uidl.f) m2 |= Pnotenough5(uidl.f) = true .

true

eq ml UserlD(uidl) m2 |= PUserlD(uidl) = true .
eq ml ulnfo(uidl,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp) m2 |=
Pulnfo(uidl,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp) = true .
eq ml category(cat) m2 |= Pcategory(cat) = true .
eq ml prd(name) m2 |= Pprd(name) = true .
eq ml addToCartBt(f) m2 |= PaddToCartBt(f) = true .
eq ml quantity(q) m2 |= Pquantity(q) = true .
eq ml prdList(uidl,pname,cat,price) m2 |= PprdList(uidl.pname,cat,price) = true .
eq
eq
eq
eq
eq

ml
ml
ml
ml
ml

cartList(uidl,index) m2 |= PcartList(uidl,index) = true .
accept(uidl,f) m2 |= Paccept(uidl.f) = true .
delFrCartBt(f) m2 |= PdelFrCartBt(f) = true .
cancelBt(f) m2 |= PcancelBt(f) = true .
orderList(uidl,ordNm) m2 |= PorderList(uidl.ordNrn) = true .

eq ml placel(f) m2 1= Pplacel(f) = true .
eq ml place2(f) m2 |= Pplace2(f) = true .
eq ml place3(uidl,f) m2 |= Pplace3(uidl.f) = true ,
***(Component Cart)
eq ml addToCart6(uidl.f,pname,cat,price,q) m2 | =
PaddToCart6(uidl,f,pname,cat,price,q) = true .
eq ml addToCart65(uidl,index) m2 |= PaddToCart65(uidl,index) = true .
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eq ml delFrCart6(uidl.f,index) m2 )= PdelFrCart6(uidl,f,index) = true .
eq ml checkout6(uidl,f) m2 |= Pcheckout6(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml prdLCt61(uidl,pname,cat,price,q) m2 |=
PprdLCt61(uidl,pname,cat,price,q) = true .
eq ml cartDb(uidl,index,pname,cat.price,q) m2 |=
PcartDb(uidl,index,pname,cat,price,q) = true .
eq ml cartIndex(index) m2 |= Pcartlndex(index) = true .
eq ml delPlace(uidl,index) m2 |= PdelPlace(uidl,index) = true .
***(Component Warehouse)
eq ml response72(uidl,pname,cat,price) m2 |=
Presponse72(uidl,pname,cat,price) = true .
eq ml request7(uidl.f,cat) m2 |= Prequest7(uidl,f,cat) = true .
eq ml chkout7(uidl,f) m2 |= Pchkout7(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml prdLCt7(uidl,pname,cat,price,q) m2 1=
PprdLCt7(uidl,pname,cat,price,q) = true .
eq ml paySucc7(uidl.f) m2 |= PpaySucc7(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml shipEmail72(uidl.f) m2 |= PshipEmail72(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml enough78(uidl.f) m2 |= Penough78(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml notenough72(uidl.f) m2 |= Pnotenough72(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml cancelToWh7(uidl.f,ordNm) m2 |= PcancelToWh7(uidl.f.ordNm) = true .
eq ml prdDb(pname,cat»price,q) m2 |= PprdDb(pname,cat,price,q) = true .
eq ml waitWh(uidl,f) m2 |= PwaitWh(uidl.f) = true ,
***(Component Order)
eq ml prdLCt8(uidl,pname,cat,price,q) m2 |=
PprdLCt8(uidl,pname,cat,price,q) = true .
eq ml checkout8(uidl.f) m2 |= Pcheckout8(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml enough8(uidl.f) m2 |= Penough8(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml uInfoReq82(uidl.f) m2 |= PuInfoReq82(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml uInfoRes8(uidl,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp) m2 |=
PuInfoRes8(uidl,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp) = true .
eq ml paySucc87(uidl.f) m2 |= PpaySucc87(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml ordNum82(uidl,ordNm) m2 |= PordNum82(uidl) = true .
eq ml chargeRet82(uidl,ordNm,price) m2 |= PchargeRet82(uidl,ordNm,price) = true .
eq ml cancel0rd8(uidl.f,ordNm) m2 |= Pcancel0rd8(uidl.f.ordNm) = true .
eq ml cancelToWh87(uidl.f,ordNm) m2 |= PcancelToWh87(uidl.f,ordNm) = true .
eq ml backChBk82(uidl.f,price) m2 |= PbackChBk82(uidl.f.price) = true .
eq ml ccErr82(uidl.f) m2 |= PccErr82(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml ccRes8(uidl.f) m2 |= PccRes8(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml ccAuth82(uidl.name,ccNum,limit,ccExp,price) m2 | =
PccAuth82(uidl,name,ccNum,limit»ccExp,price) = true .
eq ml price(uidl,price) m2 |= Pprice(uidl,price) = true .
eq ml ulnfWait(uidl.f.price) m2 |= PuInfWait(uidl.f,price) = true .
eq ml ccPreValid(uidl,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp,price) m2 |=
PccPreValid(uidl,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp,price) = true .
eq ml ccGet(uidl.f) m2 |= PccGet(uidl.f) = true .
eq ml ordNumWait(uidl.f,price) m2 1= PordNumWait(uidl.f.price) = true .
eq ml ordNumGen(ordNm) m2 1= PordNumGen(ordNm) = true .
eq ml ordDb(uidl.ordNm,price) m2 |= PordDb(uidl,ordNm,price) = true .
***(Component PaymentProcess)
eq ml ccAuth3(uidl,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp,price) m2 | =
PccAuth3(uidl,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp,price) = true .
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eq ml ccRes32(uidl,f) m2 |= PccRes32(uidl,f) = true .
eq ml backChCc3(uidl,£,price) m2 |= PbackChCc3(uidl,f.price) = true .
eq ml ccAuthor(name,ccNum,limit, ccExp,balance,ccStatus) m2 |=
PccAuthor(name,ccNum,limitsccExp,balance,ccStatus) = true .
eq ml cStolenCuidl,ccNum,ccStatus) m2 |= PcStolen(uidl,ccNum,ccStatus) = true .
eq ml cOutlmt(uidl,ccNum,ccStatus) m2 |= PcOutlmt(uidl,ccNum,ccStatus) = true .
eq ml cExp(uidl,ccNum,ccStatus) m2 1= PcExp(uidl,ccNum,ccStatus) = true .
eq ml cPass(uidl,ccNum,ccStatus) m2 |= PcPass(uidl,ccNum,ccStatus) = true .
***(Component RetailerBank)
eq ml backChBk4(uidl,f.price) m2 |= PbackChBk4(uidl,f,price) = true .
eq ml chargeRet4(uidl,ordNm,price) m2 |= PchargeRet4(uidl,ordNm,price) = true .
eq ml backChCc43(uidl,f,price) m2 |= PbackChCc43(uidl,f.price) = true .
eq ml retailerBk(uidl,ordNm,price) m2 |= PretailerBk(uidl,ordNm,price) = true .
endm
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APPENDIX C
RUNTIME CODE FOR COFFEE MACHINE

The generated code for the coffee machine contains hundreds of files, we cannot list every
file due to space limit. Following the ArchJava code for the component Coffee Machine.

package CoffeeMachine;
import CoffeeMachine.base.SAM.* ;
import java.lang.*; import java.util,
import CoffeeMachine.Com_CMInterface.
import CoffeeMachine.Com_CoinHandler.
import CoffeeMachine.Com_BrewingFacility. '
import CoffeeMachine.Con_CH_CMI.* ;
import CoffeeMachine.Con_CH_BF.* ;
import CoffeeMachine.Con_BF_CMI.* ;
public component class Model_CoffeeMachine extends SAMModel_Component {
private final Com_CMInterface
theCom_CMInterface = new Com_CMInterface();
theCom_CoinHandler = new Com_CoinHandler();
private final Com_CoinHandler
private final Com_BrewingFacility
theCom_BrewingFacility = new Com_BrewingFacility();
private final Con_CH_CMI
theCon_CH_CMI = new Con_CH_CMI();
private final Con_CH_BF
theCon_CH_BF = new Con_CH_BF();
private final Con_BF_CMI
theCon_BF_CMI = new Con_BF_CMI();
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect

pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern

Com_CMInterface.request_cmi, Con_CH_CMI.request_cmi;
Com_CMInterface.coin_back_cmi, Con_CH_CMI.coin_back_cmi;
Com_CoinHandler.request_ch, Con_CH_CMI.request_ch;
Com_CoinHandler.coin_back_ch, Con_CH_CMI.coin_back_ch;
Com_CoinHandler.coffee_request_ch, Con_CH_BF.coffee_request_ch;
Com_CoinHandler.pay_return_ch, Con_CH_BF.pay_return_ch;
Com_BrewingFacility.coffee_request_bf,
Con_CH_BF.coffee_request_bf;
connect pattern Com_BrewingFacility.pay_return_.bf, Con_CH_BF.pay_return_bf;
connect pattern Com_BrewingFacility.ready_bf, Con_BF_CMI.ready_bf;
connect pattern Com_BrewingFacility.coffee_serve_bf, Con_BF_CMI.coffee_serve_bf;
connect pattern Com_CMInterface.ready_cmi, Con_BF_CMI.ready_cmi;
connect pattern Com_CMInterface.coffee_serve_cmi, Con_BF_CMI.coffee_serve_cmi;
connect pattern Model_CoffeeMachine.money_cm, Com_CMInterface.money_cmi;
connect pattern Model_CoffeeMachine.change_cm, Com_CMInterface.change_cmi;
connect pattern Model_CoffeeMachine.coffeetype_cm,
Com_CMInterface.coffeetype_cmi;
connect pattern Model_CoffeeMachine.ready_enjoy_cm,
Com_CMInterface.ready_enjoy_cmi;
public Model_CoffeeMachine () {
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super("CoffeeMachine","");
connect (theCom_CMInterface.request_cmi, theCon_CH_CMI.request_cmi);
connect (theCom_CMInterface.coin_back_cmi, theCon_CH_CMI.coin_back_cmi);
connect (theCom_CoinHandler.request_ch, theCon_CH_CMI.request_ch);
connect (theCom_CoinHandler.coin_back_ch, theCon_CH_CMI.coin_back_ch);
connect (theCom_CoinHandler.coffee_request_ch,
theCon_CH_BF.coffee_request_ch);
connect (theCom_CoinHandler. pay_return_ch, theCon_CH_BF. pay_retum_ch) ;
connect (theCom_BrewingFacility.coffee_request_bf,
theCon_CH_BF.coffee_request_.bf);
connect (theCom_BrewingFacility.pay_retum_bf, theCon_CELBF.pay_return_bf);
connect (theCom_BrewingFacility.ready_bf, theCon_BF_CMI.ready_bf);
connect (theCom_BrewingFacility.coffee_serve_bf,
theCon_BF_CMI.coffee_serve_bf);
connect (theCom_CMInterface.ready_cmi, theCon_BF_CMI.ready.cmi);
connect (theCom_CMInterface.coffee_serve_cmi,
theCon_BF_CMI.coffee_serve_cmi);
connect (this.money_cm, theCom_CMInterface.money_cmi);
connect (this.change_cm, theCom_CMInterface.change_cmi);
connect (this.coffeetype_cm, theCom_CMInterface.coffeetype_cmi);
connect (this.ready_enjoy_cm, theCom_CMInterface.ready_enjoy_cmi);
subcomponents.add(theCom_CMInterface);
subcomponents.add(theCom_CoinHandler);
subcomponents.add(theCom_BrewingFacility);
subcomponents.add(theCon_CH_CMI);
subcomponents.add(theCon_CH_BF);
subcomponents.add(theCon_BF_CMI);
theCom_CMInterface.start();
theConcCoinHandler.start();
theCom_BrewingFacility.start();
theCon_CH_CMI.start O;
theCon_CH_BF.startO;
theCon_BF_CMI.start();

public port money_cm {
requires void money_cmi_RecvMessage(Object p_msg);
}
public port coffeetype_cm {
requires void coffeetype_cmi_RecvMessage(Object p_msg);
}
public port change_cm {
provides void change_cmi_RecvMessage(Object p_msg);
}
public void change_cmi_RecvMessage(Object p_msg) {
addMessage( "change_cm",Message_Token.Message2Token(p_msg) );
System.out.println("Port " + " change_cm" + " receives message " +
Message_Token.Message2Token(p_msg). toStringO);
1
public port ready_enjoy_cm {
provides void ready_enjoy_cmi_RecvMessage(Object p_msg);
}
public void ready_enjoy_cmi_RecvMessage(Object p_msg) {
addMessage( "ready_enjoy_cm",Message_Token.Message2Token(p_msg) );
System.out.println("Port " + " ready_enjoy_cm" + " receives message " +
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Message_Token.Message2Token(p_msg) .toStringO) I
}
public static void main(String[] args) {
Model_CoffeeMachine
theModel_CoffeeMachine;
theModel_CoffeeMachine = new Model_CoffeeMachine();
Thread.yieldQ;
whileC true ) {
if ( !theModel_CoffeeMachine. isWaitingO ) {
Thread. yieldO;
continue;
}
Thread.yieldQ;
if ( theModel_CoffeeMachine. isWaitingO )
System.exit(0);
}

The generated aspectj code for the component CoffeeMachine is shown in the follow
ing-

package CoffeeMachine;
import CoffeeMachine.base.SAM.*;
import java.lang.*;
import java.util.*;
import CoffeeMachine.Com_CMInterface.*;
import CoffeeMachine.Com_CoinHandler.*;
import CoffeeMachine.ComJBrewingFacility.
import CoffeeMachine.Con_CH_CMI.*;
import CoffeeMachine.Con_CH_BF.*;
import CoffeeMachine.Con_BF_CMI.*;
public aspect Model_CoffeeMachineMonitorAspect {
pointcut MonitorPointO: (call(void addMessage(String, Object)) II
call(void removeMessage(String, Object)));
after(Model_CoffeeMachine$C thisObject) : target(thisObject) && MonitorPointO {
F_cm_Property(thisObject);
}
private boolean Model_CoffeeMachine$C.F_cm_Property_hasResult = false;
public void F_cm_Property(Model_CoffeeMachine$C thisObject) {
if (thisObject.F_cm_Property_hasResult)
return;
boolean PhasMoney = ( thisObject.isMessageContained("money_cm","85") );
boolean PisCoffeeType2 =
( thisObject.isMessageContained("coffeetype_cm","2") );
boolean PmoneyBack = ( thisObject.isMessageContained("change_cm","85") );
boolean Pchange = ( thisObject.isMessageContained("change_cm" ,"10") );
boolean PhasChange = ( 85 > 75 );
boolean PnoChange =(85 ==75);
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boolean PgetCoffee = ( thisObject.isMessageContained("ready_enjoy_cm","1"))
switch(thisObject.F_cm_Property_$state) {
case 1:
thisObject.F_cm_Property_$state = PgetCoffee ? -1 : PmoneyBack ? -1 :
PisCoffeeType2 ? PhasMoney ? 2 : -1 : -1 ;
break ;
case 2:
thisObject.F_cm_Property_$state = PgetCoffee ? -1 ; PmoneyBack ? -1 : 2 ;
break ;
}
if (thisObject.F_cm_Property_$state == -2) {
thisObject.F_cm_Property_hasResult = true;
System, out .printlnC'Formula F_cm_Property is violated!");
return;
}
if (thisObject.F_cm_Property_$state == -1) {
thisObject.F_cm_Property_hasResult = true;
System.out.printlnC'Formula F_cm_Property holds!");
return;
}
thisObject.F_cm_Property_hasResult = false;
System.out.printIn("Cannot judge Formula F._cm_Property currently!");

private int Model_CoffeeMachine$C.F_cmJProperty_$state = 1;
pointcut ConstructorPointQ: (!within(SAMModel_Component) &&
execution(new(..)));
after(Model_CoffeeMachine$C thisObject) :
target (thisObject) && ConstructorPointO 1
}
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APPENDIX D
RUNTIME CODE FOR ONLINE SHOPPING

The generated code for the online shopping contains hundreds of files, we cannot list every
file due to space limit. Following the ArchJava code for the component OnlineShopping.

package onlineShopping;
import onlineShopping.base.SAM.* ;
import java.lang.*;
import java.util.*;
import onlineShopping.Com_3_PaymentProcess.* ;
import onlineShopping.Com_4_RetailerBank.* ;
import onlineShopping.Con_l_2,
import onlineShopping.Con_2_3.
import onlineShopping.Con_2_4.
import onlineShopping.Con_3_4.* ;
import onlineShopping.Model_Com_l_Customer.* ;
import onlineShopping.Model_Com_2_ECompany.* ;
public component class Model_onlineShopping extends SAMModel_Component {
private final Com_3_PaymentProcess
theCom_3_PaymentProcess = new Com_3_PaymentProcess();
private final Com_4_RetailerBank
theCom_4_RetailerBank = new Com_4_RetailerBankO;
private final Con_l_2 theCon_l_2 = new Con_l_2();
private final Con_2_3 theCon_2_3 = new Con_2_3();
private final Con_2_4 theCon_2_4 = new Con_2_4O;
private final Con_3_4 theCon_3_4 = new Con_3_4();
private Model__Com_l_Customer
theModel_Com_l_Customer = new Model_Com_l_CustomerO;
private Model_Com_2_ECompany
theModel_Com_2_ECompany - new Model_Com_2_ECompanyO;
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect

pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern

Model_Com_l_Customer,v_request_12, Con_l_2.request_12;
Model_Com_l_Customer.response_15, Con_l_2.response_15;
Model_Com_l_Customer.shipEmail_15, Con_l_2,shipEmail_15;
Model_Com_l_Customer.ulnfoReq_l5, Con_l_2.uInfoReq_l5;
Model_Com_l_Customer.v_uInfoRes_.12, Con_l_2.uInfoRes_12;
Model_Com_l_Customer.ordNum_15, Con_l_2.ordNum_15;
Model_Com_l_Customer.v_cancelOrd_12, Con_l_2.cancelOrd_12;
Model_Com_l_Customer.v_checkout_12, Con_l_2.checkout_12;
Model_Com_l_Customer.chkoutErr_15, Con_l_2.chkoutErr_15;
Model_Com_l_Customer.v_prdLCt_12, Con_l_2.prdLCt_12;
Model_Com_2_ECompany.request_27, Con_l_2.request_27;
Model_Com_2_ECompany.v_response_21, Con_l_2.response_21;
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connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect
connect

pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern
pattern

Model_Com_2_ECompany.v_ulnfoReq_21, Con_l_2.uInfoReq_21;
Model_Com_2_ECompany.uInfoRes_28, Con_l_2.uInfoRes_28;
Model_Com_2_ECompany.v_ordNum_21, Con_l_2.ordNum_21;
Model_Com_2_ECompany.cancelOrd_28, Con_l_2.cancelOrd_28;
Model_Com_2_ECompany.checkout_28, Con_l_2.checkout_28;
Model_Com_2_ECompany.checkout_27, Con_l_2.checkout_27;
Model_Com_2_ECompany,v_ccErr_21, Con_l_2.ccErr_21;
Model_Com_2_ECompany.prdLCt_27, Con_l_2.prdLCt_27;
Model_Com_2_ECompany.prdLCt_28, Con_l_2.prdLCt_28;
Model_Com_2_ECompany.v_ccAuth_23, Con_2_3.ccAuth_23;
Model_Com_2_ECompany.ccRes_28, Con_2_3.ccRes_28;
Model_Com_2_ECompany.v_backChBk_24, Con_2_4.backChBk_24;
Model_Com_2_ECompany.v_chargeRet_24, Con_2_4.chargeRet_24;
Com_3_PaymentProcess.ccAuth_3, Con_2_3.ccAuth_3;
Com_3_PaymentProcess.ccRes_32, Con_2_3.ccRes_32;
Com_3_PaymentProcess.backCh_3, Con_3_4.backCh_3;
Com_4_RetailerBank.backChBk_4, Con_2_4.backChBk_4;
Cora_4__RetailerBank.chargeRet._4» Con_2_4.chargeRet_4;
Com_4_RetailerBank.backCh_43, Con_3_4.backCh_43;

public Model_onlineShopping () {
super ("onlineShopping"
connect (theModel_Com_l_Customer.v_request_12, theCon_l„2.request_12);
connect (theModel_Com_l_Customer.response_15, theCon_l_2.response_15);
connect (theModel_Com_l_Customer.shipEmail_15» theCon_l_2.shipEmail_15);
connect (theModel_Com_l_Customer.uInfoReq_15, theCon_l_2.uInfoReq_15);
connect (theModel_Com_l_Customer.v_uInfoRes_12, theCon_l_2.uInfoRes_12);
connect (theModel_Com_l_Customer.ordNum_15, theCon_l_2.ordNum_15);
connect (theModel_Com_l_Customer.v_cancelOrd_12, theCon_l_2.cancelOrd_12);
connect (theModel_Com_l_Customer.v_checkout_12, theCon_l_2.checkout_12);
connect (theModel_Com_l_Customer.chkoutErr_15, theCon_l_2.chkoutErr_15);
connect (theModel_Com_l_Customer.v_prdLCt_12, theCon_l_2.prdLCt_12);
connect (theModel_Cora_2_ECompany.request_27, theCon_l_2.request_27);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.v_response_21, theCon_l_2.response_21);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.v_shipEmail_21, theCon_l_2.shipEmail_21);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.v_uInfoReq_21, theCon_l_2.uInfoReq_21);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.uInfoRes_28, theCon_l_2.uInfoRes_28);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.v_ordNum_21, theCon_l_2.ordNum_21);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.cancelOrd_28, theCon_l_2.cancelOrd_28);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.checkout_28, theCon_l_2.checkout_28);
connect (theModel_Cora_2_ECompany.checkout_27, theCon_l_2.checkout_27);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.v_ccErr_21» theCon_l_2.ccErr_21);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.prdLCt_27, theCon_l_2.prdLCt_27);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.prdLCt_28, theCon_l_2.prdLCt_28);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.v_ccAuth_23, theCon_2_3.ccAuth_23);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.ccRes_28, theCon_2_3.ccRes_28);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.v_backChBk_24, theCon_2_4.backChBk_24);
connect (theModel_Com_2_ECompany.v_chargeRet_24, theCon_2_4.chargeRet_24);
connect (theCom_3_PaymentProcess.ccAuth_3, theCon_2_3.ccAuth_3);
connect (theCom_3_PaymentProcess.ccRes_32, theCon_2_3.ccRes_32);
connect (theCom_3_PaymentProcess.backCh_3, theCon_3_4.backCh_3);
connect (theCom_4_RetailerBank.backChBk_4, theCon_2_4.backChBk_4);
connect (theCom_4JRetailerBank.chargeRet_4, theCon_2_4.chargeRet_4);
connect (theCom_4JRetailerBank.backCh_43, theCon_3_4.backCh_43);
subcomponents.add(theCom_3_PaymentProcess);
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subcomponents,add(theCom_4_RetailerBank);
subcomponents.add(theCon_l_2);
subcomponents.add(theCon_2_3);
subcomponents.add(theCon_2_4);
subcomponents.add(theCon_3_4);
subModels.add(theModel_Com_l_Customer);
subModels.add(theModel_Com_2 JECompany);
theCont_3_PaymentProcess. startQ ;
theCom_4_RetailerBank.start();
theCon_l_2.startO;
theCon_2_3.start O;
theCon_2_4.startO ;
theCon_3_4.start () ;
}
public static void main(String[] args) {
Log.clear();
Model_onlineShopping theModel_onlineShopping;
theModel_onlineShopping = new Model_onlineShopping();
Thread.yieldC);
while( true ) {
if ( ! theModel_onlineShopping. isWaitingO ) {
Thread. yieldO;
continue ;
1
Thread. yieldO ;
if ( theModel_onlineShopping. isWaitingO ) {
Log.recordSummary("Following is the summary of runtime
verification\n");
theModel_onlineShopping.generateSummaryO;
System.exit(Q);
}
}
}

The generated aspectj code for the component ECompany is shown in the following.

public aspect Model_Com_2_ECompanyMonitorAspect {
pointcut MonitorPointC): (call(void addMessage(String, Object)) 11
call(void removeMessage(String, Object)));
after(Model_Com_2 JECompany$C thisObject) : target(thisObject) && MonitorPointOi
F_ResponseForCcAuthor(thi sObj ect);
}
private boolean Model_Com_2_ECompany$C.F_ResponseForCcAuthor_hasResult = false;
private boolean Model_Com_2_ECompany$C.F_ResponseForCcAuthor_result = false;
public void F_ResponseForCcAuthor(Model_Com_2_ECompany$C
if (thisObject.F_ResponseForCcAuthor_hasResult)
return;
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thisObject) {

String
info = "Formula „F_ResponseForCcAuthor:\n";
boolean PccAuth = ( thisObject.isMessageContained("ccAuth_23","
<001,Emma,123456789001»200®,0805»15®>") );
info += "\tPccAuth" + "= " + PccAuth + "\n";
boolean PccRes = ( thisObject.isMessageContained("ccRes_28","<®Sl,s>") );
info += "\tPccRes" + "= " + PccRes + "\n";
boolean PccErr = ( thisObject.isMessageContained("ccErr_21","<®®l,ccErr>") );
info += "\tPccErr" + "= " + PccErr + "\n";
boolean PshipEmail = ( thisObject.isMessageContained("shipEmail_21",
"<®®l,shipEmail>") );
info += "\tPshipEmail" + "= " + PshipEmail + "\n";
boolean PordNum = ( thisObject.isMessageContained("ordNum_21","<®®l,o>") );
info += "\tPordNum" + "= " + PordNum + "\n";
switch(thisObject.F_ResponseForCcAuthor_$state) {
case 1:
thisObject.F_ResponseForCcAuthor_$state = PccAuth 7 PccRes 7 PccErr 7
1 : PordNum 7 PshipEmail 71:2:2:2:1;
break ;
case 2:
thisObject.F_ResponseForCcAuthor_$state = PccRes 7 PccErr 7 1 : PordNum 7
PshipEmail 71:2:2:2;
break ;
}
if (thisObject.F_ResponseForCcAuthor_$state == -2) {
thisObject.F_ResponseForCcAuthor_hasResult = true;
thisObject.F_ResponseForCcAuthor_result = false;
info += "Formula F_ResponseForCcAuthor is violated!\n\n";
Log.recordPropertyStatus(info);
return;
}
if (thisObject.F_ResponseForCcAuthor_$state == -1) {
thisObject.F_ResponseForCcAuthor_hasResult = true;
thisObject.F_ResponseForCcAuthor„result = true;
info += "Formula FJResponseForCcAuthor holds!\n\n";
Log.recordPropertyStatus(info);
return;
}
thisObject.F_ResponseForCcAuthor_hasResult = false;
info += "Cannot judge Formula F_ResponseForCcAuthor currently!\n\n";
Log.recordPropertyStatus(info);

private int Model_Com_2_ECompany$C.F_ResponseForCcAuthor_$state = 1;
pointcut ConstructorPointQ: (!within(SAMModel_Component) &&
execution(new(..)));
after(Model_Com_2_ECompany$C thisObject) :
target (thisObject) && ConstructorPointQ {
}
public void Model_Com_2_ECompany$C.generateSummary() {
Log.recordSummary("Composition: name= id= Com_2_ECompany \n");
if ( F_ResponseForCcAuthor_hasResult == false )
Log.recordSummaryC Property F_ResponseForCcAuthor cannot be judged!\n");

220

else {
if ( F_ResponseForCcAuthor_result )
Log.recordSummaryC' Property FJResponseForCcAuthor held!\n");
else
Log.recordSummaryC" Property FJResponseForCcAuthor failed!\n");
}
super .generateSummaryO;
}
}

221

APPENDIX E
RUNTIME CODE FOR CRUISE CONTROL

The generated code for the cruise control contains hundreds of files, we cannot list every
file due to space limit. Following the Aspect] code for the component Cruising.

public aspect Com_Cruising_2MonitorAspect {
pointcut MonitorPointO: (call(void addMessage(String, Object)) ||
call(void removeMessage(String, Object)));
after(Com_Cruising_2$C thisObject) : target(thisObject) && MonitorPointO {
F_Cruising_accl(thisObject);
}
private boolean Com_Cruising_2$C.F_Cruising_accl_hasResult = false;
private boolean Com_Cruising_2$C.F_Cruising_accl_result = false;
public void F_Cruising_accl(Com_Cruising_2$C
thisObject) {
if (thisObject.F_Cruising_accl_hasResult)
return;
String
info = "Formula Cruising.F_Cruising_accl:\n";
boolean PP_C2_o2 = ( thisObject.isMessageContained("C2_o2" ,
"<sl,5®,true,false>") );
info += "\tPP_C2_o2" + "= " + PP_C2_o2 + "\n";
boolean PP_C2_i4 = ( thisObject.isMessageContained("C2_i4" ,
"<sl,5®,true,false>") );
info += "\tPP_C2_i4" +
" + PP_C2_i4 + "\n";
switch(thisObject.F_Cruising_accl_$state) {
case 1:
thisObject.F_Cruising_accl_$state = PP_C2_i4 ? -1 : PP_C2_o2 ? 2 : -1 ;
break ;
case 2:
thisObject.F_Cruising_accl_$state = PP_C2_i4 ? -1 : 2 ;
break ;
}
if (thisObject.F_Cruising_accl_$state — -2) {
thisObject,F_Cruising_accl_hasResult = true;
thisObject.F_Cruising_accl_result = false;
info += "Formula F_Cruising_accl is violated!\n\n";
Log.recordPropertyStatus(info);
return;
}
if (thisObject.F_Cruising_accl_$state == -1) {
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thisObject,F_Cruising_accl_result = true;
info += "Formula F_Cruising_accl holds!\n\n";
Log.recordPropertyStatus(info);
return;
}
thisObject.F_Cruising_accl_hasResult = false;
info += "Cannot judge Formula F_Cruising_accl currently!\n\n";
Log.recordPropertyStatus(info);

private int Com_Cruising_2$C.F_Cruising_accl_$state = 1;
pointcut ConstructorPointO; (!within(SAM_Component) && execution(new(..)));
after(Com_Cruising_2$C thisObject) :
target (thisObject) && ConstructorPointO {
}
public void Com_Cruising_2$C.generateSummary() {
Log.recordSummary("Component: name= Cruising id= Cruising_2 \n");
if ( F_Cruising_accl_hasResult == false )
Log.recordSummaryC Property F_Cruising_accl cannot be judged!\n");
else {
if ( F_Cruising_accl_result )
Log.recordSummaryC' Property F_Cruising_accl held!\n");
else
Log.recordSummaryC Property F_Cruising_accl failed!\n");
}
super.generateSummaryO;
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APPENDIX F
SAM MODEL OF ONLINE SHOPPING SCENARIO

Followings are the SAM model of online shopping scenario. The behavior model of each
component and composition are shown in this appendix.
The first figure (Figure 33) is the whole structure of the SAM model of online shop
ping scenario, which was demonstrated in the Chapter 8. After that several components’
behavior model, such as component User, Cart, Order, are demonstrated.
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<b(prdLC/_61) =< uid, index, prdName, category, price, quantity >
<t>(cartDb) =< uid, index, prdName, category, price, quantity >
QXpartlndex) =< maxlndex >
M$(cartlndex) - ¡0}
= (c[1 ] = x[l] A c[2] = / A c[3] = x[3] A c[4] = x[4] A c[5] = x[5] A c[6] - x[6]
Ax'[l] = x[l]Ax'[2] = iAf =/+l|
7?(4) = M2] == del A 3c € C : c[2] == y[l] A C = C - (c))
Æ(if) = (42] == checkout A (Vc 6 C : 41] == d[2]
Az[l] = 42] A z[2] = 43] A z[3] = <4] A z[4] = 45] A z[5] = 46] A Z = Z U {z}}

Figure 35: Behavior model of Cart component

Q>(prdDb) =< prdName, category, price, quantity >
ORwait-wh) =< uid, wait >
tp{responsedl2) =< uid, prdName, category, price >
Q^request-T) =< uid, req, category >
®(chkoutj) =< uid, “checkout” >
WjmdListJ) =< uid, prdName,category, price,quantity >
<b(payS ucc-7) =< uid, payS tatus >
<S>(shipEmail-.72) =< uid, “ship” >
®(enoughJ8) =< uid,“enough” >
WcancelToWhJ) =< uid,“cancer’ >
R(t7) = 142] == pReq A 43] == d[2] A x[l] = 41] A x[2] = 41] A x[3] = d[2] A x[4] = 43]}
<0) =

== 44 a c[2] == “checkout” A (42] == p[3] A 44 >= p[5] A wi[l] = p[l] A m[2] = enough
Aw[l] = p[l] A w[2] = wait A if [4] = 44] - p[5] A/[l] = <1 ] A <f [2] = d[2] A tf [3] = <3])}

= (c[l] == p[l] A c[2] == “checkout” A (d[2j == p[3] A d[4] >= p[5] A z»[l] = p[ 1] A m[2] = “notenough”
Aw-[1] = p[l] a w[2] = “waif' f\ if [4] = </[4] A <f[1] = 41 ] a tf [2] = 42] A d'[3] = 43]))
R(t2) =

{w[l] == 44 A42] == succ A e[ 1] = w[4 A e[2] = shipEmail}

Figure 36: Behavior model of Warehouse component
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QlprdLCtJV) -< uid,prdName, category,price, quantity >
$>(checkout..8) -< uid, checkout >

$>(ecErr_&2) =< uid,ccErr >
<&(ccRes„$)
uid, ccS talus >
Q>(ccAuthJk2) -< uid, name, ccNum, limit, ccExp, totP >

$>(enough-&) =< uid, enough >
<&(uInfoReqJV2,) =< uid, uReq >

<t>( price) =< uid,totPrice >
tyuInfWail) =< uidjolPrice.wStatus >
<&(ccPre Valid) =< uid, name, ccNum, Unit, ccExp, totPrice >

QRuInfoResJh) =< uid,name,ccNum,limit,ccExp >
fylordGenJk) -< uid, ordGen >
®{payS uccJVJ) -< uid,paySucc >
$>(ordNumJ&2) =< uid, ordNum >
$>(cancelOrdJ$) -< uid, cancel, ordNum >
®(cancelToWhJVl) = < uid, cancel, ordNum, totP >

QHccGet) ~< uid,ccSucc >
<b(ordNumGeri) =< uid,ordNum,totP >
<b{ord[)b) -■< uid, ordNum, totP >
<b{chargeRet-&2) -< uid,ordNum,iolP >

^{hackChBk-Xl) = < uid, cancel, ordNum >

$(/8) = {¿[1] == pl{ 1 ] == A[l]

a/?[2]

--enough Aprfl]

MM AV/ € pi : /?r[2] = £(/[4] */f.5])}

R(t$) = {w[ 1] = pr[ 1 ] A w[2 j = pr[2] A w[3] = wait A wr[ 1 ] ~ z[l] A wr(2] - uReq]
Riti) = {w[l] =

ms[ 1]

A id[ 1 ] ~ wf 1 ] A w'[2] = wi[2] A w’'[3] = »43} A id[4] ~ »44} A w'[5] = w.f[5] A vvz[6] = w’[2])

Ä(/8) = (i{2] =•= ccPass A m/[1]

/[l] A v[ 1] ™ H'*ni

aX2]

~ paySucc A ag[ 1 ] = w-MJ] A og[2] = wr'}6]}

Ä(iJ) ” {°mU] = ogU] A o/w(2] = randomNum A c/[l] ~ og[ 1] A t?/[2] = öm[2] A og'[3] = og[2j A r/[ 1 ] = og[l] A rZ[2] = om[2] A rf[3] = og[2]]
Ä(r®) ~ M2] = “notpass"}
R{t^) = }(/[2] = “ccSucc” A £7?[11 = r[l] A c„[2] ~ f(2])|
R(t%) = {m[2] == cancel A 4M == m[l] A 42] ~~ m[3] A zl[I] = </[l ] A zl[2] = m[2] Ari [3] - w[3 J
Az2[l] = 41 ] A z2[2] = m}2] A z2[3] = m[3]) A z2[4] = 43]}

Figure 37: Behavior model of Order component
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0>(ccAuth3) =< uid, name, ccNum, limit, ccExp, totP >

4>(cStoleri) =< uid, ccNum, stolen >

0>(ccRes32) =< uid, ccStatus >

Q>(cOutlmi) =< uid, ccNum, outlimit >

<&(backCh3) =< uid, cancel, totP >

®>(cExp) =< uid, ccNum, expire >

QXccAuthor) =< name, ccNum, limit, ccExp, totP, status >

Q>(cPass) =< uid, ccNum, true >

R(t3m) = {VaeA: (a[2] == x[3] A a[l] == x[2] A a[6] == stolen A ¿/[I] = x[l] A <2] = x[2] A rf[3] = a[7])}
R}^) = {VaeA: (a[2] == x[3] A a[l] == x[2] A a[3] < x[6] A 41] = x[l] A 42] = x[2] A 43] = "outlimit”)}
R($3) = {VaeA: (a[2] == x[3] A a[l] == x[2] A a[4] < x[5] A 41] = x[l] A <2] = x[2] A 43] = “expire”)}
R(t3M) =(laeA: (a[2] == x[3] A a[l] == x[2] A x[4] == a[3] A x[4] >= x[6]}
A41] = x[l] A 42] = x[2] A 43] = true)
/?(zJ) = {£/'[l] = 41]Aif[2]=43])

«(4) = (c'[1] = c[1]Ac'[2] = c[3])
R«3) =

= 41] A b’[2] = 43])

/?(d) = {/[’] =XU A/[2] = v[3] AZ[1] = Ml] AZ[2] = pay}

Figure 38: Behavior model of PaymentProcess component

tb(backChRetJt) =< uid, ordNum, totP >
^(chargeRet.4) =< uid, ordNum, totP >
^(backChCcM) =< uid, ordNum, totP, cancel >
®>(retaiIerBk) =< uid, ordNum, totP >
R(t%) = {3deD: x[ 1 ] == 41] A x[2] == 42] A x[3] == 43] A O' ~ D ~ {</»
R(O = {/y = DU M)

Figure 39: Behavior model of RetailerBank component

228

VITA

YUJIAN FU

2000-2006

Doctoral Candidate in Computer Science
Florida International University
Miami, Florida
Teaching Assistant
School of Computing and Information Sciences
Florida International University
Miami, Florida

1998-1999

Software Engineer
Everbright Securities, Ltd., Co.
Shenzhen, P.R. China

1994-1997

M.S., Electronic Science
NanKai University
TianJin, P.R.China

1992-1995

B.A., Foreign Language
TianJin Normal University
TianJin, P.R.China

PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS
Y. Fu, Z. Dong, and X. He. A Method for Realizing Software Architecture Design. In
Proceedings of QSIC06: Sixth International Conference on Quality Software. Beijing,
China, October 26 - 28, 2006.
Y. Fu, Z. Dong, and X. He. Validating and Automating Composition of Web Services. In
Proceedings of ICWE06: Sixth International Conference on Web Engineering, pages 217
- 224, Palo Alto, CA, USA, July 10-14, 2006. (Best Paper Nomination)
Y. Fu, Z. Dong, and X. He. An Approach to Web Services Oriented Modeling and Valida
tion. In Proceedings of ICSE06 workshop: The 2006 International Workshop on Service
Oriented Software Engineering, Shanghai, China, May 27-28, 2006.
Y. Fu, Z. Dong, and X. He. An Approach to Validation of Software Architecture Model.
In Proceedings of APSEC05: twelfth Asia-Pacific Software Engineering Conference
(APSEC), December 15-17,2005, TaiPei, Taiwan, China.

229

Y. Fu, Z. Dong, and X. He. Formalizing and Validating UML Architecture Description
of Web Systems. In Proceedings of ICWE06 workshop: Model-Driven Web Engineering
(MDWE’06), Palo Alto, CA, USA, July 10-14, 2006.
Z. Dong, Y. Fu, and X. He. An Integrated Runtime Monitoring Framework for Software
Architecture Model Verification. In Proceedings of The 9th IASTED International Con
ference on Software Engineering and Applications, Phoenix, AZ, USA, pages 106-111,
November 14-16, 2005.
Y. Fu, Z. Dong, and X. He. A Methodology ofAutomated Realization of a Software Archi
tecture Design. In Proceedings of 17th International Conference on Software Engineering
and Knowledge Engineering, pages 412-417. Taipei, Taiwan, July 14-16, 2005.
Z. Dong, Y. Fu, and X. He. Automated Runtime Validation ofSoftware Architecture Design.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3816, pages 446 - 457. 2nd International Con
ference on Distributed Computing & Internet Technology. Bhubaneswar, India. December
22-24, 2005.
Z. Dong, Y. Fu, and X. He. A Framework for Component-based System Modeling. In
Proceedings of SEKE’06: The eighth International Conference on Software Engineering
and Knowledge Engineering, pages 290 - 295, San Francisco Bay, CA, USA, July 5-7,
2006.
Z. Dong, Y Fu, and X. He. Deriving Hierarchical Predicate/Transition Nets from Statechart Diagrams. In proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Software Engi
neering and Knowledge Engineering, pages 150 - 157. San Francisco CA, U.S.A. July 1 3, 2003.
Z. Dong, Y. Fu, and X. He. UML Consistency Checking Through Transformation based
Petri Net Framework. The workshop of Consistency in Model Driven Engineering (CoMoDE), in conjunction with European Conference on Model Driven Architecture, Nurem
berg, Germany. November 7 - 10th, 2005.

230

